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From Chinese National Identity to Taiwanese Consciousness: an Examination of the Cultural Elements in Taiwan's Democratization During the Lee Teng-hui Era and its Legacy, 1988-2004.

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**From Chinese National Identity to Taiwanese Consciousness:
An Examination of the Cultural Elements in Taiwan's
Democratization During the Lee Teng-hui Era and Its Legacy,
1988-2004**

By

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Note on Transliteration

There is no consensus on romanization of Chinese names and terminology and the debate has become ideological in Taiwan since 1998. This thesis adopts in many instances the Taiwanized Wade-Giles transcription, as it remains the most commonly used in Taiwan. However, the official *pinyin* system of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is used for personal and place names pertaining to the PRC, or for concepts, terms and names rendered familiar to Western readers in their *pinyin* transcription. Thus both systems are used in accordance with context. Characters are added in the first instance of use where this is deemed appropriate. As a great proportion of the sources used in this thesis are Taiwanese, when they appear as references they are rarely rendered in their transliterated or character form but are translated into English for convenience.

Summary

This thesis is an investigation of the emergence of democracy and its localized culture in Taiwan during the Lee Teng-hui era and its legacy, from 1988 to 2004. From a Leninist authoritarian system, Taiwan experienced a peaceful transition to representative democracy. The establishment of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in 1986, and President Chiang Ching-kuo's tolerance towards it, had signaled the commencement of Taiwan's democratization. Various political opposition movements existed prior to 1986, especially between 1983 and 1986, indicating a gradual strengthening in the public's political consciousness. The pivotal event to mark the democratization-localization movement in Taiwan was the emergence of a local Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as President of the Republic of China and Chairman of the ruling party, the *Chungkuo Kuomintang* (KMT). This occurred when he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death in 1988. Local politics henceforth emerged as a major force and KMT factional struggles had begun in earnest.

During the democratic transformation that took place in Taiwan in the last quarter of the 20th century, the ruling power of the *Waishengren* (外省人) political elite (that is, the Chinese who took over Taiwan in 1945) gradually transferred to local political leaders, and the suppressed issue of building an independent Taiwanese nation became politicized. Furthermore, the KMT itself was undergoing a far-reaching transformation, moving from liberalization, to democratization, to localization or Taiwanization. As a result, the issues of national recognition and the power redistribution of different national groups (from Chinese "Mainlanders" to local Taiwanese) had combined with

democratization from the beginning.

Democratization was assisted by institution-building through regular elections, an associated critical voice from opposition groups, a solid middle class, and the Taiwanization phenomenon itself. While the experience of colonial rule and an oppressive (rather than reformist) KMT may be said to be in the past, and hence less an impetus for action in the present, yet with the addition of a persistent military threat from People's Republic of China seeking Taiwan's "reunification" with the "motherland", past, present and an anticipated future, combine contextually in the quest for Taiwan's integrity – and hence the acquisition of an identity that is consciously *Taiwanese* rather than *Chinese* by default.

Introduction

In 1945, at the end of Japan's 50-year colonial rule of Taiwan and with the resumption of the Chinese civil war between Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chiang Kai-shek's *Chungkuo Kuomintang* (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party,¹ Taiwan was occupied once again – but this time under the guise of a return to Chinese sovereignty under KMT rule. Communist Party victory in 1949 culminated in the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chiang, maintaining the Republic of China (ROC) in name even if not in reality from his Taiwanese stronghold, swore to retake China.² This did not eventuate. Instead, the inhabitants of Taiwan bore the brunt of oppressive Chinese KMT rule for four decades. This period included the notorious “228 Incident” (also known as the February 28th Incident) and the “white terror” of the secret police.³ These historical themes are examined in Chapters 1 and 2. Large-scale political transformation culminating in democratization finally took place

¹ In this thesis, “Chinese” is used in front of KMT or Nationalist Party as this is the correct name, a practice not commonly observed in English language renditions of the party's name. This is a significant issue from the point of view of this thesis because it reflects on identity, and on the shift to Taiwanese consciousness during the Lee Teng-hui era, as demonstrated in discussions to drop “Chinese” in the party's name. (See Huang, Tai-lin. “KMT Is Split on ‘Chinese’ in Its Name.” *Taipei Times*. May 16th 2004.)

² Today, the Republic of China controls only Taiwan and its immediate islands of Penghu (the Pescadores), Kinmen and Matsu – a total area of 36,000 square kilometers, with the main island of Taiwan lying some 160 kilometres off the southeast coast of China. Unlike the authoritarian past under Chiang Kai-shek, the ROC is a constitutional democracy, with a system of checks and balances. The five highest organs of the central government (led by the ROC president) and the National Assembly (that can amend the constitution and impeach the president) administer the country. The five organs are the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuan. The Executive Yuan is the cabinet and is headed by the premier. The Legislative Yuan formulates the laws. The Judicial Yuan runs the courts and oversees civil, criminal, and administrative cases. The Examination Yuan manages the civil services, including its selection by examination. The Control Yuan is the highest watchdog organ of state and has the power to impeach, censure and audit. The president is the country's highest representative. Prior to 1996 he was elected by the National Assembly. Since March 1996, the president has been popularly elected.

³ Chao, Linda & Ramon H. Myers. *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 169. ; Wu, Zhuo-liu. *Wu Hua Kuo*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1988, p. 187; Wu, Zhuo-liu. *Taiwan Lian-qiao*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1989, pp. 220-221.

after the first local president, Lee Teng-hui, was sworn in. As a consequence, post-Civil War ambitions to retake the Mainland were abandoned. This was evident in the First National Assembly, better known as the “Forever National Assembly” (*Wan Nien Kuo Hui*, 萬年國會), with aged Representatives chosen in Mainland China and representing the Mainland Provinces, resigning at the end of 1991. Re-elections were held shortly after. This topic in conjunction with theories of transition to democracy and analyses of authoritarian rule are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

On March 23rd 1996, despite the PRC's missile tests in the Taiwan Strait and military threats to attack Taiwan if Lee Teng-hui was elected president, Lee asked the people of Taiwan to use their ballots as a protest to the PRC. Over three-quarters (76 percent) of voters participated in the first direct presidential election, and gave Lee 54 percent of total support among four candidates.⁴ Significantly, Lee Teng-hui was not only the first president popularly elected in Taiwan, but also in the history of the “Greater China” region (comprising PRC, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan). These developments and their implications are investigated in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Chapters 8 and 9 take their cue from a second milestone in Taiwan's democratization and “Taiwanization”: on March 18th 2000, the Chinese KMT that had been in power for more than 50 years in Taiwan was defeated by the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Chen Shui-bian. Remarkably, the Chinese KMT, as well as the other contenders - the People First Party (PFP, *Ching Ming Dong*, 親民黨) and the New Party (*Shing*

⁴ Ruan, Ming. “Peaceful Revolution Under the Missiles” (Preface). In Ruan, Ming, Lin Ruo-si, Zhu Zheng-bang and Lu Jia-ling. *Ming Chu Zai Tai Wan (Democracy in Taiwan)*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, p. v.

Dong, 新黨) - accepted electoral defeat without recourse to violence. In actuality, the votes won jointly by the Chinese KMT and the PFP, which had split from the Chinese KMT, had surpassed those of the DPP. Despite their appeal to different constituencies, neither the Chinese KMT nor the PFP had used its influence to obstruct the establishment of the new political order. This further demonstrates the maturation of a democratic political culture in Taiwan and is well illustrated by the categorization of Taiwan vis-à-vis the PRC in the rankings of the US human rights organization, *Freedom House*, which published a report on its investigation of each country's degree of freedom and democracy from 2000 to 2001.⁵ It divided all countries into three grades, the first being "fully free countries", the second, "partly free countries", and the third grade comprised "countries without freedom". Taiwan was listed in the first grade of the "fully free countries", along with nations such as the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Germany. By contrast, China was listed in the third grade of the "countries without freedom", together with nations such as Rwanda and Cameroon.

On the other hand, those opposed to Lee Teng-hui condemned him for helping Chen Shui-bian to win the presidential election, and terminating the ruling power of the Chinese KMT. In this regard it should be noted that during the elections, despite the KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan having betrayed local feeling or "Taiwanese consciousness" (*Taiwan yishi lunbian*, 台灣意識) as promoted by Lee Teng-hui, Lee had still campaigned strongly for him. Still, Taiwan's democratic processes and the voters' wishes had overtaken Lee's views. An activist group of intellectuals and

⁵ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2000-2001." <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/index.htm>; Ruan, Ming, Lin Ruo-si, Zhu Zheng-bang and Lu Jia-ling. *Ming Chu Zai Tai Wan* (Democracy in Taiwan). Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, p. 38.

entrepreneurs - including winner of the Nobel prize for physics, Lee Yuan-je, the president of Chi-mei Corporation, Su Wen-long, and the president of Taiwan High Speed Railway, Ying Chi - pointed out that the implication of Taiwan successfully changing the ruling political party by democratic means was that it could thereby also change a political culture of gangsterism and corruption, as well as disagree with the pro-China groups.⁶ As a result, the democratic system is applauded for rectifying what was viewed as Lee Teng-hui's final mistake, endorsing the KMT's presidential candidate Lien Chan, despite Lee's earlier productive work of indigenizing the KMT.

Democratization and Taiwanization in the period under Lee Teng-hui reveal a strong cultural component in which the inter-penetrating elements of identity, history and politics have molded a sense of nation separate from that of China. Numerous works, such as those of Stephane Corcuff,⁷ Maysing H. Yang,⁸ Hong-mao Tien, Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner,⁹ have covered the question of national identity in Taiwan, with its political, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions, as well as Taiwan's democratic transformations. In addition, Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang's *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era*,¹⁰ addresses the cultural elements in Taiwan's

⁶ Ruan, Ming. "Lee Teng-hui's Double Personality." *Chengming Magazine*, Hong Kong, June 2000, pp. 28-36.

⁷ Corcuff, Stephane. *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002.

⁸ Yang, Maysing H. *Taiwan in the Modern World -- Taiwan's Expanding Role in the International Arena*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1997.

⁹ Tien, Hung-mao, Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner. *The Opportunities and Challenges of a Newly Rising Democracy*. Chang Yung-Fa Foundation Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, 1997.

¹⁰ Lee, Wei-chin and T. Y. Wang (eds.). *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2003.

democratization; nevertheless, the work resembles a collection of conference papers, and lacks sustained, in-depth research. As a result, this thesis is aimed at rectifying this omission and hence contributing to this field of endeavor. The Lee Teng-hui era encapsulates the transition from the dominance of Chinese identity claims to those of Taiwanese through the emergence of democracy and its localized culture in Taiwan. As indicated in Chapter 5, during the Lee era the percentages of people who identified themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese had reversed position with Taiwanese overtaking Chinese as a designation of identity.

The issue of identity is crucial to understanding its bearing on politics and, indeed, the bearing of politics on the forging of identity – which in turn has even led to the suggestion of the emergence of a “newly arisen nationality”.¹¹ It is thus pertinent to note from the outset Taiwan's four designated “ethnic”¹² groupings, three of which are *Han* Chinese originally from the Mainland. The view that *Han* Chinese can be separated into different ethnicities is a feature of Taiwanese political culture that enables the argument of separation (such as “state-to-state” relations, discussed in this thesis) find ideational support.

The first ethnic grouping is the Aborigines: the Pingpu (or Makato-Siraya) and nine other tribes, who have lived in Taiwan for over two thousand years.¹³ The indigenous

¹¹ Opposition leader Hsu Hsin-liang asserted this in 1995. See Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, p. 6; Tu, Weiming. “Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan.” *The China Quarterly*. No. 148, December 1996, p. 1128; Schubert, Gunter. “A New Rising Nation? – The Discourse on National Identity in Contemporary Taiwan.” 1998, <http://www.inprnet.org.tw/inpre/cefc6.htm>

¹² On the use of different terminology, such as “ethnic identity” and “national-ethnic identity”, see Liu, I-chou and Ho Szu-yin. “The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwanese People.” *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1999, pp. 2-5.

¹³ Huang, Chao-tang. *The Story of Taiwan Independence & Nation-Building Alliance*. Avanguard,

tribes now form approximately two percent of Taiwan's population of 23 million. Thus the great majority of Taiwanese are, as noted, *Han* people. Most moved to Taiwan in the Ming (1368-1644) and Ching (1644-1911) dynasties, with the largest influx occurring in the 17th century. "Push" factors included escape from the oppressive rule of the Manchus, population pressure, and a shortage of farmland. If their migration is dated at 1624, when the Dutch occupied Taiwan, it has been some 380 years since the early migrations. The largest of the early immigrant groups are Hokkien or Holo¹⁴ speakers, having come from southern Fukien (Fujian) province. These people constitute approximately 70 percent of Taiwan's current population and form the second of the four ethnic groupings. The third grouping, also referred to as "Taiwanese" are their fellow *Han* immigrants, the Hakka. They represent a minority of 10 to 15 percent of the population. Hakka's origins are disputed as they engaged in migration for some 1,500 years. Thus the term "Hakka" means "guest" in Cantonese, as they eventually settled in Cantonese-speaking southern China, after migrating south from central or northern China.

Besides the Holo and Hakka *Han* Chinese who migrated to the island almost four centuries ago, a new wave of immigrants came to Taiwan from Mainland China after 1945. These, comprising Taiwan's fourth ethnic grouping and representing some 15 percent of the population, have commonly been called the *Waishengjen*, meaning people from outer provinces. The term is peculiar to Taiwan and designates the

Taipei, 2000, p. 2; Wang, Yu-de. *Taiwan – The Distressed History*. The Independent Newspaper Publishing Co., Taipei, 1993, pp. 93-96; Corcuff, Stephane. "The Symbolic Dimension of Democratization and the Transition of National Identity Under Lee Teng-hui." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 86-87.

¹⁴ This is a Minnan dialect. "Holo" is the preferred expression in Taiwanese. In Mandarin it is written as "Helao", "Heluo", and "Falao". It is also commonly transliterated as "Hoklo".

“Mainlanders” who arrived between 1945, when Japan’s defeat resulted in the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China, and 1955 when the island of Dachen fell to the Chinese Communists and Republican Chinese were evacuated.¹⁵ The identity shift from the “*orthodoxy*” of “*Chinese identity*”¹⁶ – characterized by the one-party authoritarian elite formed by the Chinese *Waishengjen* – to the more heterodox, multi-party minded “New Taiwanese”¹⁷ (inclusive of all four groupings) in the Lee Teng-hui era is developed in this thesis.

In Taiwan, “ethnicity” is not only often determined by dialect and place of origin but especially by shared perception of identity,¹⁸ and identity is similarly not only a matter of ancestry and tradition, but also of self-identification through social – inclusive of political – experience. This is dynamic and malleable and includes the influence of national identity formation.¹⁹ Frederick Barth regards ethnicity as a social construction

¹⁵ On the use of the term *Waishengjen* in Taiwan’s ethnic landscape, see Corcuff, Stephane. “Taiwan’s ‘Mainlanders,’ New Taiwanese?” In Corcuff, Stephane (ed.). *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 163-195. By comparison, the *Waishengjen* or Mainlanders saw themselves as citizens of China, not “people from outside the province”; while many of those who were the opposite of *Waishengjen*, that is, *Benshengjen* (“from within the province”), did not wish to give the impression of Taiwan being a Chinese province and so called themselves *Bendijen* (“people of this land”). (See Laliberte, Andre. “Democratic Transition and Cultural Diversity.” In Henders, Susan J. (ed.). *Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*. Lexington Books, Lanham, Maryland, 2004, p. 158.)

¹⁶ Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.). *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*. M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1994, p. 356.

¹⁷ “New Taiwanese” was first proposed in a speech in January 1995. See Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999, p. 62; Lee, Teng-hui. “Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap.” *Foreign Affairs*. November-December 1999; Liu, I-chou and Ho Szu-yin, 1999; Corcuff, 2002, ch. 8.

¹⁸ See Corcuff, *ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁹ See Brown, Melissa J. *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004. Henders, 2004, p. 5, defines ethnic groups as “collectivities centred on contested, shifting claims to a shared cultural identity, broadly defined, whether based on language, religion or other beliefs and customs, lineage, history, territory, or way of life”.

in which the group defines a border with others through “ascription” and “self-ascription”.²⁰ The various ways in which people think of ethnicity is important when dealing with the notion of “Chinese”. For example, it can be understood as pertaining to ancestry (the common ascription of “descendents of the Yellow Emperor”) or to culture (Confucian values and sinicization). If ancestry is taken as the key variable, then Chinese claims on Taiwanese can take on a certain historical determinism. Similarly, Taiwanese nationalists have used mixed marriages with Aborigines to engage the ancestry argument on their terms.

On the other hand, the socio-cultural-political creation of ethnicity is far more fluid. China has used both for national purposes – *Han* Chinese on Taiwan are deemed historically Chinese; however national minorities like the Tibetans are also Chinese through national-cultural absorption in a multi-ethnic state.

The notion of nationalism for China has long had a strong cultural component: political nationalism that centers on the state does not easily separate from cultural nationalism that depends on culture and morality.²¹ Cultural nationalism, or “culturalism”, has long been a refined art in China, as Reischauer and Fairbank have observed:

... the Chinese state was regarded as coterminous with Chinese culture. The spread of

²⁰ See Barth, Fredrik (ed.). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, p. 15; Barth, Fredrik. “Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity.” In Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (eds.). *The Anthropology of Ethnicity*. Het Spinois, Amsterdam, 1994.; Corcuff, 2002, pp. 167-168.

²¹ On the distinction, see Hutchinson, John. *Modern Nationalism*. Fontana Press, London, 1994, ch. 2, following on from Hans Kohn's traditional typology of two forms of nationalism: the political and rational (found in the West), and the cultural and mystical (found in Eastern Europe and Asia). (Kohn, Hans. *The Idea of Nationalism*. Macmillan, New York, 1946, discussed in Hutchinson, *ibid.*, pp. 48-49.)

one carried the other with it. In Chinese thinking they were not distinguished. In Chinese "culturalism" there was such a close identification of the entire way of life with the unified empire that the one implied the other.²²

It is to be concluded that ethnicity is a politically charged proposition²³ and that, from the investigations of this thesis, it will be found that Taiwanese consciousness overtakes Chinese nationalism during the democratic transition in the Lee Teng-hui era. Until now, this widely remarked social phenomenon has not been singled out for doctoral study in its own right and within the period of Taiwan's first locally-born president.

Chapter One

The Transition from an Authoritarian System to Democratization

²² Reischauer, Edwin O. and John K. Fairbank. *East Asia: The Great Tradition*. 8th ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970, p. 293.

²³ It was, after all, Max Weber, who said that it is "primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity", even though Weber seemed to infer "historical memory" rather than "political bases for determining ethnic identities" (Henders, 2004, pp. 6, 19). In China's case, historical memory *is* a political basis for identity.

When the Chinese *Kuomintang* officially moved to Taiwan from Mainland China in 1949, it had established the so-called modern one-party authoritarian system. Through this system, the leader manipulated the party mechanism, and controlled the civil, political, and ruling sectors of society. When President Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded as the new authoritarian leader of the Chinese KMT. Even though the reputation and power of the new leadership was not as strong as the previous one, the succession process had proceeded smoothly. Henceforth, the authoritarian system focused on transformations in the fields of economic development and social mobility. These two accomplishments had reinforced local economic power and increased the demand for Taiwanese people's participation in politics.²⁴

The impossibility of counterattacking the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and recovering Mainland China, the large local Taiwanese population (16.1 million),²⁵ and the gradual increase in socio-economic power locally, challenged the *Waishengjen* (the Chinese who took over Taiwan in 1945) ruling elite. Under this condition, localization or 'Taiwanization' had become inevitable, and the conduct of elections had been upgraded from the local to the central government. Thus the elections for filling the vacant seats of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan

²⁴ Gold, Thomas. *The State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. Sharpe, New York, 1986, Ch. 5; Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (Vol. 4): Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin. Taipei, 1998, p. p. 26-27.

²⁵ Ministry of the Interior. April 16th 2004, Republic of China (Taiwan). <http://www.moi.gov.tw/moi/index.asp>; MSN. "The Introduction of Taiwan – Advantage of Marketing." January 22nd 2004. <http://advantage.msn.com.hk/flattened/2CD07C1A-44A8-42E9-9A41-FDA7CA4A16D3.asp>; Dong, Chou-shen. "2002 Taiwan Social Review." china.com.cn <http://202.130.245.40/gate/big5/www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/262279.htm>

were held in 1969, and elections for additional seats were held in 1972. Representatives who had never been re-elected after the Chinese KMT moved to Taiwan faced a great challenge, and the legitimacy of the authoritarian system was seriously questioned.²⁶

With advances in economic, social, and educational opportunities, a middle class emerged. At the same time, local Taiwanese of the second generation, between the ages of 35 and 45, stood for election.²⁷ The so-called “democratic vacation” that occurred during the period of elections had temporarily overcome the prevailing authoritarian rule and helped develop an appreciation of democratic values and political participation.²⁸ This chapter discusses the decline and transformation of the authoritarian system; the first opposition party – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); the transition of power to the first Taiwanese President, Lee Teng-hui; the power structure of politics; and the transformation to, and development of, democratization.

An emerging consciousness of “renovation and protecting Taiwan” supported by economic and social resources

²⁶ Chiou, C. L. *Democratizing Oriental Despotism. China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 78-89; Jacobs, J. Bruce. “Chinese Nationalist Politics in Taiwan under the Two Chiangs.” *Modern Taiwan in the 1990s*. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, 1991, p. 17.; Lee, Siao-fon. *Forty Years of Taiwanese Democratic Movements*, The Independent Evening Newspaper Publishing Company, Taipei, 1988, pp. 251-252; Clark, Cal. “Lee Teng-hui and the Emergence of a Competitive Party System in Taiwan.” In Lee, Wei-chin and T. Y. Wang (eds.). *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era. Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2003, pp. 91-112.

²⁷ Gold, 1986, ch. 5; Hu, 1998, pp. 26-27; Chiou & Jacobs & Lee, *ibid*.

²⁸ Chiou, 1995, pp. 78-89; Jacobs, 1991, p. 17; Lee, 1988, pp. 251-252.

Since October 1971, when the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations (UN) upon the PRC's admission to the world body, Taiwan became isolated diplomatically. Japan broke off diplomatic ties with the ROC in July 1972, and many countries followed. In January 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan as well. Consequently, the authoritarian system's final goal of recovering Mainland China could not be maintained and a sense of insecurity pervaded society. Thus public opinion gradually moved towards a view of renovating and protecting Taiwan. Liberal intellectuals agitated for democratic reforms - such as the termination of martial law, the return to constitutional rule, and subjecting the delegates of the National Assembly to the electoral process – thereby denting the legitimacy of the Chinese KMT authoritarian rule.²⁹

On the other hand, the “Ten Great Constructions”³⁰ supported by President Chiang Ching-kuo had brought economic prosperity, social liberalism and mobility, and strengthened the resources of the civil and political societies. When these resources combined with an emergent Taiwanese consciousness,³¹ that promoted political participation, the system of open and free elections had become the most systematic

²⁹ Cheng, Tun-jen & Haggard, Stephen. “Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative perspectives.” In Cheng, Tun-jen & Stephen Haggard (eds.). *Political Change in Taiwan*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1992, pp. 1-32; Ting, Tin-yu. “Socio-cultural Developments in the Republic of China.” *Democracy and Development in East Asia. Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines*. The AEI Press, Washington, D. C. 1991, pp. 75-90; Lu, Ya-li. “Political Developments in the Republic of China.” *Democracy and Development in East Asia. Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines*. The AEI Press, Washington, D. C. 1991, pp. 35-48.

³⁰ The “Ten Great Constructions” are Tai-chung Port, Su-ao Port, Tao-yuan Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek) Airport, North-bound Railway, Chong-shan Highway, Railway Electrification, Nuclear Power Generating Factory, Kao-shiong Shipbuilding Yard, Kao-shiong Steel Refinery, Petroleum and Chemistry Industry.

³¹ Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, pp. 43, 198 & 215; Siao, 1999, p. 57; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Liberal Times*. June 3rd 1997, p. 5.

and lawful method of attracting political participation. It also held hope of stabilizing the political situation by redistributing power more evenly across local, provincial, and central governmental levels. Localization was thereby reinforced and, under the auspices of the electoral mechanism, the structure of authoritarian rule gradually declined.³²

The regularity of free and open elections at every level came to be equated with the legal system that could best represent popular opinion. The dilemma for the KMT governing regime was that it was ceding power to democratic processes but at the same time it dared not stop holding elections lest its symbolic legitimacy should collapse and societal chaos ensue. Concurrently, opposition forces entered the elections to win legitimate support from the public. Under this consideration, both government and the opposition groups needed the electoral mechanism, since it not only impacted on KMT rule, but also brought the opposition groups into systematic competition. Consequently, the authoritarian system transformed gradually without recourse to violence.

A government ban on forming political parties was broken on September 28th 1986, when the *tangwai* (outside the party – later the opposition) announced the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party.³³ Even though the government

³² Gold, 1986, ch. 8; Hu, 1998, p. 28.

³³ The opposition or local/family factions, includes many political groups from all over Taiwan. For example, Yu Deng-fa of Kaohsiung County, Hsu Shih-hsien of Chia-yi City, Su Tung-chi of Yun-lin County, Hsu Hsing-lian of Tao-yuan County, and the independent opposition leaders, such as Huang Hsin-jie, Kang Ning-hsing of Taipei City, and Kuao Yu-hsing of I-lan County. See Domes, Jurgen. "Political Differentiation in Taiwan: Group Formation within the Ruling Party and the Opposition Circles, 1979-1980." *Asian Survey*. Vol. 21, No. 10, 1981, pp. 1011-1028; Lu, 1991, pp. 35-48; Ting, 1991, pp. 75-90; Chao, Linda & Ramon H. Myers. *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the*

had pointed out that the DPP was illegal, President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to tolerate it in order to avoid provoking political tensions in a climate ripe for democratization. Chiang Ching-kuo had seen the democratic developments of localization, and thought that it had become increasingly difficult to sustain authoritarian rule, to find succession to authoritarian leadership, and to maintain a Chinese-led political structure. Consequently, the government had to correspond with the gradual progress of localization. The transition to democracy was inevitable.³⁴

From 1987, Taiwan's political transformation and democratization became apparent. It came on the heels of four decades of authoritarian rule by a Chinese Mainland party, which moved to Taiwan because of circumstances external to Taiwan – a civil war between ideological rivals for the government of China.³⁵ When President Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13th 1988, his presidency and Chinese KMT party chairmanship transferred to Vice President Lee Teng-hui, who was appointed by Chiang to be his successor. Chiang had the foresight to realize that political stability was now premised on the perception that localization was well underway. Lee Teng-hui became the first Taiwanese president after a century marked by Japanese colonization and the two Chiangs' (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo) one-party authoritarianism. As a result, Lee was particularly supported and respected by Taiwanese politicians, not only local party members of the Chinese KMT but also the

Republic of China on Taiwan. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 5.

³⁴ Copper, John F. *A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China*. Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C. 1988, pp. 123-168; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 81-85; Siao, Hsing-huang. *United Daily News*. July 2nd & 3rd 1999, pp. 3 & 5.

³⁵ See Hu, 1998, pp. 13-14; Winckle, Edwin A. "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" *The China Quarterly*. Sep. 1984, No. 99, pp. 481-499.

opposition. This became known as the “Lee Teng-hui complex”. An opinion poll conducted in 1992 revealed that 39.7 percent of people in Taiwan agreed that since Lee was the first Taiwanese President, he should receive “unconditional” support.³⁶

Transformation and development of democratization

In July 1987, martial law was lifted and prohibitions on forming political parties were removed. In January 1988, the bans on newspaper publications were liberalized. After the first local president succeeded the Chinese KMT Chairmanship on January 27th 1988, the entire authoritarian system led by Chiang Ching-kuo had changed fundamentally in structure. In August 1993, the majority of the elected Central Executive Delegates and Central General Delegates were Taiwanese. In addition, within the five Yuans,³⁷ the posts of President of the Executive Yuan (usually referred to as the premier), President of the Legislative Yuan, President of the Judicial Yuan, and President of the Examination Yuan, had all be taken by Taiwanese; only the President of the Control Yuan continued to be held by *Waishengjen*.³⁸

Although the Chinese KMT had still kept its original organizational structure, it had localized, and completely given up its initial objective of counterattacking the Chinese

³⁶ Chen, Su-ling. “No Matter What He Does, Nearly Forty Percent of People Will Still Give Firm Support to Him.” *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, March 23rd 1992, p. 1; Peng, Huai-en. *The Fifty Years of Taiwan's Political Transition*. Feng-yun, Taipei, 1997, p. 42.

³⁷ See footnote 2 on the five Yuans.

³⁸ Hu, 1998, pp. 30-31; Office of the President Republic of China. “Government Organizations.” http://www.president.gov.tw/1_roc_intro/e_struct.html.

Communist Party and recovering Mainland China. This produced power struggles between the mainstream faction led by Chairman Lee Teng-hui that mainly comprised Taiwanese, and the non-mainstream faction led by the previous *Waishengjen* leading figures. The internal arguments and opposition changed the original authoritarian structure of the ruling party. The first split within the Chinese KMT occurred when the members of the New KMT Alliance left the Chinese KMT and set up the "New Party". In contrast, Lee Teng-hui established the Taiwanese elite at the center of the party structure; he promoted a local nationalism in Taiwan, and become the new authoritarian leader of the Chinese KMT. In fact, the Chinese KMT had turned into another form of authoritarian party, which influenced the development of democratic politics.³⁹

In 1989, due to strong pressure and protest from students and the public, who were influenced by the Tiananmen crackdown, all senior Delegates of the "Forever National Assembly", who were chosen in Mainland China in 1947 before the KMT moved to Taiwan, finally agreed to President Lee Teng-hui's advice that they should resign; the entire National Assembly was re-elected for the first time at the end of 1989. In 1992, all senior Delegates of the Legislative Yuan, who were chosen in Mainland China before the KMT moved to Taiwan, also resigned and the re-elections were conducted in Taiwan at the end of 1992. The DPP won a victorious battle in the 1992 legislative elections, thereby further inducing the government structure to democratize and localize.⁴⁰

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Moody, Jr. Peter R. *Political Change on Taiwan. A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability*. Praeger, New York, 1992, p. 29; Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan. *Annual Review of Government Administration, Republic of China, 1986*. Taipei, 1987, p. 31; Chang, Hui-ying. *Lee Teng-hui 1988-2000 Twelve Years in Power*. T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), 2000, p. 9; Hu, 1998,

As indicated in Table 1, independent social and political opposition movements emerged in 1983, and increased from 143 in that year to 676 in 1987, demonstrating civil society's greater liberalization and autonomy.⁴¹ For example, the consumers' rights movements, the anti-pollution protest movements, the conservation movement, the women's movement, the aboriginal human rights movement, the students' movement, the new testament church protests, the labor movement, the farmers' movement, the teachers' rights movement, the handicapped and disadvantaged welfare group protests, the veterans welfare protests, the human rights movement, the *Waishengjen's* home-visiting movement, the Taiwanese home-visiting movement, the anti-nuclear power movement, the Hakka rights movement, and the non-homeowners' "Shell-less Snail" movement.⁴² As presented in Table 2, the political, environmental, economic, and labor protests were the four main types of social protest that had emerged.

Table 1: Reported Frequencies of Social Protest Incidence in Taiwan, 1983-1987

Year	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Total
Frequency	143	183	243	271	676	1,516
Growth rate	--	28.0%	32.8%	11.5%	149.4%	

p. 31.

⁴¹ Chu, Yuan-han. "Social Protests and Political Democratization in Taiwan." *Taiwan in the Modern World. The Other Taiwan, 1945 to the Present*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 1994, pp. 99-113; Chu, Yun-han. *The National Taiwan University Political Science Quarterly Review*. Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 65-88.

⁴² Chu, 1994, pp. 99-113; Chu, 1990, pp. 65-88.

Source: Chu, Yun-han. *The National Taiwan University Political Science Quarterly Review*. Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1990, pp. 65-88.

Table 2: Reported Frequencies of Social Protest Incidence in Taiwan by Type of Issue, 1983-1987

Issue	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	Total	%
Political							
Frequency	5	4	20	35	106	170	11.2%
Growth rate	-	-20%	400%	75%	202.9%		
Environmental							
Frequency	43	61	34	78	167	383	25.3%
Growth rate	-	41.9%	-44.3%	129.4%	114.1%		
Economic							
Frequency	57	72	89	101	257	576	38.0%
Growth rate	-	26.3%	23.6%	13.5%	154.5%		
Labor							
Frequency	20	37	85	38	63	243	16.0%
Growth rate	-	85%	129.7%	-55.3%	65.8%		
Other							
Frequency	18	9	15	19	83	144	9.5%
Growth rate	-	-50%	66.7%	26.7%	336.8%		

Source: Chu, Yuan-han. "Social Protests and Political Democratization in Taiwan." *Taiwan in the Modern World. The Other Taiwan, 1945 to the Present*. M.E. Sharpe,

New York, 1994, p.100.

Next, as shown in Table 3, the votes that the DPP and the independent candidates won in the legislative elections, had increased from 16.68 percent in 1983 to 31.86 percent in 1992, a rise of 15.18 percent.⁴³ By contrast, the votes that were received by the Chinese KMT, had dropped from 72.86 percent in 1983 to 60.50 percent in 1992, a fall of 12.36 percent.⁴⁴ This signaled the gradual emergence of a two-party political system.

Table 3: The Distribution of Popular Votes in the 1983, 1986, 1989, and 1992 Legislative Yuan Elections

	1983	1986	1989	1992
KMT	72.86	69.06	60.60	60.50
DPP	16.68	22.22	28.20	31.86
Other parties	-	-	-	1.92

⁴³ Chu, Yun-han & Tien, Hung-mao. "Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms, Institutional Change and Power Realignment." In Klintworth, Gary (ed.). *Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s*. Allen & Unwin, ANU, Canberra, 1994, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Independent	10.48	8.72	11.20	5.72
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Source: Central Election Commission, the Executive Yuan

Conclusion

Through the elections, social and political power had weakened the authoritarian system originally led by the *Waishengjen*. The socio-political phenomenon of Taiwanese consciousness was projected onto President Lee, and created the “Lee Teng-hui complex”. It recognized that a local person should take the country’s leadership, and he or she should hold effective power. Therefore, stabilizing the constitutional system in order to create a legitimate basis for elections was important for building democracy. Chapter 2 will examine the crucial role of the electoral system. Even though it was primarily adopted by the Chinese KMT as a device for winning support and legitimacy from Taiwanese, it had developed into a mechanism for diminishing the Chinese KMT authoritarian system, and promoting localization and democratic transformation.

Chapter Two

Elections and the Politics of Terror

It is not so much elections that weaken authoritarian rule but, in the case of Taiwan at

least, social change made possible by elections. Thus the electoral system is the major political mechanism to promote social change in Taiwan, and social change has become the main contributing factor to weaken authoritarian rule and advance democratic transformation.⁴⁵ In a society's political expression, democracy means that people have the freedom of choosing the government under competitive elections, and can influence the government's policymaking through various modes of participation. In a civil society, democracy is the freedom that people possess when dealing with the country's individuals and society; under the democratic structure, the governing authority is in charge of dividing rights and balancing power. The political system that only has partial and limited democracy cannot be called democratic. For example, after 1949, the elections held in Taiwan had been partial and limited. Nonetheless, they created the political *mechanism* and provided the function of *advocacy* towards change.⁴⁶ The *motive* for change includes society's rejection of the oppressive consequences of authoritarian rule – especially those that target the local population by acts of state terror. This chapter investigates the impacts of the “228 (February 28th) Incident” and the “white terror” towards the local people, as well as the influence of limited elections. Voting patterns and the importance of candidates' national identity (that is, Mainland Chinese or local Taiwanese) are also analyzed. In this way, this chapter shows how the process of democratization was being fuelled by the motive of “Taiwanization” which, in turn, was heightened by oppressive rule against the local

⁴⁵ See Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (Vol. 4): Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 35.

⁴⁶ Jacobs, J. Bruce. “Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative politics.” *Politics*, No. 13 (November 1978), pp. 239-247; Moody, Jr. Peter R. *Political Change on Taiwan. A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability*. Praeger, New York, 1992, pp. 4-9; Hu, Fo. “The Myth and Practice of Democratic Politics.” *Conference of a Chinese Democratic Future*. Times Culture and Education Foundation, 1989; Hu, 1998, p. 36.

Taiwanese population.

The 228 Incident

Since the Chinese KMT moved to Taiwan from Mainland China it faced the challenge of how to win political legitimacy after Japanese colonization.⁴⁷ Even though the Japanese authorities had been strict in their rule of the Taiwanese population, their officers and constabulary had followed the stipulated rules and regulations of conduct. By contrast, the newly arrived *Waishengjen* soldiers, policemen, and officials had been corrupt, disorderly, and incompetent, thereby causing deterioration in Taiwan's social order.⁴⁸ For example, the quarantine system of contagious diseases had collapsed. Cholera, which had been eliminated in 1920, became rampant again. With social discipline declining, people became dissatisfied. Posters appeared with the message: "The dogs [Japanese] just ran out of the island, but the pigs [*Waishengjen*] have come!"; and "The dogs at least know how to safeguard the doors, but the pigs only know how to eat and sleep!"⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See Chao, Linda & Ramon H. Myers. *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Long, Simon. *Taiwan: China's Last Frontier*. Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 55-65; The Executive Yuan. "The Uprising of 28 February 1947 on Taiwan: The Official 1992 Investigation Report." *China Information*, VII-4, Spring 1993, Taipei, pp. 1-19; Chiou, C. L. "The 1990 National Affairs Conference and the Future of Democracy in Taiwan." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*. Vol. 25, No. 1, January-March 1991, pp. 17-33.

⁴⁹ Liao, Ping-hui. "Rewriting Taiwanese National History: The February 28 Incident as Spectacle." *Public Culture*. No. 5, 1993, pp. 281-296; Lin, Tsung-yi. "Confrontation or Conflict Resolution? Part 1: Violent Oppressors versus Miserable Survivors." *February 28th Incident 50th Anniversary International Academic Research Conference*, February 24-27, Taipei, 1997; Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Taiwan: The Democratization of a Divided Nation*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1994, p. 69; Edmondson, Robert. "The February 28 Incident and National Identity." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for*

The intellectuals had begun writing criticisms of the *Waishengjen* officials who, in turn, condemned the Taiwanese for their Japanese education. This had deepened the divide between the two groups. It was under such circumstances that the “228 Incident” occurred.⁵⁰ The incident itself was instigated by a comparatively minor matter, but the crisis behind it was much greater. On February 27th 1947, a local widow selling “black market” cigarettes on Taipei’s Yen-Ping North Road had been hit violently by several *Waishengjen* officers of the Monopoly Bureau, who were responsible for seizing smuggled cigarettes. Later on the same day, those officers argued with witnesses who sympathized with the widow, and shot dead one of the witnesses. According to the defense minister at that time, Bai Chong-si, the incident was caused by the *Waishengjen* officers, who did not have enough money to buy alcohol during their meals, and so wanted the local widow to give them cigarettes to smoke.⁵¹

As to why cigarettes were sold on the illegal or black market, it should be noted that after the Chinese KMT took over Taiwan the quality of cigarettes produced by their Monopoly Bureau had been poor and hence difficult to sell. Foreign cigarettes had been secretly imported to meet the demand. In an ironic twist, it was reported those *Waishengjen* officers of the Monopoly Bureau who attacked the widow and shot a

a *New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p.27.

⁵⁰ Wu, 1972, pp. 165-166; Wu, Zhuo-liu. *Wu Hau Kuo*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1988, p. 187; Wu, Zhuo-liu. *Taiwan Lian-qiao*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1989, pp. 220-221.

⁵¹ Lee, Siao-fon. *Taiwan's Public Representatives in the Early Days After the War*. The Independent Evening Newspaper Publishing Company, Taipei, 1986, p. 192; Herzfeld, Michael. *Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State*. Routledge, New York, 1997, p. 57.

witness had been involved in the smuggling operations.⁵² Under a system without discipline, the corrupt *Waishengjen* officers' violent acts towards weaker Taiwanese had become the spark to ignite a massive uprising. On February 28th 1947, the day after the incident, soldiers shot demonstrators on their way to protest to administrative officials. Riots erupted throughout Taipei. By the afternoon, martial law had been announced; *Waishengjen* soldiers and police clashed with demonstrating Taiwanese, resulting in further casualties.⁵³ The uprising was suppressed by Chinese KMT troops. According to a report from the "228 Incident Research Team" of the Executive Yuan in February 1992, approximately 18,000 to 28,000 local people were killed.⁵⁴ George Kerr's *Formosa Betrayed*, by comparison, provides a lower estimate of around 10,000 and 20,000 deaths.⁵⁵

The "white terror"

The repressions and executions conducted by the Chinese KMT troops during the 228 Incident resulted in a depletion of the ranks of the educated elites in Taiwanese society,

⁵² Yang, Ying-chou. *Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek – the Center of the 228 Incident*. San-yi, Japan, 1970, pp. 71-72; Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Beacon, Boston, 1995, p. 2.

⁵³ Cheng, Zi. *Forty Years of Council Politics in Taiwan*. The Independent Evening Newspaper Publishing Company, Taipei, 1987, p. 89.

⁵⁴ Edmondson, Robert. "The February 28 Incident and National Identity." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2002, pp. 25-45; *Asahi Shimbun News*. Tokyo, March 18th 1992; Executive Yuan, 1993, pp. 1-19; Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Taiwan: The Democratization of a Divided Nation*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1994, p. 75; Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: *Les lieux de memoire*" (Loci of memory). *Representations*. No. 26, Spring 1989, pp. 7-25.

⁵⁵ Kerr, George H. *Formosa Betrayed*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1965, p. 309; Edmondson, 2002, p. 31.

many of whom had been educated and trained in the period of Japanese colonial rule.⁵⁶ According to Thomas Gold, the massacre revealed the targeting of Taiwanese intellectuals and social elites, especially teachers, lawyers, newspaper editors, and other well-educated Taiwanese.⁵⁷ Moreover, as Masahiro Wakabayashi points out, after experiencing the “228 Incident” and the “white terror”, Taiwanese who survived were the less educated people.⁵⁸

During the period of the “white terror”, almost all Taiwanese, who had been reported by any information as being Communist party members or their sympathizers, had been shot to death. In the 1950s, the “white terror” had become the Chinese KMT's mechanism of targeting local people, and many felt they had been treated unjustly.⁵⁹ Lin Su-chi, a writer who had been arrested as a political criminal, reported that after the war to the 1950s, political criminals were secretly arrested and tried. Their families and friends finally learnt about the imprisonments after they had been missing for one or two years.⁶⁰ The examination of suspects followed no regular procedures in the 1950s; only by the 1960s were political criminals militarily judged under martial law.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Lee, Teng-hui. *Selected Addresses and Messages: 1988*. Government Information Office, Taipei, 1988, pp. 33-34; Taussig, Michael. *The Nervous System*. Routledge, New York, 1992, pp. 26-35; Kerr, 1965, p. 310; Edmondson, 2002, pp. 29-32.

⁵⁷ Gold, Thomas B. *The State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1986, p. 51.

⁵⁸ Wakabayashi, 1994, p. 75.

⁵⁹ Dai, Kuo-hui. *Taiwan – The World, History, and Mind and Nature*. Yang-po Bookstore, Japan, 1988, p. 126; Kerr, 1965, pp. 254-300; Chen, Wei-ming. “Is the 228 Incident the only Song of Lament of Taiwan?” *Capital Morning Newspaper*. Taiwan, March 1st 1990, p. 5; Lai, Tse-han, H. & Wei, Wou. *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Lin, Su-chi. *The History of Blood and Tears of the Conscience Criminals*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1989, pp. 6-7.

⁶¹ Ibid.

The “white terror” has been described as a period of “national violence”.⁶²

To conduct the “white terror”, President Chiang Ching-kuo had commanded the huge and densely configured secret service networks of the variously called “Eight Large Systems” and the “Ten Large Systems” (terms referring to the same secret services). During the 1960s decade, the number employed in the secret services was at least 120,000, representing 2.14 percent of the population in the age group of 15 to 64.⁶³ Moreover, through coercion, bribery, or by voluntary means, the secret services recruited many civilian informers called *Sian Ming*. As the *New York Times* reported in 1963, the number of secret agents including *Sian Ming* numbered approximately 550,000, which was equal to 8.9 percent of the population in the age group of 15 to 64.⁶⁴

With the practice of national violence, post-World War II society in Taiwan experienced repression in freedom of movement, information, and culture, in addition to the “Red China” threat militarily. As indicated by Dai Kuo-hui, who spent his youth in the “white terror” period, apart from a few intellectuals who passively resisted the *Waishengjen* authority by means of silence, concealment, and escape, an atmosphere of mutual distrust and feigned obedience pervaded society.⁶⁵ It was an atmosphere which also encouraged a growth in the number of sycophants and followers of politically

⁶² Wakabayashi, 1994, p. 118.

⁶³ Guo, Cheng-liang. “The Transformations of the KMT Regime in Taiwan (1945-1988).” Masters Thesis, Graduate School of Sociology, National Taiwan University, 1988, p. 33.

⁶⁴ Wakabayashi, 1994, p. 119.

⁶⁵ Dai, 1988, p. 126.

powerful people.⁶⁶

The “white terror” caused Taiwanese to regard politics as a dangerous undertaking. They thought it impossible to oppose the authorities effectively, so they withdrew from the political sphere allowing a martial political culture to emerge from the impact of the “white terror”.⁶⁷ Fear and mutual distrust became the norm in relations among people in daily life.⁶⁸

The elections and consolidation of the one-party authoritarian regime and the influence of elections

The 50-year-separation between the local people and *Waishengjen*, together with the occurrences of the “228 Incident” and the “white terror”, were highly influential in the development of a distinctive Taiwanese identity, and influenced to a great extent attitudes toward the Chinese Mainland. That the government had been completely controlled by *Waishengjen* caused local people to regard the Chinese KMT as a foreign regime.⁶⁹ If the Chinese KMT government wanted to win legitimate support from

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Chang, Jun-hong. “The Review of Martial Culture and the Prospect of Taiwan’s Future.” *Taiwan Literature and Art*. Taipei, No. 107, September-October, 1987, p. 22; Lu, Annette Siu-liang. “Discussing Martial Culture and the Democratic Developments.” *The Independent Morning Newspaper*. July 3rd 1988, Taipei, p. 3.

⁶⁸ Wu, Jei-ming. “Social Protests during the Period of Transformation in a Political Regime – Taiwan in the 1980s.” Masters Thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1990, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁹ Huang, Huang-siong. *Contemplation in Harvard –To See Taiwan from the World*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 32-33.

local people, it had to close the gap between the local people and *Waishengjen*. Without local acceptance, the Chinese KMT came to rely upon authoritarian control to preserve its power, and established a political regime of “revolutionary democracy” in Taiwan with the aim of recovering Mainland China. At the same time, in order to prevent resistance from local people, the government decided to implement limited democracy, and incorporate local people into the Chinese KMT authoritarian system. The key approach was to allow Taiwanese to elect their local public officials, with the purpose of cultivating support towards the Chinese KMT regime. This occurred from 1950, when Taiwanese were permitted to elect their public representatives below the provincial level, and government chiefs below the county level. Through mutual dependence relations among the factions (*guanxi*, 關係) and the manipulation of elections, the Chinese KMT had been able to co-opt local political elites, and incorporate local politics into its party structure.⁷⁰ This scheme of “revolutionary democracy” anchored Chinese KMT rule in Taiwan.⁷¹

Thus by controlling the elections and building up its support base at the sub-provincial levels, the Chinese KMT consolidated its authoritarian rule through the tool of local government elections. As indicated in Table 1, the Chinese KMT faction candidates had always taken more seats than the non-faction candidates between 1950 and 1985. This suggests that the Chinese KMT authoritarian rule had made use of mutual dependence relations, and effectively won support in the elections.⁷²

⁷⁰ Hu, 1998, pp. 39-40.

⁷¹ Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, pp. 91-92 & 214.

⁷² Ibid.

Table 1: Local Faction Candidates in the Elections for Members of Taiwan Provincial Council (1950 -- 1985)

	KMT faction candidates	KMT faction elected	Non-faction elected
1950	59.30%	75.40%	8.00%
1954	55.20%	78.00%	30.00%
1957	43.80%	82.20%	39.70%
1960	52.20%	85.70%	40.30%
1963	54.90%	70.90%	47.20%
1968	47.40%	88.40%	38.40%
1972	43.80%	90.70%	43.60%
1977	56.30%	88.50%	42.50%
1981	44.00%	83.60%	18.80%
1985	42.60%	89.80%	30.30%
Total	49.95%	83.32%	33.88%

Source: Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (Vol. 4): Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 35.

Table 2 shows the elections held in 1986 and 1989, in which 23.4 percent and 23.8 percent of voters, respectively, considered that they had been psychologically disposed to expecting a degree of democratic culture or change from the government through the

elections.⁷³

**Table 2: The Psychological Impact of Elections on Voters
(1986 and 1989)**

	Very strong		Strong		Normal		No feeling		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1986	68	4.8	264	18.6	849	59.7	240	16.9	1,421	100
1989	71	5.6	232	18.2	800	62.6	174	13.6	1,277	100

Source: Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (Vol. 4): The Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 41.

Next, Table 3 indicates that the voters who had been influenced to hope for a breakthrough to multi-party politics, and fulfillment of democratic aspirations, by the elections held in 1986 and 1989 were 40 percent and 63.9 percent in 1986 and 1989, respectively, a growth of 23.9 percent.⁷⁴ It was found that an increased proportion of voters - 9.1 percent and 44.6 percent in 1986 and 1989, respectively - viewed the elections as a force for improving the political position of Taiwanese, and increasing

⁷³ Chen Ming-tun, Chen Dei-yu, Hu, Fo & Yo Yin-long. *The Voting Behavior of Voters*. The Central Electoral Committee of the Administrative Yuan, Taipei, 1987, pp. 44-47; Lin, Jia-long. "Comparative Analysis of Taiwanese Voters' Support towards the Political Parties, 1983-1986." Masters Thesis, Graduate School of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1988, pp. 67-69.

⁷⁴ Chen, Chen, Hu, and Yo & Lin, *ibid*.

their prospects for leadership.⁷⁵

However, Table 3 signals that an increasing number of voters – 10.5 percent and 31.9 percent in 1986 and 1989, respectively (a rise of 21.4 percent) – were concerned that the elections would increase societal tensions based on identity claims.⁷⁶ The most obvious effect of the elections was elevation of people's political consciousness toward the issue of democratization in Taiwan. Concurrently, there were fears that the elections would heighten a sense of identity politics and hence increase the potential for conflict.⁷⁷

**Table 3: Voter Attitudes Towards the Elections
(1986 and 1989)**

	Agree	No opinions	Unsure	Total
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⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

		n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1. They cause a	1986	128	40.0	21	6.6	171	51.5	321	100
breakthrough to	1989	189	63.9	92	30.4	15	5.1	296	100
multi-party politics,									
and herald a fulfillment of									
democratic aspirations.									
2. They lift the	1986	29	9.1	30	9.4	260	81.5	319	100
political position	1989	133	44.6	146	48.2	149	6.4	198	100
of Taiwanese, and									
increase their prospects									
for leadership									
3. They cause	1986	33	10.5	32	10.2	250	79.4	315	100
contestation over	1989	95	31.9	186	62.4	17	5.7	288	100
national values, and increase									
conflict over identity claims.									

Sources: Chen, Ming-tun, Chen Dei-yu, Hu Fu & Yo Yin-long. *The Voting Behavior of Voters*, The Central Electoral Committee of the Administrative Yuan, Taipei, 1987, pp. 44-47; Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science* (Vol. 4): *The Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 41.

Table 4 suggests that Taiwanese people's political outlook had gravitated towards modern authoritarianism in 1983 and 1989 (63.7 percent and 68.4 percent, respectively, a growth of 4.6 percent).⁷⁸ By comparison, support for traditional authoritarianism had dropped 12.4 percent, and that of free democracy had increased 7.9 percent.⁷⁹ From the three forms of political orientation, a relationship between change in Taiwan's political orientation and the elections is evident.

Table 4: Types and Changes in Political Orientation (1983 and 1989)

	1983 (%)	1989 (%)	1983-89 (%)
Trend to traditional authoritarianism	23.5	11.1	-12.4
Trend to modern authoritarianism	63.7	68.3	+4.6
Trend to free democracy	12.8	20.7	+7.9

*The sample number was 1,692 in 1983, and 1,301 in 1989.

Sources: Chen, Ming-tun, Chen Dei-yu, Hu Fu & Yo Yin-long. *The Voting Behavior of Voters*. The Central Electoral Committee of the Administrative Yuan, Taipei, 1987, pp. 44-47. Lin, Jia-long. *The Comparative Analysis of Taiwanese Voters' Support towards the Political Parties, 1983-1986*. Masters Thesis, Graduate School of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1988, pp. 67-69.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 44.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

While it may be observed that the elections had influenced social change in Taiwan, so too had the elections been influenced by social change. As a result, elections had been the main mechanism for attracting and incorporating the emerging socio-economic structure into the political system.⁸⁰ Under the influences of cultural, social, and economic changes, the elections had promoted political participation; thus, the Taiwanese political elites had sought more extensive and complete political participation. As this demand mounted, the Chinese KMT found it could no longer ignore it; if Taiwanese political participation were repressed, the entire political system might have been damaged. Therefore, as tolerance and compromise became the optimal strategy for the Chinese KMT, it relaxed the revolutionary authoritarian system and favoured further democratic adjustment. The theory of “revolutionary democracy” that the Chinese KMT used to maintain authoritarian rule could no longer be supported; the political structure had thereby been changed.⁸¹

In the earlier period of the elections, the Chinese KMT candidates had scored easy victories. Indeed, in many areas only one candidate had been nominated. However, when an increasing number of candidates from within the political elites had fought for the party nominations, disputes increased. Some candidates went so far as to violate party regulations or leave the Chinese KMT to enter the elections independently. With

⁸⁰ Chen, Yi-yeng & Huang Li-chiu. *Electoral Behavior and Political Development*. Li-ming, Taipei, 1992, pp. 62-63; Hu, 1998, p. 44.

⁸¹ Hu, Fu. “The Electoral Whirlpool and Political Developments.” *United Daily Newspaper*, Taipei, September 23rd 1988, p. 5; Hu, Fo. “Participation Behavior of the People in the Taiwan Area.” *Fourth Seminar of the Social Sciences*, The Central Research Yuan, Taipei, 1985, pp. 363-397; Hu, 1998, pp. 46-47.

this situation becoming increasingly common and immune to party regulations, the Chinese KMT had to relax restrictions on the number of nominations.

The elections in Taiwan had been limited to local government and councils, while the elections for Taiwan Provincial Governor and Members of the National Assembly were not open to the public. After the above-noted pressure for more extensive political participation, the Chinese KMT regime had agreed to open the elections to Additional Representatives of three National Assemblies in a gradual process from 1980 to 1989, culminating with elections at the central government level. All Senior Public Representatives elected in the three National Assemblies in Mainland China in 1948, resigned at the end of 1991, and more Taiwanese entered the national ruling structure, replacing the posts that had been controlled by the Chinese elites since 1949.⁸²

The third result of the cultural, social, and economic transformation of Taiwan was the emergence of opposition movements. Rapid urbanization, a broadly based education, and a higher standard of living, created a climate in which opposition movements won support from an increasing number of voters who were sufficiently secure to challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese KMT regime. On the eve of the 1979 elections, the opposition movements had set up a formal electoral system national-wide. Thus despite bans on the formation of political parties, the opposition groups had established an organization that was, effectively, a political party.⁸³

⁸² *China Times*. December 3rd 1989, Taipei, p. 1; *United Daily Newspaper*. December 8th 1986, Taipei, p. 2; *New Life Daily*. December 3rd, Taipei, 1989, p. 8; Chiou, C. L. *Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 78-89.

⁸³ *China Times*. December 3rd 1989, p. 1; *United Daily Newspaper*. December 8th 1986, p. 2; *New Life*

Meanwhile, the ruling elites had discovered that the costs of suppressing the opposition had increased, especially after the occurrence of the Kaohsiung (Formosa) Incident of December 1979.⁸⁴ Although many well-known opposition leaders had been prosecuted on the charge of committing treason, the Chinese KMT regime paid the high price of losing legitimacy. Following the ensuing temporary chaos, the opposition groups had been reorganized, and won new support during the 1980 elections. Finally, on the eve of the 1986 elections, an official political party, the Democratic Progressive Party, had been founded. This breakthrough contributed to the relaxation of authoritarian politics, created greater opposition towards political repression, and produced the faster process of political liberalization and democratization.⁸⁵

The Chinese KMT had learnt that it was ruling a gradually emerging civil society; a number of individual social groups had teamed up to break the outdated and inappropriate restrictions, and social opposition movements appeared continuously. Consequently, the gap between authoritarian rule and civil society had grown, and the power of the Chinese KMT regime gradually diminished. The government had been forced respond to change. These responses included the localization of the Chinese KMT power structure and the loosening of political prohibitions, as evidenced in the first half of 1987, which saw the removal of martial law and bans on newspapers and

Daily. December 3rd, 1989, p. 8; Chiou, 1995, pp. 78-89.

⁸⁴ See Chapter 4.

⁸⁵ Hu, 1998, pp. 46-47; Kagan, Richard C. *Chen Shui-bian: Building a Community and a Nation*, Asia-Pacific Academic Exchange Foundation, Taipei, 1999, p. 65.

political parties.⁸⁶ By 1992, the number of registered political parties had reached 60.⁸⁷

Social and political differences revealed by the elections

Observations pertaining to Taiwan's elections can be separated into two parts: the candidates and the voters. First, the written campaign promotions that were employed by the Chinese KMT and DPP candidates are evaluated, especially the political views of the Chinese KMT and DPP candidates. Next, the social, economic, and political backgrounds of the Chinese KMT and DPP supporters are compared.⁸⁸ As shown in Table 5, the political views held by the candidates in 1986 are divided into three categories: national identity; political structure; and public policies. Political views about national identity are separated into two parts, the Chinese and Taiwanese "complexes". The Chinese complex represents the view that Taiwan should finally unify with Mainland China, and insists that Taiwan and the PRC are inseparable politically and culturally. By comparison, the Taiwanese complex emphasizes independent sovereignty for Taiwan, and the existence of political and cultural differences between Taiwan and Mainland China. Also divided into two categories is political structure, with the maintenance of political power as one category and democratic reforms as the other. As for public policies, they are separated into four

⁸⁶ Chu, Yun-han. "Taiwan's Social Protests and Political Democratization." *Discussions of Political Science*. Vol. 1, Taipei, pp. 65-88; Hu, 1998, pp. 48-59.

⁸⁷ Chu & Hu, *ibid.*

⁸⁸ Chen, Chen, Hu, and Yo, 1987, pp. 44-47; Lin, 1988, pp. 67-69.

categories: national development; social security; expansion of diplomatic relations; and administrative reform.⁸⁹

Table 5: An analysis of candidates' political views during the 1986 campaign

	The KMT candidates (N=51)		The DPP candidates (N=17)	
1. <u>National identity</u>	n	%	n	%
(1) The Chinese complex				
* Taiwan must unify with Mainland China, and oppose separatism.	25	49.02	0	0.00
(2) The Taiwanese complex				
*Taiwan's future should be decided by its entire populace.	0	0.00	17	100.00
*People should identify themselves with Taiwanese history, languages, culture, and localization.	0	0.00	13	76.47
2. <u>Political Structure</u>				
(1) The maintenance of political power	2	3.92	0	0.00
*In order to maintain social order, opposition movements should				

⁸⁹ Hu, 1998, pp. 53-56; Lee, Siao-fon. *Forty Years of Taiwanese Democratic Movements*, The Independent Evening Newspaper, Taipei, 1988, pp. 189-191.

be restricted.

(2) Democratic reforms

*In order to expand political participation, Public Representatives should be entirely re-elected.	0	0.00	17	100.00
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*Insist on freedom of forming political parties; all parties should compete fairly, and political power should be transferred.	0	0.00	17	100.00
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*Removing martial law, and ensuring basic human rights.	0	0.00	17	100.00
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3. Public Policies

(1) National development

*Researching high technology, and strengthening national defense.	15	29.41	0	0.00
-------------------------------------------------------------------	----	-------	---	------

*Strengthening economic development and improving the trade environment.	24	47.06	15	88.24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------	----	-------	----	-------

(2) Social security

*Increasing the salary of public servants and soldiers.	31	60.78	0	0.00
---------------------------------------------------------	----	-------	---	------

(3) Expansion of

diplomatic relations

*Breaking through the diplomatic dilemma, and	16	31.37	16	94.12
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returning to international society.				
(4) Administrative Reform				
*Eliminating corruption.	26	50.98	15	88.24

Source: Chen, Ming-tun, Chen Dei-yu, Hu Fu & Yo Yin-long. *The Voting Behavior of Voters*. The Central Electoral Committee of the Administrative Yuan, Taipei, 1987, pp. 44-47.

The political views adopted by party candidates are represented in Table 5, above. The KMT and DPP candidates held differing views on national identity and political structure but had no obvious disagreements on public policy. The political views of most DPP candidates focused on national identity, which meant that Taiwan’s future should be decided by all citizens. In addition, almost all DPP candidates had supported the democratic reforms, including the re-election of the entire National Assembly, the removal of bans on forming political parties, and the protection of basic human rights. The biggest difference between the 1983 and 1986 elections was that during the 1986 elections, almost none of the KMT candidates had expressed support for the legitimacy of the authoritarian system. Therefore, the KMT had tacitly recognized the democratic reforms.

With regard to political views on economic growth, social security, expansion of diplomatic relations, and administrative reform, the KMT and DPP candidates had similar standpoints. Yet a major distinction existed, one which all DPP candidates failed to mention: that of increased national power. By contrast, many KMT candidates

advocated maintenance of a strong national defense force, plus higher salaries for public servants and soldiers. From the analysis above, it appears the DPP candidates did not agree with the original national and political systems; besides, the KMT and DPP candidates did not intend to attract any particular social status or ethnic group; instead, they focused on all types of voters. The only exception was that the KMT candidates alone emphasized the benefits for soldiers and public servants.⁹⁰

Next, the voters' economic and social backgrounds are observed; furthermore, four individual variables are chosen: (1) the democratic view, (2) national identity, (3) the ethnic groups, and (4) economic and social strata/occupations. With regard to attitudes towards national identity, two questions were asked: "Do you agree with the goal of unification?" and "Do you agree that economic prosperity is more important than unification?" The influence of the above factors on voting behavior is shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Correlations between Social background and Attitudes while Choosing a Candidate (1986)

Function	The KMT	The DPP	The KMT/ DPP
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⁹⁰ Liu, I-chou and Ho Szu-yin. "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwanese People." *Issues and Studies*. Vol. 35, No. 3, 1999, pp. 2-5.

The major functions while choosing a political party	1.752	0.571	3.07
1. The function of the ethnic groups			
*Holo	1.146	0.837	1.31
*Hakka	0.672	1.489	0.45
*Waishengjen	1.300	0.770	1.69
2. The function of strata/occupation			
*Farmer	1.207	0.829	1.46
*Labor	0.917	1.091	0.84
*Public servant	1.174	0.852	1.38
*Middle class	0.766	1.305	0.59
*Entrepreneur	0.882	1.134	0.78
*Others	1.140	0.877	1.30
3. The function of identities			
*Positive	1.309	0.764	1.71
*Negative	0.764	1.309	0.58
4. The function of democratic legitimacy			
*Positive	0.933	1.071	0.87
*Negative	1.071	0.933	1.15
5. The relationship between the ethnic groups and democratic legitimacy			

(1) Holo

*Positive	0.745	1.343	0.55
*Negative	1.343	0.745	1.80
(2) Hakka			
*Positive	1.141	0.876	1.30
*Negative	0.876	1.141	0.77
(3) Waishengjen			
*Positive	1.177	0.850	1.69
*Negative	0.850	1.177	0.72

N=953	Likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square = 72.5
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Sources: Chen, Ming-tun, Chen Dei-yu, Hu Fu & Yo Yin-long. *The Voting Behavior of Voters*. The Central Electoral Committee of the Administrative Yuan, Taipei, 1987, pp. 44-47; see Fienber, Stephen E. *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.

Through the analysis, it is found that the *Waishengjen* voters were the KMT's largest constituency; on the other hand, the Holo were least supportive to the KMT among the other three major ethnic groups. Secondly, the votes won by the KMT had mostly come from public servants, farmers, housewives, and retired soldiers and public servants. In contrast, the votes received by the DPP had mainly come from the middle class, entrepreneurs, and laborers.

In the economic domain, the middle class, entrepreneurs, and laborers were relatively less dependent on the state. In the social domain, it was difficult to incorporate these three strata/occupations of a modern society into the original faction-interdependent network. As for democratic values, the voters who gave positive answers had tended to

vote for the DPP. On the issue of national identity, voters who supported Chinese identity had tended to vote for the KMT. This suggests that there were correlations among the voters' democratic view, national identity, and choice of political party.

In order to examine more closely relations between the democratic view and the voters' choice of a political party, the inter-related functions of the ethnic backgrounds are discussed. The democratic view and the choice of candidate are decided by the ethnic background to a certain extent. For instance, Holo voters, who gave positive answers to democratic values, had tended not to support the KMT candidates. On the other hand, Hakka and *Waishengjen* voters had the opposite tendencies; in particular, they gave positive answers to democratic values, and were less supportive of the DPP candidates. This was because Hakka and *Waishengjen* voters did not regard the KMT to be an undemocratic political party as the DPP had claimed. At the same time, the voters of the above two ethnic groups thought that the anti-authoritarian strategies adopted by the DPP candidates could endanger a stable transformation to democracy. By comparison, Holo voters, who account for the majority population in Taiwan (about 70 percent of the 23 million population of Taiwan), and who originally came from southern Fukien province on the mainland opposite Taiwan, tended to think that democratic reforms and Taiwan identity would not violate each other.

As a result, the voters' political and social divergences, which were implied in the political views of democratic legitimacy and national identities, were noticeable. The social divergences were influenced by the ethnic groups, and the economic and social strata/occupations. Compared to developed countries, the impacts of economic and social divergences were less obvious in the past elections. This was because the

problem of political and ethnic differences had exceeded economic and social gaps. This indicates that tensions existed between the political views of democratic legitimacy and Taiwan identity, particularly in the *Waishengjen* and Hakka groups.

Conclusion

Through cultural, social, economic, and political changes, the functions of the electoral mechanism in Taiwan have been discussed. It is found that KMT authoritarian rule faced great challenges in this electoral system; thus democratic transformation occurred. Even though the KMT had outgrown the phase of one-party autocracy, a fully competitive political system had not developed. Moreover, although the competition between the political parties had promoted development of social movements, the KMT still controlled the majority of social organizations, schools, and mass media. On the other hand, KMT authoritarian rule was weakening, and a new civil-political framework in Taiwanese society began to emerge.⁹¹

More significantly, while the elections promoted democratic reforms, the appeal of the Taiwan identity and Taiwan independence movements became intertwined with democratic reforms and national identities. These caused the reforms to be neglected, and obstructed the route for transformation via reconciliation. On the other hand, the elections had become the mechanism and process of winning people's support, and increasing the legitimacy of the opposition. Thus the opposition had used the elections

⁹¹ See Hu, Fu. "Electoral Mechanism and Political Changes in Taiwan." *In the Shadow of China:*

as a tool for achieving democratic transformation.⁹²

Therefore, the process of elections had accelerated political change, and political change had in turn examined the electoral mechanism. This interactive process signals that elections in Taiwan had not reached structural stability under a democratic framework. Chapter 3 will examine how Taiwan became a democracy, the competition among the political parties, the nature of Chinese democratic culture, and social mobilization and political participation in Taiwan.

Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949. Hurst, London, 1993, ch. 6, pp. 134-168.

⁹² Mainwaring, Scott & Share, Donald. "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain." In Selcher, Wayne A. (ed.) *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1986; Share, Donald. "Transitions to Democracy and Transitions through Transactions." *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 19, No. 4, 1987, pp. 525-548.

Chapter Three

Taiwan's Democratization

In Samuel P. Huntington's theory of democratization as three waves,⁹³ the first wave occurred from 1826 to 1926, and the next 20 years was the period of regression. The second wave took place from 1943 to 1962. This was a short period, as was its regressive period from 1958 to 1975. The third wave, which began in 1974, has swept over more than 30 countries, giving people what Tocqueville called "the unlimited power of the majority".⁹⁴

Martial law was finally lifted in Taiwan on July 15th 1987. This marked a watershed in Taiwanese politics and made Taiwan – in Huntington's terms - a third wave country: it was transformed from a traditional undemocratic society to a democratic one. Even though martial law had been practiced in Taiwan for 38 years, the ruling KMT party's monopoly of power transferred to the people relatively quickly. Thus in March 1996, only nine years after the lifting of martial law, Taiwanese voters had been able to elect directly their president and central government representatives. As a result, the process of democratization in Taiwan may be observed to have been rapid and peaceful.⁹⁵ This chapter examines the major changes in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law, President

⁹³ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century*. Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991, p. 16.

⁹⁴ Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Vintage Books, New York, 1956, ch. IX. On the literature on democracy comparing Taiwan with other countries, see Chapter 4 of this thesis, footnote 200.

⁹⁵ Chao, Linda & Ramon H. Myers. *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan*, Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, pp. 3-4; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Central Daily*. January 12th 1998, p. 2.

Chiang Ching-kuo's decision to prepare the country for democratization, and how President Lee Teng-hui solved the crisis of the first large-scale student demonstration.

Taiwan as the sole democracy in the Greater China region and a comparison of political hierarchies in Taiwan and China

After World War II, due to a *laissez faire* policy adopted by the colonial rulers in economic affairs, a wealthy middle class emerged in Hong Kong and Macao. However, the political prohibitions enforced by the colonial rulers, and the people's failure to challenge such constraints, meant Hong Kong or Macao failed to embark on the journey to democratization. In December 1984, China and the United Kingdom signed an agreement, the Joint Declaration, for the return of Hong Kong to the PRC on July 1st 1997. Thereafter, political parties appeared in Hong Kong, under conditions of "de-colonization without democracy".⁹⁶ Direct election of members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) is limited to half the seats, while Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was re-elected in 2002 to a second term thanks to pro-Beijing forces within the election committee.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Chen, Ming-cho. "De-colonization without Democracy: The Birth of Pluralistic Politics in Hong Kong," in Edward Friedman (ed.), *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 161-181.

⁹⁷ The chief of state of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC, as it became known, is the PRC President. The head of government ("Chief Executive") is assisted by his cabinet (Executive Council) which consists of three ex-officio members and 10 appointed members. In the legislative branch of government – the unicameral Legislative Council or LEGCO – half of the 60 seats were indirectly elected by functional constituencies, and half by popular vote, with members serving four-year

Macao's political situation is similar to Hong Kong's, with the difference that it reunified in 1999. When considering Mainland China's political history, irrespective of whether it was divided, unified, or occupied by foreigners, the ruler has been autocratic. Post-1949 China in the form of the People's Republic was no exception insofar as law and order remained the purview of the ruler. Chinese rulers have relied on regulations to restrain people; but they have been unable to develop a political theory that allows representatives elected by people to balance the powers of authority. By comparison, democratization in Taiwan has been uncharacteristic among Chinese societies in contemporary times.⁹⁸

Edward A. Shils' "political center" is used as the basis to compare Taiwan and China's political systems.⁹⁹ The definition of the political center is the "legally most powerful roles and collectivities in a society, along with their subordinates and centripetal elites".¹⁰⁰ Next, the comparison of the centripetal elites and the rest of society is made, with the purpose of exploring the structural relations between the two parties. In addition, free elections and freedom of information are observed, in order to test the strength of correspondence between the "political center" and public opinion. Theoretically, power can be transferred to the people in a democratic society or civil society, and in this respect David Held separates democracy into three modern types. The first type is that which John Stuart Mill calls the "developmental democracy", the

terms. The last election was held in 2004. (See Legislative Council website: <http://www.legco.gov.hk/english>; and CIA Factbook about Hong Kong: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hk.html>)

⁹⁸ Lee, Teng-hui and Nakashima Mineo. *The Resourcefulness of Asia*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 137-139.

⁹⁹ Shils, Edward A. *The Constitution of Society*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.

¹⁰⁰ Myers, Ramon H. (ed.). *Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution press, 1991, p. xvii.

second type Joseph A. Schumpeter labels the “competitive elitist democracy”, and the third type is understood by R. A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom as a “pluralistic democracy”.¹⁰¹

When discussing the relationships between the political center and the rest of society, the three types of democracy can be classified into the same type of political center, the “subordinated political center”, by which is meant that public servants act in accordance with the mandate of the people. After the lifting of martial law, Taiwan's political center conformed to this type.¹⁰² This is diametrically opposed to the autocratic-type center which is controlled by the consolidated power of various forces - including the leader of the ruling party, government agencies, and the ideological system operated and led by the ruling party's organs.¹⁰³ This type of political center adopts what Amitai Etzioni labels the method of the “normative, coercive, and remunerative sanctions” to control the overall situation.¹⁰⁴ It is a political center that has sufficient power to govern people arbitrarily, and its leaders are skilled at attracting loyalty by corrupt means, such as buying popular support or granting high ranking

¹⁰¹ Held, David. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1987, pp. 102, 184 & 204. The theorists' works cited are: Mill, John Stuart. *On Liberty*. Bobbs-Merrill Educational, Indianapolis, 1982, pp. 68-72; Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (3rd edn). Harper & Row, New York, 1950, pp. 250-283; Dahl, Robert A. & Lindblom, Charles E. *Politics, Economics and Welfare*. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1953; Dahl, Robert A. & Charles E. Lindblom. *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (2nd edn). The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976; Dahl, Robert A. *Who Governs?* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961; Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971; Lindblom, Charles E. *The Intelligence of Democracy*. Free Press, New York, 1965; Lindblom, Charles E. *Politics and Markets*. Basic Books, USA, 1977; Lindblom, Charles E. *Democracy and the Market System*. Norwegian University Press, Oslo, 1988.

¹⁰² Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 11.

¹⁰³ Myers, 1991, pp. xviii-xix.

¹⁰⁴ Etzioni, Amitai. *The Moral Dimension: Towards A New Economics*. Collier Macmillan, London, 1988.

posts in exchange for political subservience. On the world stage, these leaders typically avoid initiating conflict in order to lift their profile in international society. This type of the political center is called the “uninhibited political center”; under the rule of an uninhibited political center, society must follow the ideology, administrative strategies, and the standards of behavior set by the center in order to operate passively.¹⁰⁵ The last type of political center is called the “inhibited political center”. It is one which cannot completely control the expression of popular opinion. The leadership’s authority and power are inhibited, and the needs of the people are considered when making policy.¹⁰⁶

In the 1950s, the leaders in Taiwan adopted the mode of “inhibited political center” (elaborated below); 40 years later, it has transformed to the “subordinated political center”, and started implementing a genuine democratic system. In order to understand the transformations of Taiwanese politics, it is necessary to analyze the leaders in power, and why they established the relationship between the political center and the people on the basis of a “limited democracy”. In other words, even though the political center promised the people it would carry out complete democratic reform, a timetable was not set. This political center also exerted restraining powers in relation to the political opposition.¹⁰⁷

The nature of democratic politics and the formation of a new

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Myers, 1991, p. xviii.

¹⁰⁷ Gunther, Richard and John Higley (eds). *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993; Chao & Myers, 1998, pp. 12-13.

society

As Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter indicate, while democratization and liberalization are closely related, their meanings are different.¹⁰⁸ The basic implication of democracy is the equal position of citizens, their rights of participating in collective decision-making, and their duties to respect legitimate authority. Some scholars have enlarged the definition of democracy to take in freedom, and use Dahl's "polyorchy" (poly-politics) as the guiding concept. It includes the citizens and groups, especially the political parties that compete for government; political participation, at least through impartial elections to decide the country's leaders and policies; freedom of citizens and politics, such as the freedoms of speech, publication, and gathering.¹⁰⁹

In Huntington's perspective, democratic states are the world's most stable and they also have the most prosperous economies.¹¹⁰ In Taiwan, economic development promoted social mobility, and formed the newly emerging middle class. After members of this class entered local and central elections, the KMT could no longer manipulate the country, and the opposition forces gradually became more consolidated and defined. Even though the KMT had tried to suppress the opposition groups on several occasions, this was to no effect; finally, the KMT had to remove martial law, and liberalize bans on

¹⁰⁸ O'Donnell, Guillermo & Philippe C. Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986.

¹⁰⁹ Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Democracy in Developing Countries*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Co., 1989, pp. xvi-xvii; Share, 1987, p. 527.

¹¹⁰ Huntington, Samuel. "The Context of Democratization in Taiwan." Keynote Address, *Conference on Democratization in Taiwan*. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and Institute of International Relations, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, 1989.

forming political parties and publishing newspapers. Taiwan's politics liberalized, and the KMT faced another transformation. Consequently, economic and social developments strengthened the prospects of democratization.¹¹¹

When the authoritarian KMT moved to Taiwan from Mainland China, the leadership class was exclusively *Waishengjen*. Yet, due to the impossibility of returning to Mainland China in the foreseeable future, the KMT had to adopt a localization policy in order to acquire local legitimacy. On the other hand, the purpose of the localization policy had been to resolve ethnic conflict and hence the appeal of Taiwan independence. This, in turn, equated with protecting national identity as symbolized by the Republic of China. The political system became liberalized, a situation that represented a distinctive phenomenon: not only did it accord with the interests of the opposition groups, but it also matched the original needs of the ruling KMT party.¹¹²

Finally, it should be noted that in Chinese tradition, too, there is support for humanistic political development. Democracy is not necessarily culturally alien to Chinese habits of mind. Chinese political philosophy derives from the indigenous traditions of Confucianism and Taoism.¹¹³ The prime teaching of Confucianism is *ren* (仁), meaning "humaneness", while that of Taoism is the quest for harmony through

¹¹¹ Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (Vol. 4): Political Transformation and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, pp. 124 & 134.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 136.

¹¹³ The key texts of Confucianism are the *Analects of Confucius* and the *Mencius*, while those of Taoism are the *Tao Te Ching* and *The Chuang Tzu*. See also de Bary, Wm Theodore and Irene Bloom (comp.). *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (2nd edn.). Vol. 1, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999.

following the Way (“the source of all being”).¹¹⁴ Together they promoted a conception of the state as a moral order centered on the welfare of the people through good governance. This ideology dedicated to a just and stable society was maintained through scholar-officials who advised the monarch.¹¹⁵ Their remonstrations provided a form of checks and balances against overweening imperial power. This was a people-oriented political culture, one which Mencius (4th century BC) promoted to the point of endorsing popular revolt against a ruler who has failed in his duties to the people.¹¹⁶ This accorded with the ancient Chinese concept of the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*, 天命), which states that Heaven (the moral universe) would withdraw a ruler's mandate to govern if he did not rule with the common people's well-being and prosperity as his guiding principle.¹¹⁷ Although traditional Chinese political culture was not democratic in the modern sense of competitive party elections through universal suffrage, its value in providing a moral foundation for the building of democratic institutions is not without merit. In other words, if a state is able to take the people as the starting point, then it is easy to develop further and take the people as the center. As a result, based on traditional Chinese culture, democracy can be improved.¹¹⁸

From 1950 to 1986, dramatic changes occurred in Taiwanese society. For example, the

¹¹⁴ de Bary and Bloom, *ibid.*, pp. 926 and 78.

¹¹⁵ See Reischauer, Edwin O. & John K. Fairbank. *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (8th edn). Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1970.

¹¹⁶ *Mencius*, (trans. D. C. Lau), Penguin, London, 1988, Bk 1, Part B:8. de Bary and Bloom, 1999, p. 115.

¹¹⁷ See Legge, James (trans.). *The Sacred Books of China: The Texts of Confucianism*. In Mueller, F. Max (ed.). *The Sacred Books of the East*, 50 vols., Oxford: Clarendon, 1879-1910, Vol. 3. pp. 92-95; Marshall, S. J. *Mandate of Heaven: Hidden History of I Ching*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, pp. 1-26; de Bary and Bloom, 1999, p. 115.

¹¹⁸ See Huang, Wen-shiong. *The Value Concepts of the People in Taiwan*. Avanguard, Taiwan, 2000, pp. 30-32.

national income had risen from US\$100 to US\$4,000, and the savings rate had reached 38 percent of the income.¹¹⁹ Half of family income in the 1950s was spent on food, alcohol and tobacco.¹²⁰ By 1986, less than a third was spent on this, the rest being transferred to education, travel, health insurance, and entertainment.¹²¹ People's income largely derived from the manufacturing and services industries. In the 1950s, more than half of the population was living in the rural areas; by the early 1980s, approximately 90 percent of people in Taiwan were urban dwellers, and the majority was middle class.¹²²

These changes directly related to the government's encouragement of development of a market economy. The government had given each household freedom in economic power, maintained long-term stability by avoiding a national deficit, and controlled the monetary rate of exchange. The flourishing market economy stimulated some of the social changes. Tien Hong-mao and other scholars praised the emergence of "a civil society that owns the publishing organizations, the various public associations, and the professionals who receive a high level of education and are courageous to glorify the accomplishment of the political center".¹²³

A free economic market and the emergent civil society complemented each other, so that an "ideological marketplace" may be said to have formed in the two decades from

¹¹⁹ Zheng, Pei-yun. *The Students Movements in Taiwan in the 80's*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1993, pp. 3-5.

¹²⁰ Zheng, 1993, pp. 3-5.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Quoted in *ibid*.

1970 to 1980. This invested a dynamic quality in Taiwan's "limited democracy". The overseas Taiwan independence activists also noticed a degree of political progress. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, many anti-KMT activists came back to Taiwan in succession, and the economic prosperity and social stability had been the main reasons of bringing them home.¹²⁴

The KMT had successfully carried out "limited democracy" without interference from the opposition groups. Those who attacked the government strongly and continuously had been jailed, or put to death. This "inhibited political center" (which, as noted above, was inhibited by some concern for popular opinion) had determined to implement martial law, with the aim of securing Taiwan as the stronghold of anti-communism. After 1980, Taiwan's political center became content with economic prosperity and social stability; therefore, it tolerated more from the opposition movements – as long as they conducted their affairs according to the regulations. On the other hand, the opposition groups learned how to behave by following the rules; nevertheless, they had never given up their dream of organizing a legal political party that could compete with the KMT in the national elections. In short, it was a wish to transform Taiwan's "limited democracy" to "total democracy".¹²⁵

The incentives for democratization and the political

¹²⁴ Jacobs, J. Bruce. "Political Opposition and Taiwan's Political Future." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*. No. 6, July 1981, pp. 21-24; Chiou, C. L. *Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 80-89.

¹²⁵ Hsiung, James C. *et al.* (eds). *Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950-1980*. Praeger, New York, 1981, p. 21.

opposition groups

Apart from improvements in Taiwanese society noted above, incentives for Taiwan's democratization may be found in democratic politics itself. Taiwan had been influenced by Western culture from an early period, and the people came to perceive democratic politics in a favorable light, and worthy of promotion. It was an independent factor in Taiwan's political development, that is, the advocacy of democracy did not take place after economic development; the democratic value system had come directly from politics itself. Another incentive was political development in Taiwan, which was related to local people's demand for more political participation. In other words, it was related to ethnic self-awareness, suggesting that local people saw in politics a method of acquiring power (which they had been denied by the dominant ethnic Other).¹²⁶

On the influence of modernity and education on democratic values, three studies were conducted in 1981. They suggested that modernity had influenced democratic values. In addition, people who received a relatively high degree of education held high democratic values; on the contrary, those who were illiterate or had low literacy levels were less attached to democratic ideals. From the economic and social vantage points, those from the upper-middle class were most committed to democratic values; while those who were lower-middle classes had weaker democratic values.¹²⁷ Similarly,

¹²⁶ Hu, Fu. *China Discussion Platform*. Vol. 13, No. 2, Taipei, 1981, pp. 44-47; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Central Daily*. January 12th 1998, p. 2; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 64-65.

¹²⁷ Hu & Siao & Siao, *ibid*.

people on higher incomes had higher democratic values, and the professionals most attuned to democracy were academics, engineers, and business people. Conversely, farmers and laborers displayed less commitment to democratic values. Finally, it comes as no surprise that those who believed power should be transferred to the people, were most active in terms of political participation.¹²⁸

Former opposition leader Yao Jia-wen warned that it was not a reliable strategy to depend on the KMT to increase Taiwan's democracy; what the country needed was a new opposition power in order to start a new political system.¹²⁹ Educated opposition leaders like Yao were the beneficiaries of improvements in Taiwanese society. Some of them were the elder generation who received a Japanese education, and others were younger with a Chinese education. The elder generation viewed the KMT as corrupt and incompetent. The younger generation believed in democracy. They thought it could occur only in the presence of a powerful opposition party that could compete with or replace the KMT.¹³⁰

Many people of the younger generation had joined the KMT, but later left the party due to disappointment; others, who felt dissatisfied or angry over the behavior of the KMT, refused to enter the party. Yet, all held a similar belief towards politics, and admired Western democracy; in order to oppose the KMT's one-party rule, they participated in local elections. After they were elected as central government representatives, they

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Wong, Tuo. *Voice of the Opposition*. Long Bridge, Taipei, 1978, p. 277.

¹³⁰ Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 90; Wong, *ibid*.

executed their duty of interpellation in the Legislative Yuan, and criticized the government officials. Central government representatives had close contact with the KMT “free faction” intellectuals, as they became known. The parties interacted and consequently influenced each other.¹³¹

Since 1970, the major activity of the oppositionists was to criticize the internal policies of the KMT. They did not support the “inhibited political center”, and wished this political center to be transformed to the complete democratic “subordinated political center”. From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, the various opposition magazines had examined Taiwanese politics across the board and in detail. They engaged in mockery, humor, and investigative reporting; they were widely available in book and newsstands, and all sold well. The opposition groups’ major strategy was informing Taiwanese how the government had only talked about democracy but never put it into practice, indicating that the government lacked the political will to realize democracy.¹³²

In the oppositionists’ view, a government without sincerity lacked morality, and was thus not qualified to govern the country (reminiscent of the Mandate of Heaven of traditional political philosophy). Having revealed to voters the negative side of the government, the oppositionists tried to win people’s support in elections, and improve Taiwan’s political structure. Each year, they asked how long the periods of “conquering chaos” (a reference to Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion) and the “enforcement of martial law” would last. Citing the

¹³¹ Wong, 1978, p. 277.; Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 90.

¹³² *The Eighties*. “One Hundred Questions the KMT has to Answer.” Taipei, No. 88, October 26th-31st 1985, p. 52; Chao and Myers, 1998, pp. 90-91.

continued presence of marital law, the oppositionists ridiculed "limited democracy".¹³³

The anti-KMT politicians were knowledgeable in constitutional matters; they repeatedly urged the government to lift bans on the formation of political parties, and to allow its opponents to compete with them fairly. For example, the former publisher of *The Eighties* and Defense Vice-Minister, Kang Ning-siang, said that the biggest expectation of the opposition towards the ruling KMT was for it to carry out its tasks in accordance with democratic constitutional practice.¹³⁴ This was in the context of complaints that the ruling party employed various excuses and methods to freeze, restrict, and deprive people's constitutional rights as it pleased.¹³⁵

President Chiang Ching-kuo's decision and plan to democratize

After Chiang Ching-kuo became the president in March 1978, he spoke of the importance of the Taiwanese democratic system in unification with China. President Chiang had intended to use the peaceful method of transferring Taiwan's experience of democratization to Mainland China. On October 10th 1980, Chiang stated in his National Day Celebration speech the following:

¹³³ *The Eighties*. October 26th-31st 1985, p. 52; Chao and Myers, 1998, pp. 90-91.

¹³⁴ Kang, Ning-siang. "Securing Constitutions, Protecting Constitutions, and Practising Constitutions." *Asian*. Taipei, No. 23, April 1st 1981, p. 33.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*.

We have all been striving for the great task of anti-communism and recovering Mainland China, and keeping high hopes in bringing the democratic constitution of the *Three Principles of People*, and a free, stable, and comfortable lifestyle back to Mainland China, with the aim of sharing these with the entire nation's people.¹³⁶

Thus, Chiang Ching-kuo believed that if Taiwan could become the first democratic society in Chinese history, it would grow to be a strong power in politics, and open a road to enter Mainland China. When he answered Opposition Legislator Kang Ning-siang's interpellation, President Chiang stressed that "We will never give up our goal of practicing democratic politics".¹³⁷

Chiang Ching-kuo believed democracy should be implemented gradually, a stance which the opposition politicians did not find convincing. However, he decided at an early stage that, first, Taiwan's successful example of democracy could build China into a country that provides quality of life, law and order, and allows for its people the pursuit of happiness.¹³⁸ Secondly, under a democratic system, all political parties could compete impartially according to the Constitution enacted in 1947.¹³⁹

Chiang had emphasized repeatedly that the KMT party members should develop their own morality, conduct, and self-cultivation. In 1984, he said in the KMT internal work

¹³⁶ Chiang, Ching-kuo. *The Collected Works of Chiang Ching-kuo* (Vol. 14). Government Information Office, Taipei, 1991, p. 243.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 258.

¹³⁸ Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 135.

¹³⁹ Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 370-372; pp. 416-420; pp. 527-542.

panel discussion that all party workers had to make progress at all times, act unselfishly and impartially, endeavor to become close to the people, enter the grassroots deeply, cooperate solidly, and be hard-working, thrifty, simple, and honest.¹⁴⁰

President Chiang Ching-kuo reiterated that if the KMT party members could sacrifice themselves and their own comfort, and strengthen their spirit of serving people, then they could win people's support and ensure the endurance over time of the party's power. Especially during the elections, the KMT had to demonstrate its ethical values to voters, serve people, establish a democratic system, and act impartially.¹⁴¹ Chiang's Confucian democratic style called for high personal standards for party members. As for President Chiang's own cultivation, he had also taken the slogan of "ordinary, common, and honest" (that is, being open, identifying with the common people and transparent rather than duplicitous) as his guiding principles, which were attuned to the Confucian concept.¹⁴² From the 1960s, Chiang Ching-kuo declared that more of the local people should be appointed as government officials, and he understood that Taiwanese politics had to open to greater diversity of opinion. In order to cope with Taiwan's future diversified political situation, Chiang started selecting and promoting talented local officials in the party, the political structure, and military.¹⁴³

After the elections in 1983, if no political parties were organized, and society was not disrupted by the opposition groups, then President Chiang Ching-kuo would remain tolerant of opposition movements. Although he still enforced a ban on publications

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 127.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Vol. 20, pp. 44-45.

¹⁴² Song, Zi-li. *National Politics, National Rights, and National Fate*. Guang-hua, Taipei, 1979, p. 13.

¹⁴³ Liu, Yong-si. *Chiang Ching-kuo's Thirty Years in Taiwan*. Da-lian, Hong Kong, 1985, p. 243.

that were deemed to incite unrest, he did not arrest any oppositionists who did not intend to overturn the government.¹⁴⁴

Chiang had realized Taiwan's democratization was in keeping with the world trend; yet, he remained concerned over the direction and behavior of the opposition groups under a democratic system. If they could follow the Constitution, agree on unification with China, and strive for the dream of recovering Mainland China with the KMT, then there would be no problems. However, the ambiguous course taken by the opposition groups unsettled Chiang Ching-kuo. Developments, nevertheless, had reached a decisive stage, and President Chiang knew that setting up democracy in Taiwan, carrying out political reforms, and lifting martial law were now imperative. Democracy was the only acceptable approach for the KMT to embrace unification with Mainland China. Hence, in the last phase of Chiang Ching-kuo's life, he considered the goal of making Taiwan fully democratic was worth attempting.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Chang, Parris. "Taiwan in 1983: Setting the Stage for Power Transition." *Asian Survey*. Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1984, pp. 122-123.

¹⁴⁵ Chiou, C. L. "Politics of Alienation and Polarization: Taiwan's *Tangwai* in the 1980s." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*. Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1986, pp. 16-28; Winckler, Edwin A. "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" *The China Quarterly*, No. 99, September 1984, pp. 481-499; Long, Simon. *Taiwan: China's Last Frontier*. Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 180-202.

Reforming the political status quo and Taiwanese find their voice

During September and October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo knew of the activity of the oppositionists; and after the Democratic Progressive Party was founded, some KMT party members urged President Chiang to arrest and imprison the opposition leaders. Chiang Ching-kuo did not heed their advice. Instead, on October 2nd 1986, Chiang announced that after careful consideration the government concluded that the national security law – that is, martial law – would be lifted as quickly as possible.¹⁴⁶

On October 7th, when he was interviewed by *Washington Post's* Katherine C. Graham, President Chiang Ching-kuo said that the ROC had previously decided to lift martial law (in which he said, “The times are changing, the environment is changing, the tide is also changing”); however, due to military threats from the PRC, martial law was retained. Further, this national security law existed with the purpose of guaranteeing the country's social stability.¹⁴⁷

From spring 1986 to the end of 1987, a series of major events were enacted on Taiwan's political stage. As one political commentary observed:

The whole society had been “dispelling its structures”; voices previously afraid to

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Lee, Siao-fon. *Forty Years of Taiwanese Democratic Movements*, The Independent Daily, Taipei, 1988, p. 242; Moody, Peter R. Jr. *Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability*. Praeger, New York, 1992, pp. 90-95; Long, 1991, pp. 180-202.

express themselves were now proudly seeking their new “historical position”. In addition, various political and community groups had been set up in succession to gain their own social resources. “Anti-” became the best label of 1987; the political opposition, the students, the retired soldiers, the women, the laborers, the drivers, the businesspeople, and the general populace had all entered the group of “anti-”.¹⁴⁸

Taiwan was no longer a society that was dominated by one-party rule, and was going to transform into a diversified society. The establishment of the new political party, the tolerance of the KMT towards the opposition groups, the lifting of martial law, the cancellation of news censorship, and the increase in street protests, caused the unraveling of the KMT as an “inhibited political center”. Instead, it came to resemble a “subordinated political center” that was more sensitive to people’s needs, and more tolerant towards another political party.

In a series policy steps towards the realization of Taiwanese democratization, President Chiang Ching-kuo played the roles of both planner and advocate. At first, Chiang was concerned that he would be unable to establish in his lifetime a strong foundation for Taiwan’s democratic politics. The biggest dream of President Chiang was to cause China to move towards unification under conditions that were democratic and economically prosperous.¹⁴⁹ That he should be instrumental in bringing a strong semblance of these conditions to Taiwan, irrespective of the effects on China, proved to

¹⁴⁸ The Editorial Group. “In Order to Walk a Longer Journey, Introspection is Needed.” *The Journalist 2.0*. No. 42. December 28th 1987 - January 3rd 1988, p. 7.

¹⁴⁹ Chiang, Liang-ren. “The Legacy left by President Chiang.” *The Journalist 2.0*. No. 45, Taipei, January 18th - 24th 1988, p. 20.

be a more realizable and perhaps equally important dream.

President Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13th 1988, and the public expressed a calm solemnity towards his death. On January 14th and 15th 1988, a telephone survey was conducted in Taipei, with 1,000 households being interviewed. It indicated that nearly 70 percent of respondents considered Lee Teng-hui could smoothly assume the office of president, 20 percent were uncertain, and 7.8 percent doubted Lee's ability to some extent.¹⁵⁰

When asked about Taiwan's future after Chiang's death, 69.5 percent expressed themselves to be optimistic or very optimistic, only 3.8 percent were pessimistic, and 16.9 percent were unsure.¹⁵¹ In the aspect of the future political direction of Taiwan, while 46 percent were optimistic, 29.9 percent indicated they were unsure.¹⁵² It demonstrates that the most important change in Taiwanese society was not the political reform itself, but the open-minded environment created by it. This allowed for the ease of leadership transfer, and indicated that such a leader could no longer wield such a huge influence on society, as had occurred in the past.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Guo, Hong-zhi & Hua Yi-wen. "When I Heard This News." *The Journalist* 2.0. No. 45, January 18th - 24th 1998, p. 18.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

The political emergence of Lee Teng-hui and the development a new political market

President Lee Teng-hui was born on January 15th 1923, of Hakka parentage, and was raised in Taipei County.¹⁵⁴ After Lee graduated from junior high school, he entered the previous body of National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei High School, to study; only four Taiwanese students were in his class, the others all being Japanese.¹⁵⁵ In 1943, Lee Teng-hui went to Japan to study in Kyoto Imperial University; he witnessed the administrative efficiency and urban construction of Japan, and admired the Meiji political reform. There he built exemplary work habits, being loyal, responsible, and respectful of the spirit of teamwork. It was these qualities that endeared him to President Chiang Ching-kuo.¹⁵⁶

When Lee was 23 years old, he transferred back to National Taiwan University to study. Later, at the age of 26 after graduation, he became a teaching assistant at the university. In 1951, Lee Teng-hui won the Iowa State University scholarship and went there to study for his Master of Agricultural Economics. In 1953, he came back to Taiwan and worked as a lecturer in National Taiwan University. Three years later, Lee successfully entered the Agriculture Reconstruction Committee; he started as the assistant technician engineer, later was promoted to the technician engineer, and finally became

¹⁵⁴ Shi, Han. *The Seventy Years of Lee Teng-hui*. Kai-jin Culture, Taipei, 1993, pp. 25-26, 37; Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, p. 206.

¹⁵⁵ Shi & Shi, *ibid*.

¹⁵⁶ Chang, Hui-ying. *Lee Teng-hui 1988-2000 Twelve Years in Power*. T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), Taipei, 2000, pp. 4-5.

Chief of the Department of Agricultural Economics. In 1965, Lee Teng-hui received a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship and went to study for his doctorate at Cornell University. His dissertation was selected for the US Outstanding Dissertation Award of the US Agriculture Academy in 1969.¹⁵⁷

Lee's educational and administrative experience drew him to the government's attention. On June 2nd 1972, while Lee was participating in a conference in New Zealand, he was informed that President Chiang Ching-kuo had invited him into the cabinet and appointed him as Delegate of Political Affairs of the Executive Yuan. Shortly after, Lee Teng-hui was accompanying President Chiang on inspection tours of the whole island, increasing substantially their networks during these visits. In 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo appointed Lee as Taipei Mayor, a move which caught many by surprise. Lee's success can be attributed to his competence and talent, but also his ability to coordinate diverse (KMT and local Taiwanese) perspectives. In addition, President Chiang was attracted to Lee Teng-hui's non-political background.¹⁵⁸

In 1979, Lee was elected as the KMT Central General Commissioner for the first time, and in 1981, he was promoted to Governor of Taiwan Province. In 1983, Lee's only son died of cancer. This tragedy was seen as confirming in Chiang Ching-kuo's mind that Lee Teng-hui would become a successor who regarded the country as his first priority.¹⁵⁹ One year later, President Chiang made the decision of choosing Lee as his

¹⁵⁷ Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, pp. 6-9.

¹⁵⁸ Lee, Da. *The Biography of Lee Teng-hui*. Wide-Angle Lens, Hong Kong, 1988, pp. 44-45.

¹⁵⁹ Lee, Da. 1998, pp. 49-50; Su, Han. *The Seventy Years of Lee Teng-hui*. Kai-jin Culture, Taipei, 1993, p. 76.

partner to run for the presidency. Political commentator, Su Han, suggests that Chiang had promoted Lee Teng-hui for the reasons that Lee had never entered any local election, had not been involved in factional favors or disputes, and had no sons.¹⁶⁰ In Chiang Ching-kuo's perspective, as noted above, Lee could therefore work for the country wholeheartedly. Besides, Lee's good relationship with the North Taiwan Presbyterian Church could be utilized to restrain and balance the anti-government force of the South Taiwan Presbyterian Church.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, the act of promoting Lee Teng-hui could respond to the local need for a Taiwanese success story, and demonstrate to the United States that the political rights of *Waishengjen* and local people have become equal.¹⁶²

While Taiwan is widely known to have developed into a successful market economy from 1960 to 1986,¹⁶³ the same familiarity cannot be assumed of its open ideological marketplace.¹⁶⁴ Yet in this marketplace, the intellectuals and elites could state, explain, broadcast, evaluate, and promote their own thoughts without restraint. Thus, various kinds of Chinese and Western ideas could compete liberally in Taiwan. But there was still no multi-party political market with which to engage the democratic system.¹⁶⁵ In

¹⁶⁰ Su, 1993, p. 76.

¹⁶¹ See chapter 8 for more information about the Taiwan Presbyterian Church.

¹⁶² Su, 1993, p. 76.

¹⁶³ *Taiwan Economic Development Research Center*. "The Influences of the Asian Financial Crisis Towards Taiwan and China." Taiwan, http://rcted.ncu.edu.tw/e_c04.phtml; *Xinhua News Net*. "The Condition of Taiwan Economic Devolvement." China, May 11th 2004, http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/23/content_703815.htm

¹⁶⁴ See Metzger, Thomas A. "The Chinese Reconciliation of Moral-Sacred Values with Modern Pluralism: Political Discourse in the ROC, 1949-1989." in Myers, Ramon H. (ed.). *Two Societies in Oppositions, The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, California, 1991, pp. 3-56.

¹⁶⁵ Chao & Myers, 1998, pp. 173-174.

such a market, the government tolerates those who belong to different political parties that compete freely for winning power. The political parties promote their nominees for election, and voters follow their own beliefs or interests to support the candidates. After the elections, public representatives at each level and political leaders use their power to pass laws and distribute advantages to satisfy the voters' needs. As Cal Clark observes:

Competing parties, according to democratic theory, "aggregate" disparate issues into policy packages to organize and simplify political choice for the electorate. Over time, citizens observe the effects of the winning party's policy package and either reward or punish it at the next election. Thus the nature of the party system is critical for ensuring that government is representative of and responsive to the broader society.¹⁶⁶

The democratic system produced by open socio-political structures satisfies voters' needs and accords with the law to restrain and balance the government. Moreover, through the conduct of regular free elections, a new governing elite can be chosen.¹⁶⁷

The critical crisis

On February 19th 1990, when the National Assembly was convened in Taipei, the DPP

¹⁶⁶ Clark, Cal. "Lee Teng-hui and the Emergence of a Competitive Party System in Taiwan." In Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang (eds). *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-Hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*. University of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2003, p. 91.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

Representatives changed their pledges from “people of the ROC” to “people of Taiwan”, and year 79 of the ROC calendar to 1990 of the Western calendar. As a result, their pledges were considered invalid by the presidium, and all DPP Representatives were firmly stopped from attending the National Assembly to exercise their authority of office, a situation that caused strong resentment from the DPP. As an expression of protest, Independent Representatives left the National Assembly, and the First Examination Committee of the National Assembly took only 24 minutes to pass the clauses of amended Temporary Provisions.¹⁶⁸ These stated that Representatives of the National Assembly could continue to exercise their two rights of initiative and referendum, and the term of office of Additional Representatives was extended from two to nine years. In addition, Representatives of the National Assembly could gather together by themselves once per year, and the attendance fee was increased from the originally calculated 52,000 to 220,000 New Taiwan (NT) dollars.¹⁶⁹

If the National Assembly passed the clauses of amended Temporary Provisions, it meant Representatives' authority of office would greatly increase. This held the potential to trigger a constitutional and political crisis; therefore, most sectors of society were against the decision. Besides, any unilateral decision by the National Assembly to extend the term of office, and allow Representatives to gather regularly each year on their own, represented a violation of the Constitution. In fact, the National Assembly

¹⁶⁸ The Temporary Provisions were promulgated in 1948 by the ROC government to deal with what was termed the “period of the Communist rebellion”. Due to the perceived Communist threat, the Temporary Provisions lasted 43 years until 1991 when they were abolished under Lee Teng-hui's presidency. These provisions meant that the people's Constitutional rights were restricted.

¹⁶⁹ Meaney, Constance Squires. “Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT.” In Cheng, Tun-jen & Stephen Haggard (eds). *Political Change in Taiwan*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1992, pp. 102-106; Klintworth, Gary. *New Taiwan, New China. Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 230-245.

was using the Temporary Provisions that violated the Constitution to engage in further illegal conduct. As matters transpired, these two proposals were not formally passed by the Meeting of the Entire Representatives; hence observers thought there was still a chance to pursue remedial action.¹⁷⁰

Since the situation had developed to such a stage, the DPP hardened its resolve. On March 14th 1990, the DPP Chairman, Huang Sing-je, led the DPP Party Group of the Legislative Yuan, the DPP Taipei City Council Party Group, and members of the public from all over Taiwan, to escort the DPP Representatives of the National Assembly entering Chong-shan building, to exercise their authority of office. However, they were stopped by troops in front of the Chong-shan building, and the DPP Representatives decided to stage a sit-in.¹⁷¹

The KMT leadership saw matters had entered a difficult phase. They insisted that President Lee Teng-hui use his courage and determination to end this situation.¹⁷² On March 16th, Huang Sing-je and the 14 DPP Representatives of the National Assembly went to the Presidential Office to petition. However, they clashed with the military police, and were forcibly removed from the site.¹⁷³

Public dissatisfaction with the behavior of the Chinese KMT Representatives of the National Assembly became evident with the increasingly strengthened mass movement.

¹⁷⁰ Meaney & Klintworth, *ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *China Post*, "President Lee Called to End Political 'Farce'." Taipei, March 16th 1990, p. 16.

¹⁷³ *China Post*, "Military Police Drag Away Fourteen DPP Deputies." Taipei, March 17th 1990, p. 12.

The students of the north Taiwan universities started gathering in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and sat silently to demonstrate. Both professors and students combined and coordinated protest activities among the various universities. At the same time, rally movements were launched. This involved such activities as engaging in sit-in protest vigils, boycotting classes, denouncing the Chinese KMT Representatives of the National Assembly, and refusing to pay tax. The number of students, who had started staging a sit-in in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall from March 16th 1990, had increased to hundreds on March 19th; despite the cold weather, they still decided to sit silently until the day of presidential election on March 25th. This was the first large-scale student movement in Taiwan for over 40 years, with more than 20,000 students mobilized.¹⁷⁴

The students in Taiwan had been inspired by the June 4th 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident in Mainland China, and had decided to take action in their objection to the behavior of the National Assembly. The government, apart from advising the gathered students to leave, had not taken any actions to disperse them. In this they differed from the coercive (and lethal) actions of their Mainland counterparts. The media criticized the conduct of the National Assembly as being contrary to popular opinion. Virtually all sectors of Taiwanese society including the Legislative Yuan came to a decision to formally condemn the National Assembly. Moreover, Provincial and City Councils had condemned the National Assembly in strong terms.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Opinion polls indicated that support for the National Assembly had fallen. In a March 16th 1990 survey conducted by *China Times*, amongst 834 adult interviewees, 80 percent thought the National Assembly had no function at all, and were furious about the proposals made by the Committee; only 13 percent thought that the National Assembly could represent popular opinion. Politically, Taiwan had clearly reached a critical phase of the crisis.¹⁷⁶

Relieving the crisis and addressing political divergence

Until March 17th 1990, more than 10,000 students were still assembled in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall staging a sit-in.¹⁷⁷ Through the three national television channels, President Lee Teng-hui announced the "Nation's Important Issues", and said that he believed after the final discussion, the Chinese KMT Representatives of the National Assembly would respect popular opinion. Moreover, Lee affirmed the reforms would be accelerated, and he hoped that the DPP Representatives of the National Assembly would obey the law, and remain orderly during the discussions.¹⁷⁸

However, Lee's speech was not enough to quell the student demonstration at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, and some 10 students began to stage a hunger strike.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ *China Post*. "Retirement of Aging Reps Second-Most Urgent Issue." Taipei, March 29th 1990, p. 12.

¹⁷⁷ *TTV*. Taipei, March 17th 1990.

¹⁷⁸ *CTV*. Taipei, March 17th 1990.

¹⁷⁹ *CTS*. Taipei, March 18th 1990.

Educational institutions all over Taiwan started responding sympathetically to the demonstration; not only did professors participate, but also ordinary people offered assistance and donated supplies. By March 18th 1990, the number of students gathered outside the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall reached 30,000.¹⁸⁰ This was a protest of historic proportions for Taiwan. The protest venue was kept in good order, and the government still had not taken any action to interfere, except for showing sympathy and trying to persuade the students to go home.¹⁸¹

Meanwhile, the Assembly itself was shocked by the harsh criticisms caused by the rights expansion of its Representatives. Consequently, many Representatives decided to change their mind, and said they did not support the revised articles. The ruling KMT party also stated that it had never agreed to the rights expansion of Representatives of the National Assembly. On March 19th 1990, government officials revealed that the authorities were considering convening the "Meeting of the Nation's Important Issues", which would bring together a range of people planning for a common national consciousness and policy of nation-building, and that this initiative came from Lee Teng-hui himself.¹⁸²

In order to assuage society's dissatisfaction towards it, the National Assembly decided to cancel the reversing verdicts of Temporary Provisions passed by the Examination Committee.¹⁸³ In order to calm the students, President Lee wrote a message in person

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² TTV, Taipei, March 18th 1990.

¹⁸³ CTV, Taipei, March 17th 1990.

and asked the Education Minister to convey it to them.¹⁸⁴ Lee Teng-hui assigned Lee Huan, Lee Yuan-chu, Chiang Yen-shi, and Soong Chu-yu (James Soong) to discuss overnight the timetable and agenda of the "Meeting of the Nation's Important Issues", and present the report to the Central General Committee.¹⁸⁵

On March 21st 1990, Lee Teng-hui was elected as the eighth President of the Republic of China. Among 668 Representatives of the National Assembly in attendance, Lee won 641 votes, or 95.96 percent.¹⁸⁶ On the same night, President Lee met with the 50 student representatives in the Presidential Office, who had been staging a sit-in in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall for six days. He said that the government understood every reform appeal proposed by the students, and was determined and sincere in resolving the questions as soon as possible. On March 22nd, Lee Yun-chu was elected as Vice President of the ROC; he received 602 votes from among 644 Representatives of the National Assembly present, accounting for 93.48 percent.¹⁸⁷ This was the highest margin of victory for any Vice President of the ROC since the Constitution was enacted in 1947.

Taiwan had passed through a constitutional and political crisis; the DPP had succeeded in restraining and balancing the National Assembly, a situation that had made the DPP more confident towards accelerating the process of democratization. However, if the Constitution continued to be frozen, the Temporary Provisions continued to exist, and

¹⁸⁴ *CTS*, Taipei, March 18th 1990.

¹⁸⁵ *TTV*, Taipei, March 20th 1990.

¹⁸⁶ *CTS*, Taipei, March 21st 1990.

¹⁸⁷ *CTV*, Taipei, March 21st 1990.

aged Representatives of the National Assembly, plus aged Delegates of the Legislative Yuan, both chosen in Mainland China, continued to control the parliamentary government. Thus the opposition party still had no legal device to compete with the central authority. The Chinese KMT and DPP had not developed official contact. If the Chinese KMT had no intention to provide the space for constitutional revision, then the opposition forces led by the DPP were unable to revise the Constitution under the framework of law. As a result, during the process of constitutional revision, the sensitive questions of the ethnic issues and "Taiwan independence" would be exposed. The local elites still had not reached consensus towards the operation of political power, and the factional struggles within the Chinese KMT and DPP had made those elites even more divided. Under the circumstances, if the factional conflict developed into large-scale street protests, it would cause social instability and endanger the fragile democratic system.¹⁸⁸

From the lifting of martial law in 1987 to the beginning of 1992 when the Representatives of the National Assembly revised the Constitution, a breakthrough occurred in the journey of Taiwan's political democratization. In the summer of 1992, even though severe political divisions were evident among the Taiwanese elites, democratic advancement survived. There was no political party or association prepared to adopt undemocratic solutions to the dispute or suppress divergent views, since none wished to lose its power and legitimacy in the eyes of voters. After Chairman Lee Teng-hui resolved the crisis of division within the Chinese KMT, he took

¹⁸⁸ Chu, Yun-han & Tien, Hung-mao. "Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms, Institutional Change and Power Realignment." In Klintworth, Gary (ed.). *Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s*. Allen & Unwin, ANU, Canberra, 1994, pp. 8-14; Chiou, C. L. "Emerging Taiwanese Identity in the 1990s: Crisis and Transformation." In Klintworth, Gary (ed.). *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

the initiative to develop contact and exchange messages with the opposition forces, and guaranteed that both parties would have further cooperation in advancing political reforms. Among the Representatives of the National Assembly, who took the responsibility of constitutional revision, the majority comprised Chinese KMT Representatives. It could be said that the public granted the leading role of constitutional revision to the ruling Chinese KMT. Although the DPP lost the elections, it still took part in the process of constitutional revision, and produced some results.¹⁸⁹

President Lee promptly stopped the indirect elections of President and Vice President to enter the procedure of constitutional revision. This signaled that the political divergence in Taiwan had been solved in a more tolerant manner. The new officials, the intellectuals, the commentators, and the public media that appeared in the political advertisements, had increased the public's trust towards their political leaders, and made them more respectful of divergent political views, and more willing to follow the legal democratic regulation to conduct political change.¹⁹⁰

From the summer of 1992 to 1996, Taiwan's politics had encountered further transformations. While differences of opinion still existed among the Taiwanese elites, the process of democratization continued unabated. During this significant transition period, power at the "inhibited political center" gradually distributed outward to civil society. The political parties that competed with one another, and the non-government

¹⁸⁹ Huang, Ten-fu. "Electoral Competition and Democratic Transition in the Republic of China." *Issues & Studies*. Vol. 27, No. 10, October 1991, pp. 97-123; Tien, Hong-mao. "The Transformation of an Authoritarian Party-State: Taiwan's Developmental Experience." *Issues & Studies*. Vol. 25, No. 7, July 1989, pp. 105-133; Chao & Myers, 1998, pp. 202, 279-280.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

organizations, started making demands related to their own interests to developing a “subordinated political center”.¹⁹¹

Conclusion

In spite of democracy being advocated in Taiwan since the 1950s, with the intention of continuing one-party rule, the Chinese KMT political center had adopted authoritarian rule. However, by the mid-1990s, the people of Taiwan started enjoying more substantial autonomy, and through the elections, they could freely elect their political leaders. They were allowed to join any political parties they liked, and obtain and communicate information openly and liberally. In contrast, in the People's Republic of China (PRC), people's freedoms have been restricted; they have had no significant political power devolved to them, and the government has largely retained control of information that transmits within society.

As Edwin A. Winckler recounts, Taiwan's politics transformed from “hard” to “soft” authoritarian politics.¹⁹² In the process of democratization, the ruling KMT party promoted democratic procedures from top down, led by the officials.¹⁹³ On the other

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Winckler, Edwin A. “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” *China Quarterly*. No. 99, September 1984, pp. 481-499; see also Peng, Huai-en. *Political Development and the Political Party System in Taiwan*. Dong-cha, Taipei, 1987, p. 18.

¹⁹³ Dai, Hong-chao. “The Kuomintang and Modernization in Taiwan,” in Huntington, Samuel P. and Clement H. Moore (eds). *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. Basic Books, New York, 1970; Winckler, Edwin A. “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” *China Quarterly*. No. 99, September

hand, it tolerated another democratic procedure that was from bottom up, and led by the opposition forces.¹⁹⁴ Without the occurrence of violence, turmoil, and destruction, the two democratic procedures finally merged into one, and turned Taiwan into a genuine democratic polity. That the ruling KMT party tolerated the opposition groups to the extent of sharing with them political power, and even taking the risk of losing power, must be regarded as a remarkable accomplishment.¹⁹⁵

In Taiwan, both the ruling and opposition parties were willing to incorporate the different types of national sentiment, opinion, and political culture, and made the adjustment internally to suit the practice of democracy.¹⁹⁶ Although Taiwan was influenced by Chinese politics and culture, its political leaders and social elites retained a healthy respect for views which differed from their own, and believed that democracy was more desirable for Taiwanese than dictatorship.¹⁹⁷

The local elections held in the 1950s were systematized in the 1960s, and the central elections started in the 1970s were systematized by the mid-1990s.¹⁹⁸ However, the

1984, pp. 481-499.

¹⁹⁴ Chiou, C. L. *Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990*. St. Martin's Press, London, 1995; Zheng, Dun-ren. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Affairs*. No. 41, July 1989, pp. 471-499.

¹⁹⁵ See also Ho, Helena V. S. & Andrew J. Nathan. "Chiang Ching-kuo's Decision for Political Reform." In Shao-chuan Leng (ed.). *Chiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan*. University Press of America, New York, 1993; Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Taiwan: The Democratization of a Divided Nation*. Tokyo University, Tokyo, 1992, pp. 212-213.

¹⁹⁶ See Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mill. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1958, p. 63.

¹⁹⁷ Pye, Lucian W. "Taiwan's Development and Its Implications for Beijing and Washington." *Asian Survey*. Vol. 26, No. 6, June 1986, pp. 611-629; Pye, Lucian W. with Mary W. Pye. *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 228-236.

¹⁹⁸ Copper, John F. *Taiwan's 1991 and 1992 Non-Supplemental Elections: Reaching a Higher State of*

elites of the ruling KMT party, believed only superficially in the Constitution and system, refusing to follow them in practice. The opposition made no pretense of being in favor of the Constitution of the Republic of China; rather, it attempted to formulate a new constitution. Nonetheless, in order to establish a democratic system, and although its power was limited, the opposition was willing to participate in the constitutional revision. Later, due to opposition pressure, and the ruling party's willingness to implement a democratic system, the KMT had performed the constitutional revision and thence carried out the requirements of democracy.¹⁹⁹

Taiwan's political reforms helped establish the democratic system, including the institution of a loyal opposition, a democratic political culture, the guarantee for all parties to compete openly and freely during elections, and respect for the Constitution. Indeed, these political reforms led Taiwan to becoming the first democratic country within the Greater China region (the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao). Chapter 4 will focus on the influence of the international system on Taiwan's democratization, the opposition's campaign changes, the occurrence of the Formosa Incident (or Kaohsiung Incident), and Taiwan's democratic transformation and consolidation.

Democracy. University Press of America, New York, 1994; Liu, I-chou, "Generational Divergence in Party Image among Taiwan Electorate." *Issues & Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 2, February 1995, pp. 87-114; Tien Hung-mao. *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*. M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1996; Yen, Chen-shen. "Sandong bu guoban and Political Stability in Taiwan: The Relevancy of Electoral System and Subethnic Cleavage." *Issues & Studies*. Vol. 31, No. 11, November 1995, pp. 1-15.

¹⁹⁹ See Feldman, Harvey J. *Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China*. M. E. Sharpe, New York, 1991.

Chapter Four

The International Dimension within Taiwan's Democratization

Despite Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, it still survives within an international system in which the world's paramount power and democracy, the United States of America, is its most valued protector. Moreover, the relationship between the USA and Taiwan's primary challenger, the People's Republic of China, a non-democratic state, has a direct bearing on Taiwan's political status in the international system. This was amply demonstrated when Washington switched diplomatic recognition of China from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, and pledged adherence to the "one China" policy. All nations maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC are required to do likewise. From this perspective alone the international dimension within Taiwan's democratization is readily discernible and worthy of investigation. Taiwan's democratization accords with international sentiment even if its political recognition is stymied.

Thus while Taiwan may be positioned within the third wave of democracy (that is, post-1974), so that by 2003 the majority of countries in the world (75%) were either fully or partially democratic,²⁰⁰ it has not followed the path to democracy exhibited by Latin American and European nations.²⁰¹ Theoretical work on democratization in the

²⁰⁰ Freedom House annual survey, cited in Kegley, Charles W. Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*. 9th edn, St. Martin's, New York, 2004, p. 605.

²⁰¹ See Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma University Press, 1991; Linz, Juan & Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Eastern Europe*. Yale University, 1993; Schmitter,

last quarter of the 20th century, on the whole, has concentrated on Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe, largely bypassing East Asia.²⁰² This chapter seeks to fill this gap in relation to Taiwan by investigating the importance of the international factor in Taiwan's democratization: that is, relations between Taiwan and the international community, Taiwan's democratic development from the international perspective, and the occurrence of the "Formosa Incident" – a pro-democracy demonstration - triggered by Washington's decision to switch diplomatic relations to Beijing and the KMT's subsequent decision to crush the opposition. This was a case of an external factor exacerbating internal conditions. Thus the time of superpower diplomatic abandonment and KMT entrenchment pushed the opposition into a heightened state of political activism. At stake was the fledgeling democratic movement's survival.

The theoretical concern

Changes in the international environment have arguably contributed to the process of democratic transformation in Latin America and parts of Europe. Even though the influence was rarely found in the first or second waves of democracy, it did not mean

Philippe. *The International Context for Contemporary Democratization: Constraints and Opportunities Upon Choice of National Institutions and Policies*. Stanford University, 1991; Pridham, Geoffrey, Eric Herring & George Sanford. *Building Democracies? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe*. London: Leicestershire University Press, 1994; Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz and Martin Lipset. "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?" In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Martin Lipset (eds). *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995.

²⁰² Yet, there are also some distinct examples. For instance, Huntington, 1991; Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995; Kim, Sunhyuk. *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society*. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2000.

that the international factor lacked importance at these levels. To the contrary, external intervention was often the decisive factor instigating democratic transformation, and the distinguishing feature of third wave democracy was its broadly based and enduring quality brought about by the international environment.²⁰³ Certainly there was a perceived liberalization of global politics with the end of the Cold War and hence an intellectual climate more conducive to democratization.

According to Huntington, in the first (1828-1926) and second (1943-1962) waves of democracy, both national (especially economic and social development) and international factors (the break up of empires after World War I and the rise of nationalism and decolonization after World War II) played a role in the process of overthrowing authoritarian rule.²⁰⁴ By the third wave, the loss of legitimacy by authoritarian governments is cited as a major cause.²⁰⁵ For Taiwan, as Huntington notes and as will be developed below, Confucian concepts of authority were eroded by the growth of the economy and the “emergence of a substantial entrepreneurial class, composed largely of native Taiwanese”, creating in “very un-Confucian fashion a source of power and wealth independent of the state”.²⁰⁶

In the prevailing era, liberalism and democracy are widely regarded as the most suitable for the contemporary international system. Not only did Francis Fukuyama raise this issue at the end of the Cold War with his *The End of History and the Last*

²⁰³ Huntington, 1991, p. 35.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., ch. 2.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 303.

Man,²⁰⁷ but, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan suggest, democratic values typify the modern spirit, and inform the most compelling model of political development.²⁰⁸ Under the global wave of promoting democratization, this historical situation is unprecedented and has produced a widespread effect. Democracy put pressure on dictatorial regimes from Seoul to Pretoria, and the countries that grasped the opportunity successfully transformed to democratic governance.²⁰⁹

In the Cold War era, developed democratic nations maintained an ambiguous attitude over whether to promote the democratic system to all countries. Strategic considerations sometimes dictated support for autocratic regimes, and even helped to overthrow the governments that had been popularly elected – for example, the Allende government of Chile in the early 1970s. Since the late 1970s, the United States has continuously given pressure and assistance to governments to strengthen their democratization. The European Community (EC) also began to change its policy of membership in the late 1970s and between 1980 and 1990 the EC sponsored democratic development in Eastern and Southern Europe.²¹⁰ Finally, due to the reform policy (*glasnost*) that had been practiced in the Soviet Union, along with the abandonment of ideological rectitude, the gates of democratization were opened to all of the Republics within the region.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. Penguin, USA, 1992.

²⁰⁸ Linz & Stepan, 1993, pp. 77-81.

²⁰⁹ See Sharp, Gene. *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. Albert Einstein Institution, Boston, MA, 1993, pp. 1-25.

²¹⁰ Pridham, 1994, pp. 23-25.

²¹¹ Ash, Timothy Garton. *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague*. Vintage Books, New York, 1993; Stokes, Gale. *The Walls Came Tumbling Down:*

In Taiwan's case, the early stage of democratic transformation was not influenced by the snowballing process.²¹² Political transformations that took place in Eastern Europe and Latin America did not convey a demonstrating effect to the KMT regime in Taiwan. This was evident when, at the end of 1986, President Chiang Ching-kuo decided to tolerate the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party, and immediately made the announcement of the lifting martial law and other political restrictions, which suggested the end of the long-established authoritarian rule.²¹³ While there was an increase in street demonstrations organized by the DPP in the second half of 1987, political reform led by the KMT in the 1987 to 1988 period was mainly instigated by the internal succession crisis.²¹⁴ Thus the wave of democratization that occurred across socialist Europe from 1989 to 1990, and parts of South America, reinforced but did not instigate the democratic trend in Taiwan.

During the process of the democratic transformation, East Asia lacked of any multilateral organization, or single actor, that could play a role similar to that of the European Community. During the 1980s, the United States and Japan were the most important trading partners to Taiwan. However, both put their business interest at the forefront, and tried to avoid using their economic power as leverage for democratic

The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press, New York, 1993.

²¹² Pridham, 1994.

²¹³ See Chu, Yun-han. *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan.* Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, 1992, pp. 38-44.

²¹⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 102-109.

reform in Taiwan.²¹⁵ This was also the case for South Korea, which relied primarily on civil society networks to push for democracy rather than external powers.²¹⁶

Nevertheless, the US Congress had played a significant role in promoting Taiwan's democratic reform. Stephen Solarz, who chaired the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Congress, pursued his concerns over the human rights record of Taiwan, for which there were calls for a thorough investigation.²¹⁷ In June 1987, the US Congress passed a non-binding resolution for the KMT to accelerate its political reform, and hold the re-elections of Public Representatives nationwide.

More importantly, Taiwan is different from most of the Latin American and Eastern European countries in that political liberalization in Taiwan did not originate from any major social or economic crisis, or the pressures of the international market. In addition, during the democratic liberalization in Taiwan, the civil sector did not make extensive demands for social and economic renovation.²¹⁸ Indeed, in contrast to the Latin American countries at the same level and time of industrialization, Taiwan had used the political system to lead its economic development plan. In doing so, it gained broad support from society. In another words, the export-driven industrialization strategy adopted by the old authoritarian political powers in Taiwan, had not only been

²¹⁵ See Hu, 1998, p. 167.

²¹⁶ See Kim, Sunhyuk, 2000; Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. "Democratizing China." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. December 2003, Vol. 38, No. 4-5, pp. 387-389.

²¹⁷ See Taiwan Security Research website, 'US Policy', <http://taiwansecurity.org/TSR-US.htm#Speeches>; Kim, H. N. "Political Changes in South Korea and Their Implications for U.S.-Korean Security Relations." *Korea and World Affairs*. Vol. 4, No. 11, winter 1987, pp. 649-665.

²¹⁸ Chu, 1992, pp. 30-32.

effective, but also established the system.²¹⁹ Undoubtedly, through rapid industrialization and strong economic growth, Taiwan had acquired a wide-ranging social and political mobilization power, and therefore propelled the democratic transformation that occurred in 1990.²²⁰

In the journey of Taiwan's democratic liberalism, several kinds of International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) had played a major part. For instance, the Christian Presbyterian Church had unfailingly provided spiritual and material support to the political opposition groups. When Taiwan was under authoritarian rule, several aggressive international organizations of human rights, such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International, had closely monitored the political persecutions and other human rights violations. As a result, these international organizations had directed global attention and concern towards the democratic movement in Taiwan. Other non-governmental organizations, especially the Asia Foundation, had offered generous assistance to civil society in the early stage of Taiwanese development. Besides, the internal democratic movement had been greatly supported by the overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States. These overseas Taiwanese had established close connections with the opposition leaders and groups in Taiwan, and provided both psychological and material support. Moreover, they had actively persuaded the US

²¹⁹ Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995; Chu, Yun-han & Hu Fu. "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization." In Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (eds). *Political Change in Taiwan*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992.

²²⁰ Tien, Hung-Mao. *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China*. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1989; Lasater, Martin L. "Taiwan's International Environment." *Democracy and Development in East Asia. Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines*. The AEI Press, Washington, D. C. , 1991, pp. 91-101.

Congress and Administration to adopt a more decisive strategy on human rights.²²¹

Taiwan's democratic development *vis-à-vis* the “one China” perspective

Taiwan's democratic transformation not only affected the crisis in legitimacy of the ruling authorities, but also the *Waishengjen* elitist position in Taiwanese society. The basis of both rested on the concept of “one China”, to which Taiwan was said to belong, and that the Republic of China was the only legal government to represent China in its entirety. The “one China” policy had always been the source of legitimacy of Taiwan's ruling structure. At the same time, its national consciousness had been directly implicated. Under the “one China” policy, the history and national identity of Taiwanese was prescribed, their national status decided by the ruling KMT party. The ethnic differences among Holo, Hakka, Aborigines, and *Waishengjen* were subsumed under Chinese national identity.²²²

However, with the crisis in legitimacy of the ruling authorities came the crisis of the *Waishengjen* elite's legitimacy in Taiwanese society, as Chinese national

²²¹ Shuo, Nan-fang. *Imperialism and the Taiwan Independence Movement*. Siji, Taipei, 1980, pp. 62-66; Shu, Wei-der. “Analyzing the Ideologies of the Postwar Overseas Taiwan Left Movement – A Case Study of the Debate on Taiwanese Nationalism, 1979-1982”. *The First Annual Meeting of Taiwanese History and Culture Conference*. August 9th-12th 1996, University of Texas – Austin; Tien & Lasater, *ibid*.

²²² Gold, Thomas B. *Civil Society and Taiwan Quest for Identity*. Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1991, pp. 21-32.

consciousness – or, as it was known, *great China consciousness* (*Da Chong Hua Yi Si*, 大中華意識) - had always been refused by a sector of the Taiwanese population, especially the families of those who suffered in the “228 Incident”, the overseas Taiwanese who received Western education, and the local elites of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church. The resistance of the Taiwanese towards *great China consciousness* originated from two related historical experiences. The first experience was the long-term Japanese colonial rule (half a century). During this time, the Japanese government firstly engaged in a “de-sinicization” policy in Taiwan, then urged local people to be the “Japanese Emperor’s people” during the Pacific War, and forced local elites to conform to these structures.²²³

Secondly, after World War II, Taiwan was taken over by the Chinese KMT that came from Mainland China; in the process of reconstruction and decolonization of the previous political powers, the Chinese KMT had shown ethnic discrimination towards Taiwanese, which in turn drew resistance from the local people. The occurrence of the “228 Incident” further emphasized the severity of ethnic discrimination, and Taiwanese people’s political status was repressed by the Chinese KMT. In due course, in the mid-1940s, the exiled overseas Taiwanese elites initiated the Taiwan independence movement. Despite many people having mixed Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, the KMT government attempted to establish *great China consciousness* in accordance with its posture of being the rightful ruler of Mainland China. Ironically, in inhibiting the

²²³ Chen, Edward. “Formosan Political Movement under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937.” *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 477-497; Kerr, George. *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974; Gold, 1991; Winckler, Edwin. “Taiwan Transition?” In Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard (eds). *Political Change in Taiwan*. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992; Chu, Yun-han & Lin, Chia-lung. “The Construction of Taiwanese Identity and Cross Strait Relations.” Taiwan Security Research, <http://www.taiwansecurity.org/TS/TS-Lin.htm>

growth of local Taiwanese national consciousness, the KMT fueled Taiwanese consciousness and the appeal of Taiwan independence.²²⁴

The aforementioned issues of legitimacy ultimately fell under the deliberations of a foreign power – namely, the China policy of the United States. In Taiwan's political transformation, competition between the local and *Waishengjen* elites opened the debate on Taiwan's international position and future relations between Taiwan and the PRC.²²⁵

New strategic initiatives by the Taiwanese opposition in the 1970s

After the elections held in 1977, the objective of the opposition groups had been to break the prohibitions of the KMT, and set up a new political party. Previously, opposition figures such as Lei Zhen and Kuo Yu-sing had publicized their beliefs through periodicals and mobilized the public during the elections. In the 1970s, the young intellectuals participated in the opposition movement; they were in charge of large-scale publicity to mobilize the public to join the protest. The scale of oppositional

²²⁴ Shu, Wei-der. "The Emergence of Taiwanese Nationalism – A Preliminary Work on an Approach to Interactive Episodic Discourse." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*. No. 42, 1998; Corcuff, Stephane. *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. xiii-xv; Chen & Kerr & Winckler, *ibid*.

²²⁵ Hu, 1998, pp. 181-182.

operations had vastly expanded compared to that of Lei Zhen and others in the 1960s.²²⁶

The first stage of opposition activity was the additional elections of Central Public Representatives in December 1978. In the same year were being held the elections of Delegates of the Legislative Yuan (conducted every three years), and the elections of Delegates of the National Assembly (every six years). Opposition candidates included:²²⁷

1. politicians who had been elected in the past, such as Kang Ning-siang, Huang Shun-sing, Chang Chun-nan, and Huang Ten-fu;
2. an academic at the Department of Philosophy at National Taiwan University, Chen Gu-ying, who was forced to resign because of a freedom of speech issue in *University Magazine*;
3. writers like Wong Tuo and Yang Ching-chu;
4. lawyers such as Chang Deh-ming and Yao Jia-wen;
5. feminist leader, Annette Siu-lian Lu, who was elected as the first female Vice President of the ROC in March 2000 and 2004;
6. journalist Chen Wan-jen (a woman); and
7. historian Huang Huang-siong.

²²⁶ Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Taiwan: The Democratization of a Divided Nation*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1994, pp. 197-198; Wu Jei-ming. "Social Protests during the Period of Transformation in a Political Regime – Taiwan in the 1980's." Masters Thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 1990, p. 100.

²²⁷ Wakabayashi, 1994, p. 198; Yao Jia-wen & Chen Ju. *The Collection of the Opposition Essays*. Published by Yao Jia-wen, Taipei, 1979, pp. 1-2.

Throughout the elections, opposition identities - the Delegate of the Legislative Yuan, Huang Sing-jie, and Councillor of Taiwan Province, Lin Yi-shiong - had, for the first time, formed a joint support organization, and held a combined seminar, press conference, and activity of supervising the elections, and promoted the shared political view of the "Twelve Great Political Constructions", these being:²²⁸

1. the re-election of the entire National Assembly;
2. the elections of Governor of Taiwan Province, and Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities;
3. the nationalization of the military;
4. the independence of the judiciary;
5. abolition of political control of schools;
6. removal of bans on forming political parties and publishing newspapers;
7. freedom for travel abroad;
8. the lifting of martial law;
9. abolition of capital punishment;
10. implementation of farm insurance, unemployment insurance, and universal health insurance, as well as the formulation of law for physical labor standards and law for environmental protection;
11. rendering illegal any ethnic discrimination and bias towards local languages; and
12. provision of amnesty to political criminals.

An increasing number of writers, journalists, and scholars had entered the elections, and a large number of university students volunteered as campaigners. The students

²²⁸ Wakabayashi & Yao and Chen, *ibid.*

produced a variety of election leaflets and posters, and distributed them widely. Many of them were to become opposition assistants in the 1980s. In comparison, the KMT that used the local factions and political party system to engage the organizational battle, had been unable to employ the same method to confront the opposition, and thus remained in a defensive position. The campaign of the opposition proved to be particularly powerful, and the result of the election was expected to be better than in earlier years. However, during the period of the elections, the United States proclaimed it was establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC on December 16th. In light of this development, President Chang Ching-kuo announced that the elections would be discontinued, and the opposition groups for the first time asserted that the future of Taiwan should be determined by its entire people.²²⁹

The Formosa Incident (also known as the Kaohsiung Incident) and its aftermath

It was within this context that Formosa - a group with the goal of setting up a political party - was founded. At this time, both the KMT elites and the opposition were disturbed by the diplomatic ties between the US and the PRC, and were even more conflictual towards each other: the KMT reinforced its attacks on the opposition, and the opposition further challenged the KMT. This triggered the Formosa Incident in December 1979, which resulted in leading opposition figures being convicted of

²²⁹ Kagan, Richard C. *Chen Shui-bian: Building a Community and a Nation*. Asia-Pacific Academic Exchange Foundation, Taipei, 1998, p. 65; Wakabayashi, 1994, pp. 198-200.

sedition. It was a defining moment in Taiwan's construction of a separate and independent identity.

To understand this development, it is necessary to go back to the start of 1979, when the opposition magazines – *Summer Tide* and *This Generation* – were prevented from publishing, and senior opposition figure, Yu Deng-fa, was arrested on January 21st 1979. Yu Deng-fa was the leader of the “Black Faction” – a Kaohsiung local faction that was anti-KMT. He had defeated the KMT candidate and been elected as Kaohsiung Mayor and Delegate of the National Assembly. For a long time, Yu was considered an anti-KMT force, but held the balance of power between the KMT party members and the opposition. On January 22nd 1979, the day after Yu's arrest, more than 10 well-known opposition figures protested. This was seen to challenge martial law.²³⁰ The KMT government took one of the dissidents, Taoyuan County Magistrate Hsu Hsin-liang, as the target and charged him with dereliction of duty by engaging in an illegal demonstration. On April 20th, the Control Yuan impeached and withdrew Hsu's authority as Taoyuan County Magistrate. He went into exile in the United States on September 30th.²³¹

Meanwhile, in August 1979, the opposition founded a political commentary magazine called *Formosa*. *Formosa* chose the senior opposition figure, Huang Sing-jie, as the publisher after Yu Deng-fa was imprisoned. Hsu Hsin-liang was appointed as the

²³⁰ Shu, Wei-der. “Who Joined the Clandestine Political Organization?” *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 52-53; Kagan & Wakabayashi, *ibid*.

²³¹ Ong, Joktik. “A Formosan's View of the Formosan Independence Movement.” In *Formosa Today*. Ed. Mark Mancall. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 163-170; Kagan, 1998, p. 65; Wakabayashi, 1994, p. p. 198-200; New Taiwan Foundation. “The Formosa Annual Chart.” *The Formosa Incident Data Base*. New Taiwan Foundation. Taipei, July 13th 2001, <http://formosa.yam.org.tw/chronolo04.htm>.

president, who was in charge of publication. In the names of “Delegate of the Publishing Affairs”, “Delegate of Editing”, and “The Managing Committee of Formosa Foundation”, the magazine recruited a range of oppositional talents - for instance, those from the organization of *Summer Tide* that was inclining to unification and socialism, and other groups like *The Eighties*, which was set up by the senior opposition figure, Kang Ning-siang (later to become Vice Defense Minister under the Chen Shui-bian administration). After the first issue of *Formosa*, the magazine quickly became a best seller; it had sold in excess of 100,000 copies, an unprecedented figure.²³²

Under this momentum, the Formosa group founded 11 service centers to promote the magazine and provide service to the readers.²³³ Moreover, activities such as the “Tea Party of the Establishment” and “Formosa Night” were held to give readers an opportunity to congregate. Later, when Activity Commanding General Shi Ming-de was prosecuted in the Formosa Incident, he revealed that the purpose of the Formosa activities was to form a political party without a name, which called for the re-election of the entire National Assembly, and the fully democratic election of Mayors and County Magistrates.²³⁴

As a result, the meetings and service centers of the Formosa group that had been held and set up everywhere, one after another, were viewed as a challenge to the system of martial law. In contrast, the so-called “Justice People of Anti-Communism” who, like

²³² The Editorial Committee. *The Record of Kaohsiung Incident*. New York, 1979, p. 104; Central Broadcasting System. “Democracy – Hsu Hsin-liang.” Taiwan, 2004, <http://www.cbs.org.tw/ND/democracy/p28.htm>; New Taiwan Foundation, 2001.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Formosa Television News Web. “Shi Ming-de Was Arrested.” *Taiwan Note*, Taipei, January 8th, 1980, <http://www.ftvn.com.tw/Topic/CaringTW/TWnotes/0108.htm>; The Editorial Committee of the Record of Kaohsiung Incident, 1979, p. 104.; Central Broadcasting System, 2004.; New Taiwan Foundation, 2001.

Lao Cheng-wu, fled from China to Taiwan, imitated the structure of Formosa and established a non-government organization called "Strong Wind". This had been acting provocatively during the public gatherings of the opposition. Furthermore, an unidentified person had been disturbing the house of *Formosa* publisher, Huang Sing-jie, and service centers everywhere.²³⁵

With the Formosa group having taken action to defend itself, tensions between the opposition and the Chinese KMT increased. On December 10th 1979, on World Human Rights Day, the opposition planned to assemble in Kaohsiung City, and Shi Ming-deh traveled there for preparations. Even though the previous applications for holding demonstrations had not been approved, past experience indicated that the approval was usually forthcoming at the final stage of preparations. Thus, the opposition decided to conduct the meeting and protest as scheduled. This led to clashes between the crowd and police, who were blocking the roads into Kaohsiung City. Shortly after, the authorities claimed that the police had followed a policy of not retaliating in the event of the crowd becoming violent, a situation that led to 183 policemen being injured, which was caused by the mobs of the Formosa group.²³⁶

A few days later, the public security organization arrested the opposition figures in succession: Huang Sing-jie, Shi Ming-deh, Chang Jun-hong (Delegate of the Legislative Yuan, 1995-2004), Yao Jia-wen (President of the Examination Yuan,

²³⁵ Kagan, 1998, p. 65; Wakabayashi, 1994, pp. 198-200.

²³⁶ Moody, Jr. Peter R. *Political Change on Taiwan. A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability*. Praeger, New York, 1992, pp. 79-84; Lee, Siao-fon. *Forty Years of Taiwanese Democratic Movements*. The Independent Evening Newspaper, Taipei, 1988, pp. 127-136; Kagan, 1998, p. 65; Wakabayashi, 1994, pp. 198-200.

2002-2004), Lin Yi-siong, Chen Ju (Chief Delegate of the Labor Committee, 2000-2004), Lu Siu-lian (Vice President of the ROC, 2000-2008), and Lin Hong-suan. They had been put on trial for armed rebellion by the Court of the Military Affairs. Likewise, the general jurisdictional court had prosecuted another 32 people, including Wang Touh (writer; Delegate of the Legislative Yuan, 1998-2004) and Yang Ching-pi.²³⁷

The examination by the military affairs court was conducted from March to April 1980. The court followed the assertion of the judge advocate, and pronounced the verdict of all guilty. Shi Ming-deh, who was imprisoned for an unlimited term, and later was given an amnesty due to the death of President Chiang Kai-shek, again received a verdict of an unlimited prison term. On the other hand, Huang Sin-jie was punished by a 14-year sentence, and the remaining six people received a 12-year sentence.²³⁸ Even though those judged by the jurisdictional court received a shorter term of punishment, almost everyone was pronounced guilty. Additionally, the leader of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, Kao Jun-ming, and another 10 people related to the church, were later arrested for concealing Shi Ming-deh. All were pronounced guilty.²³⁹

Although the Formosa Incident hindered the opposition movement in 1979, opposition leaders were still prepared to organize an alliance of political parties in the early 1980s. In order to prevent a crisis emanating from the opposition movement, President Chiang

²³⁷ Moody, 1992, pp. 79-84; Lee, 1988, pp. 127-136; Kagan, 1998, p. 65; Wakabayashi, 1994, pp. 198-200.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Ching-kuo was prepared to countenance political reform. He pacified those opposing the KMT conservative faction, and transferred any recalcitrant officials away from important posts. Most importantly, President Chiang also appointed a reformist Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, to be his successor.²⁴⁰

After President Chiang Ching-kuo's death in January 1988, the collapse of the KMT authoritarian system accelerated. Lee Teng-hui, who was sworn-in as the new president, decided to continue political reform and deviate from Chiang's policy of re-consolidating the KMT's political power. In the process of transformation of the political system, the opposition combined debate on (1) the ethnic indicators of national identity, and (2) the policy of promoting Taiwan's independence, when considering the best way to pursue democratization. In the late 1980s, the political environment became more liberal, so some of the more assertive DPP members advocated that the DPP should stand firmly by its position on Taiwan independence. Furthermore, the perceived liberalization of global politics with the end of the Cold War, had increased the domestic public appeal of Taiwan's independence.²⁴¹

These developments indicate that Taiwan was influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the advantageous situation brought about by weaker US-China relations after the *Tiananmen* Square Incident of 1989; as a result, the previously rigid "one China" policy had gradually loosened. Likewise, the collapse of the Eastern European

²⁴⁰ Moody & Lee & Kagan & Wakabayashi, *ibid.*

²⁴¹ Chu & Hu, 1992, pp. 128-130; Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Ten-hui*, Yuan-Liou, Taipei, 1998, p. 4.

bloc and Yugoslavia, was followed by ethnic disputation, altered political systems, and fragmentation of original territories. International society appeared more willing to accept some ethnic claims of having rights to decide autonomy, self-determination, or separation from the original country. This development in international politics encouraged supporters of Taiwan's independence.²⁴²

In the late 1980s, a public opinion poll on national identity revealed that the majority of people in Taiwan supported unification with Mainland China; however, by the mid-1990s, Taiwanese people's tendency and identity started to change dramatically. In 1995, as several surveys pointed out, 26 percent of people supported Taiwan independence, 29.1 percent expected unification with Mainland China in the future, and 18.4 percent wished to retain the status quo.²⁴³ People's diverse responses towards national identity caused argument towards the design of the constitutional system. Many DPP leaders believed that allowing people to elect the president directly could demonstrate to international society that Taiwan owned its independent sovereign rights. Moreover, a new consciousness of national identity that put Taiwan at the center could be developed. On the other hand, members of the KMT mainstream faction, such as Lee Teng-hui, also supported direct presidential elections.²⁴⁴

Democratic consolidation and remaining weaknesses

After the election of Delegates to the Legislative Yuan in December 1992, the elections

²⁴² Hu, 1998, pp. 184-185.

²⁴³ *The China Times*. August 4th, No. 4, 1995.

²⁴⁴ Lin, Zhuo-shui. "The Direct Vote of Presidency." *Seminar of Chinese Competitive Law*, Taipei, 1993.

in each primacy level had been held sequentially. The political system in Taiwan displayed a new atmosphere that was free and tolerant; for example, political leaders of the Taiwan independence movement, who were exiled overseas for many years, were permitted to return to Taiwan legally, and enter the elections as candidates. A competitive system was established among the political parties, as exemplified by the challenges in every election posed to the KMT by the DPP and the New Party (which had broken away from the KMT in August 1993). Since the position of the opposition parties had been formally admitted by the ruling elites of the KMT, and protected by law, the competitive system among the political parties had at last been legalized.

Meanwhile, the KMT elites had been replaced; while democratization did not mean that the Taiwanese elites were able to enter the core of the political power structure, it had increased people's expectations towards democratic reform. After the legislative elections held in December 1992, Lien Chan became the first half-Taiwanese, who was appointed as Prime Minister, and the transformation process of the executive powers had been accomplished in general. Since the 1980s, the mobilization produced by a variety of social movements had liberated the civil society, which was formerly controlled by the authoritarian system. Through the social movement, the intellectuals, the religious groups, the public welfare groups mainly formed by the middle class, the unions of different industries, and the university students, had all gained more opportunities for participating in politics. Remarkably, Taiwan's democratic achievement was not obtained at the price of national collapse or political turmoil.

Nevertheless, the democratic system of Taiwan had not been consolidated. Even

though the process of democratic transformation had gone smoothly, a number of negative influences were felt. For example, the reform of the constitutional system had not reached the final stage of negotiation by the political party elites. Consequently, the three major political parties still lacked consensus on the constitution. In addition, the KMT still controlled the military security system, three national television stations, a number of profitable enterprises and its monopoly rights.²⁴⁵

Conclusion

The international system and some of its actors had influenced periodically democratic transformation and consolidation in Taiwan. Due to differences in the regional dynamics of Eastern Europe and East Asia, and the collapse of the authoritarian system occurring during a different timeframe compared to Eastern Europe, the democratic achievement of Taiwan was not as noticeable as in the European case. Although Taiwan relied on the US market and its military assistance, the political and economic advantages of the United States were based on the social security of Taiwan.²⁴⁶

In the three phases of the transformation of the political power in Taiwan, which were the collapse of the authoritarian system, democratic transformation, and democratic consolidation, the PRC displayed its strong influence. In addition, after Taiwan

²⁴⁵ Chu, Yun-han. "Taiwan's Unique Challenges." *Journal of Democracy*. No. 7, July 1996, p. 3.

²⁴⁶ Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (eds). *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1997.

entered the phase of democratic transformation, the gradual increasing appeal of Taiwan independence angered China. This, in turn, meant that Taiwan-China relations entailed linkages between security and economic advantage for significant international actors, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union. How to solve the problems between Taiwan and China thereby posed a moral challenge to each of these major industrialized democracies.

Chapter five seeks to elaborate further the domestic context for Taiwan's democratization before resuming more detailed international considerations. It will examine Taiwan's democratic locomotive – the Legislative Yuan – as well as efforts made by the first large-scale students movement (the Wild Lily Students Movement) urging President Lee Teng-hui to terminate the “Forever National Assembly”, and the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. In effect, the domestic politics explored in the next chapter meant that Taiwan had foregone its old KMT claim to being one China. That which remained was Taiwan and its immediate islands of Penghu, Kinmen and and Matsu. Here the path to democratization included the geography of identity, a topic which will be explored in a subsequent chapter, but which is noted here to emphasize the cultural elements in Taiwan's democratization during the Lee Teng-hui era.

Chapter Five

Taiwan's Domestic Politics

March 18th 2000 marked an historic event in the Greater China region; 49-year-old Taiwanese Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party defeated the Chinese *Kuomintang* Party, which had been in power in Taiwan for almost 50 years. It was not only the triumph of the DPP, but also a victory for democratic politics that gradually took root in Taiwan. On May 20th 2000, President Lee Teng-hui fulfilled his promise and handed over political power peacefully; in Lee's 12 years in office, his most important accomplishment was democratization. On the other hand, during the democratic elections, the burden of corruption that the Chinese KMT carried continued to expand; as a result, the Chinese KMT was voted out of office.²⁴⁷

Taiwan's transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy was most evident under Lee Teng-hui's presidency; it was an irreversible trend, which he encouraged in accordance with the needs of the time. Given that Taiwan's quest for democratization at this time came after a hundred years of colonization and authoritarian rule, it is not surprising that local people viewed the first Taiwanese president as their national and spiritual leader.²⁴⁸ This chapter examines how Lee Teng-hui came to power, the Wild

²⁴⁷ Mitchell, James. "Taiwan Stands Up." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, May 21st 2000, p. 1; Ide, William & Lin Chieh-yu. "New Era Begins." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, May 21st 2000, p. 17; Lin, Irene & Jou Ying-cheng. "Reins of Power Change Hands." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, May 21st 2000, p. 19; Kao, Si-Jin. "The Historical Opportunity of the New President – Knocking the Door of Win-Win Situation across the Straits." *United Daily Newspaper*. March 21st 2000, p. 4.

²⁴⁸ Chang, Hui-ying. *Lee Teng-hui 1988-2000 Twelve Years in Power*. T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), Taipei, 2000, pp. 1-5; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 181-183.

Lily Students Movement, the emergence of street demonstrations that challenged authoritarian rule, relations between President Lee and the DPP, the role of the media, the construction of national identity, and the decline and change of the Chinese KMT.

Conflict and consolidation of power

When Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro in 1995, he frankly revealed the difficult condition he had encountered when he succeeded the presidency, "I had no gun, my fist was small, and I did not have any faction in the Chinese KMT. All I had were the people's voices in of my heart."²⁴⁹ During Lee's first presidency, which began from 1988 when he was sworn-in after President Chiang Ching-kuo died, to 1990 when the presidential elections ended, he did not wield any significant power, be it political or military. On the other hand, the trend toward democratic reform, the presence of local opposition groups, and popular opinion that sought freedom and democracy, provided political support for President Lee to dismantle the old authoritarian system. Tactically, Lee compromised with secondary opponents to attack the primary ones. For instance, even though Lee Teng-hui appointed political foes Lee Huan (June 1989 – April 1990) and Hao Bo-cun (May 1990 - February 1993) as President of the Executive Yuan consecutively, the strategic direction was towards democratic reform.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ Shiba, Ryotaro. *The Records of a Taiwan Tour*. Kaido O Yuku-Taiwan-Hen, Taipei, 1995, p. 537.

²⁵⁰ Chen, Yi-chun. "The KMT Conservative Faction: Political Fights Conducted Secretly in Former Years." *The New Taiwan Journal*. Taipei, Vol. 420, April 8th 2004, pp. 45-50; Chang, 2000, pp. 1-5; Guo, Cheng-liang. "Lee Teng-hui Phenomenon: Democratic Transformations and Political Leadership."

With President Lee having fulfilled rising expectations for an indigenous political “success story”, he rapidly became the leader of an emergent Taiwanese national identity. In addition, Lee caused divisions to arise within the established power structure of the Chinese KMT, gradually localized the party, and built up his own power base. The power struggle that accompanied this process of change resulted in factional splits, oppositional forces, and personal hatreds.²⁵¹

In President Lee's second term in office, from 1990 when he was elected as the eighth President to 1996, he accomplished a great many reforms. To begin with, in order to consolidate a broad backing for reform, President Lee had convened the “Meeting of the Nation's Important Issues”, invited the opposition to participate, and opened up political negotiations among the different parties. Next, Lee ended the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, abolished the Temporary Provisions, terminated the “white terror”, and brought a wayward national identity back to the people of Taiwan.

Lee Teng-hui had the constitution amended twice, caused Delegates of the entire National Assembly to be re-elected, allowed people to elect directly their Provincial Governor, Mayors, President, and Vice President, an unprecedented occurrence in the Greater China region. Hence, a new consciousness of Taiwan had gradually been developed. Constitutional amendment was carried out in accordance with the will of the people. As a result, President Lee had gained widespread popular approval, and an

Democracy & Transformation? Taiwan Experience. Kuei-kuan, Taipei, 1998, pp. 115-120; Siao, 1999, pp. 181-183.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

enhanced international reputation.

In his political ascent, Lee removed Hao Bo-cun, his final political foe; the aftermath of the contest among the Chinese KMT factions was finalized, and the non-mainstream faction left the Chinese KMT and formed the New Party, a development which formally divided the Chinese KMT. President Lee finally began to consolidate power, both political and military, and his prestige rose significantly. However, after several elections (discussed below), the opposition had risen rapidly, and the Chinese KMT faced strong challenges. In order to maintain its power, the Chinese KMT had been localized, and at the same time, gradually corrupted (this is elaborated in “The Decline of the Chinese KMT”, below). Its divided and corrupted condition had an adverse effect on the Chinese KMT's image; the party lost some talented members, and its strength weakened.²⁵²

Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui promoted a policy of “Pragmatic Diplomacy” (elaborated in Chapter 6); apart from seeking Taiwan's return to the United Nations, he made frequent overseas visits, with the aim of bringing the Republic of China back into international society. Between 1994 and 1995 alone, President Lee traveled abroad four times, visiting more than 10 countries, most of which had no diplomatic ties with Taiwan.²⁵³

Ultimately, Lee Teng-hui successfully accomplished the objective of going to the

²⁵² See Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 181-183.

²⁵³ Chang, Hui-ying. *The Super Diplomat – Lee Teng-hui and his Practical Diplomacy*. Times Culture, Taipei, 1996, pp. 12-14.

United States; as a result, Lee's prestige had climbed rapidly in Taiwan. This culminated in China's July 1995 demonstration of military power as a tool in the diplomatic war across the Taiwan Strait for the first time. In effect, China threatened Taiwan with military exercises and missile tests.

Achievements in democratic reform, diplomacy (Lee's 1995 visit to the US), and an anti-PRC sentiment amongst Taiwanese as a result of Beijing's verbal threats and military demonstrations, elevated President Lee Teng-hui's status during the first presidential direct election in March 1996. Lee obtained a landslide victory with 54 percent of votes,²⁵⁴ and became the first leader elected directly by the people in the Greater China region.

The decline of the Chinese KMT and the progress in the Legislative Yuan

During his third term in office, President Lee made the decision to close down "Taiwan Province". This was caused by one of the lingering effects of local elections. When Members of the County Councils were transferred to the Legislative Yuan, gangster and corruption problems previously concentrated at the local level shifted to the central government. Therefore, criminal activity and corruption politics rapidly expanded, to the detriment of Taiwan's political development. For example, a high percentage of

²⁵⁴ Chang, 2000, p. 6.

the County Magistrates and Delegates of the Legislative Yuan were of gangster background, and the subsequent political disorder caused public dissatisfaction with the government. Thus, ironically, Taiwanese appeared to have traded the “white terror” for the terror of organized crime and corruption. By contrast, the international status of Taiwan had been promoted by its democratization, and its independent sovereign rights had also been better articulated.²⁵⁵

In evaluating Lee Teng-hui's 12 years in office, and despite the Chinese KMT being blamed for the criminalization of politics, politics were seen to be undergoing positive transformation. Lee promoted democratization, and gradually established a popular mandate for improving the quality of politics. Thus, irrespective of the results of future elections, the leadership would have to face robust competition.²⁵⁶

In 1990 and 1991, the old system and the new democratic trend clashed. The beginning of democratization took place in the Legislative Yuan during these two years; at the elections of Additional Delegates of the Legislative Yuan, the DPP won 66 seats (22.78%),²⁵⁷ and this had opened a new era of party politics. The political elites of the DPP such as Lu Siu-yi, Chen Shui-bian, Sie Chang-ting, Peng Bai-sian, Chen Ding-nan, and Ye Ju-lan were elected Delegates of the Legislative Yuan for the first time. These DPP legislators started exhibiting their talent on the central political stage, and directly

²⁵⁵ Sia, Zhen. *The Sunset KMT*. T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), Taipei, 2000, pp. 209-211.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ The DPP Central Party Headquarters. “The Annual Table of Important Events.” Taipei, June 28th 1991, <http://www.dpp.org.tw/history/pub/>

challenged the authoritarian system.²⁵⁸

On the other hand, the new generation of the Chinese KMT Additional Legislators began to divide in accordance with their ethnic identities. For instance, the “New KMT Connection”, including the majority of Chinese Legislators such as Chao Shao-kang and Yu Mu-ming, gradually moved towards the non-mainstream faction and set up the New Party. As for the Taiwanese Legislators of the Chinese KMT, who belonged to the mainstream faction, these gathered together under the *Ji Si Hui* (Meeting of the Minds Grouping), led by Huang Chu-wen. On the surface, President Lee Teng-hui had kept an impartial distance with the Legislative Yuan; in fact, the *Ji Si Hui* quickly became the active force, which carried out Lee's decisions, and attacked opponents such as Hao Bo-cun, who was President of the Executive Yuan at that time.²⁵⁹

Between 1990 and 1991, the Legislative Yuan became the “locomotive” of political development in Taiwan. Most of the important political reforms were started from the Legislative Yuan, a notable instance being the termination of the “Forever National Assembly”.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ Chiou, C. L. *Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, pp. 133-135; Siao, 1999, p. 84.

²⁵⁹ Chang, 2000, p. 17.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

The Wild Lily Student Movement and the street movements that challenged authoritarian power

In February 1990, when the Chinese KMT had just resolved the war of politics, the National Assembly held a temporary meeting in order to prepare for the election of the eighth President of the Republic of China. All aged Chinese Representatives of the National Assembly chosen in Mainland China assembled - with assistance in view of their age and disabilities - in Chong-shan Building. The President was going to be elected by these aged Representatives, who still received a salary and were responsible for amending the constitution. This situation, along with the *Tiananmen* Square Incident that occurred in Beijing the previous year, became a source of protest for students who gathered in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. They staged a sit-in, which turned into a large-scale student demonstration called the "Wild Lily Student Movement". It was the first of its type in Taiwan.

Despite this manifestation of public resentment, government resistance was firm. After all, the regulatory status quo had been in power for 40 years; it was extremely difficult to terminate the "Forever National Assembly", and remove the Temporary Provisions. Due to strong public condemnations inspired by the students' movement, President Lee Teng-hui made a televised speech on March 17th 1990. He attempted to pacify the public, and persuade the student movement to disband peacefully; he formally declared that the "Meeting of the Nation's Important Issues" would be

convened, and political reform would be carried out.²⁶¹

As matters came to a head, the resignation of all Representatives of the National Assembly was unavoidable. On June 20th 1990, President Lee's promise of terminating the "Forever National Assembly" was finally implemented, and the Meeting of the Grand Justices interpreted the constitution as follows:

The exercise of political rights of the first Representatives of the National Assembly should be ended by December 31st 1991, and the government should conduct the elections of the second Representatives of the National Assembly in the proper time.²⁶²

Later, in a press conference held on April 30th 1991, Lee Teng-hui made the historic declaration, which stated that from May 1st, the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion would be terminated, the Temporary Provisions would be abolished, and the additional articles that were amended would be announced.²⁶³ Lee terminated the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion that had been in place for 43 years, returned to the constitution, ended the phase of regarding the Chinese Communist Party as a "bandit" regime, and moved towards the new era of using dialogue instead of force to solve

²⁶¹ Huang, Huang-siong. *Contemplation in Harvard – To See Taiwan from the World*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 152-153.

²⁶² Hu, Fu. *The Scientific Exploration of Political Science (4): The Transformation of Politics and Democratization*. Sanmin, Taipei, 1998, p. 31.

²⁶³ Lee, Teng-hui, "Termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion." International Press Conference, April 30th 1991. In Lee, Teng-hui. *Creating the Future: Towards a New Era for the Chinese People*. 2nd edn. ROC Government Information Office, Taipei, 1993, pp. 37-62.

cross-Strait problems. Accordingly, Taiwan took leave from the old system, and embarked upon democracy.²⁶⁴

In Lee's 12-year presidency, large and small street movements provided a record of democratic development in Taiwan. During that time, authoritarian rule still resisted the trend of democracy, and made efforts to restrain the power of reform. The gatherings and protest marches were inhibited or controlled by numerous prohibitions, freedom of speech was restricted, and the opposition publications were frequently investigated and banned by the authorities. The issue of Taiwan's independence was also taboo, and its supporters were deemed to be committing the crime of armed rebellion. Moreover, the government's infamous "black list" of overseas reformers and independence supporters ensured they were prevented from returning to Taiwan. On April 7th 1989, Zheng Nan-zong, Publisher of the *Liberty Times*, immolated himself as an act of protest against the Chinese KMT government's prohibition on freedom of thought and speech. On May 19th, during the funeral march of Zheng Nan-zong, another self-immolation occurred. Chan Yi-hua did so in front of the Presidential Office with the aim of striving for democratic reform.²⁶⁵

Under authoritarian rule, there was no systemic scope for implementing reform. As a result, the opposition decided to participate in the street protest movements. Marches were conducted for a range of advocacies, including re-election of the entire National Assembly, anti-nuclear demonstrations, opposition to military involvement in politics,

²⁶⁴ See Chang, 2000, p. 19.

²⁶⁵ Lee, Qiao. *The Shaping of Taiwanese Culture*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1992, pp. 248-249.

and an insistence on directly electing the President.²⁶⁶ The DPP became known for its role in maintaining public order and mediating to calm unruly crowds. Meanwhile, restrictions on gatherings and marches were gradually relaxed. As the number of street movements increased, so too society came to accept this method of expression.²⁶⁷

The number of gatherings and marches rose and fell in accordance with the changes in the political climate. In 1988, the number of gatherings and marches was only 1,433, yet the figure suddenly increased to 5,431 in 1989; in 1990, the number grew to 7,775. The street movements subsided when they received a sympathetic response from the authorities.²⁶⁸ The phase of the street movement in Taiwan's transitional politics is understandable: voices suppressed in the past needed to be expressed, those rights and interests that were violated needed to be recompensed, and dissatisfaction with the status quo also needed to be addressed. When the political reform was implemented step by step, these tensions between the ruling party and the opposition forces lessened, and the people's expressions of frustration diminished. In 1994, Representatives of the National Assembly finally passed the constitutional amendment in support of direct presidential elections, and after the last checkpoint of democracy was crossed, almost no significant political street movement was held.²⁶⁹

However, in May 1997, a different type of march took place. It was called "May 4th, Mourn for Siao-yen, and Walk for Taiwan". The direct cause was the kidnapping and

²⁶⁶ Chang, 2000, p. 21.

²⁶⁷ Siao, 1999, pp. 81-85; *TVBS*. Taipei, July 1st & 2nd 1999.

²⁶⁸ Chang, 2000, p. 19.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

killing of secondary school girl, Bai Siao-yen, but the underlying reason was the inability of police to control serious criminal activity. For example, a murder occurred at the official residence of former Taoyuan County Magistrate, Liu Bang-yo, in which the whole family was killed. Another murder case was that of feminist activist, Peng Wan-ru, who entered a taxi in Kaohsiung and was raped and killed by the driver. Due to the deteriorating public security, the accumulated resentments of the public were openly expressed. Complaints centered on the rampant politics of criminality and corruption, the ineffectual condition of the ruling and opposition parties, and the neglect of people's rights to basic security. Consequently, 108 private organizations, including the "Foundation of People's Origin", asked Lee Teng-hui to "admit mistakes, apologize to the people, and replace the cabinet". After martial law was lifted, most street movements were organized, led, and mobilized by the opposition; yet the "May 4th March" was instigated directly by public opinion. Taiwanese participated without prior political organization or mobilization, and many families brought their small children and elder family members to join the movement. The number of participants reached 50,000, surprising both the ruling and opposition parties. In order to prevent the political manipulation of people's resentments, the sponsors of this protest march did not allow any political party or politician to be part of the organizing committee.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ Chen, Fang-ming. "Peng Wan-run in Blood." *Taiwan Daily*, Taipei, December 9th 1996, p. 5; Liu, Jun-ku & Tang, Fu-nein & Cheng, Kuo-dong & Cheng Jen-shen. "Bai Bin-bin's Daughter was kidnapped." *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, April 27th 1997, p. 1; Huang, Hong-jun. "Public Representatives Asked the President to Apologize, and Lien Chan to Step Down"; Yang, Huei-jin & Lee Shing-hong. "The Non-Government Organizations Voiced Out." *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, April 30th 1997, p. 1.

The characteristics of Lee Teng-hui

Former Director of the Secretarial Office in the Presidential Office, Su Chi-cheng, who was called the confidant of President Lee, described him as follows:

President Lee's charisma and benevolence make him well suited to be the head of a family, and he is able to attract people to his side like the magnet. Moreover, President Lee is a man of the times, capable of distinguishing which persons are wanted by Taiwanese, and which ones are not, and what he has done, is what the people want.²⁷¹

Lee Teng-hui's personal characteristics may be seen to influence Taiwan's political development, society and culture in a number of ways:

1. The man with a mission

President Lee displayed a strong sense of mission; he was not only a politician, but also in his disposition a combination of scholar and preacher. Lee's scholarly side made him open to new ideas, and to ponder philosophical issues. On the other hand, the preacher within gave rise to a religious calling of mission.²⁷² A devout Christian, he regarded the duty of President as a mission that God gave him (see below).

²⁷¹ Chang, 2000, p. 31.

²⁷² Both these characteristics are evident in Lee Teng-hui. *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity*. PHP Institute, Inc., Tokyo, 1999, ch. 1: "My Intellectual and Spiritual Journey."

Consequently, despite seemingly overwhelming pressures, Lee retained his resolve. In 1990, in the 13th National Assembly of the Chinese KMT, Lee Teng-hui insisted on the nomination of Lee Yuan-chu as Vice President, in order to implement the constitutional amendment.

The narrative, which forms from the missionary view of Lee may be presented as follows: President Lee had been firm in “choosing the virtuous”: the persons appointed as officials and policies enacted had to be of benefit for the country, people, and their descendants. Even though he had to compromise occasionally when under pressure, it was only a detour from the main course he chartered. His sense of mission gave him courage in the face of difficulties, and he strove to remove the old system and open up a new political environment. Also according to the interpretation of Lee as religiously motivated, he did not have a strong desire for personal power; he did not seek power for personal satisfaction, but to accomplish his divinely ordained mission.²⁷³

According to Shi-hsing University academic, Yo Zi-siang, Lee Teng-hui has the preacher's image: he has become accustomed to speaking in front of people, his eyes are steady, and he speaks powerfully. Hence, according to Yo, the people believe what Lee said.²⁷⁴ This view is supported by the Director of Public Affairs in the Presidential Office, Ding Yuan-chao.²⁷⁵ He states that Lee Teng-hui wanted to be a preacher, not Vice President, but Chaplain Chou Lian-hua wrote a letter to tell him that as Vice

²⁷³ Chang, 2000, p. 31.

²⁷⁴ Yo, Zi-Siang was interviewed by the Formosa Television's “Taiwan's Old Gentleman – Mr. Democracy Lee Teng-hui” on May 20th 2000, which was hosted by Kao Zen-jei.

²⁷⁵ Ding Yuan-chao was interviewed in *ibid*.

President he could do more for the people than as a preacher.

In another reported episode, President Lee went to the Grand Hotel in Kaohsiung to attend a function. When he took the elevator and saw the floor numbers light up one after another, Lee pointed to the numbers, and said to his companions: "I am already in my 70s. Just as those numbers have almost come to the end, so have my years. I want to devote the final part of my life to this land and its people."²⁷⁶

In yet another incident, in March 2000, after the Chinese KMT lost the presidential election, the reformist faction criticized Lee Teng-hui - in Lien Chan's presence - as unwilling to hand over his chairmanship to Lien. In spite of the fact that Lien had just been defeated, he said: "You are mistaken about Chairman Lee, he is not a person who is reluctant to leave power and position", and the criticism ceased.²⁷⁷

2. Personal probity

Lee appeared to oppose the operation of "power politics" and bureaucratic treachery. As described by Yo Zi-Siang, President Lee Teng-hui did not speak as a bureaucrat; for instance, he criticized China for acting like bandits in the "Thousand Islets Lake Incident" (discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis), and said the Chinese leadership had

²⁷⁶ Chang, 2000, p. 32.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

brains as hard as concrete.²⁷⁸ In addition, as media analyst Liu Zuo-kun indicated, Lee once pointed out that despite everyone saying that “China is big, but how big it is, it is not bigger than my father”.²⁷⁹ Although Lee Teng-hui may be criticized for undiplomatic language, nevertheless, he was admired for speaking honestly and vividly.

3. Taiwan is the first priority

Lee's Taiwanese consciousness manifested in his concern for the future of Taiwan. When Lee as President was given the right to lead the country, Taiwanese were still under the sway of internal authoritarian politics. Internationally, Taiwan was under Beijing's pressure, and could not act freely. Thus Lee Teng-hui attempted to bring Taiwanese people out of domestic and foreign subservience. To this end he promoted democratic reform, and carried out direct presidential elections that enabled voters to determine who would be President. Lee Teng-hui's local Taiwanese identity is partly explained by his never having lived in Mainland China. In his China Policy, Lee insisted that “Taiwan must be the first priority”, and the interests of Taiwanese cannot be compromised.²⁸⁰

President Lee was an avid reader of foreign books and periodicals, thereby exposing

²⁷⁸ Yo, May 20th 2000.

²⁷⁹ Liu Zuo-kun was interviewed by the Formosa Television's “Taiwan's Old Gentleman – Mr. Democracy Lee Teng-hui” on May 20th 2000, which was hosted by Kao Zen-jei.

²⁸⁰ Siao, Hsing-huang. *Taiwan Times*. March 25th 1999, p. 3.

himself to global intellectual trends and new technology. Not only did he keep up with the latest developments, but his field of vision also expanded to take in the global situation.²⁸¹ This compares favorably with other politicians in Taiwan, who typically may understand foreign languages, but are absorbed with power struggles domestically, and have not set aside time to study international political trends. Because Taiwan is an island nation, its development is closely related to international relations; hence the importance of a leader's mastery of issues of international politics and economics.²⁸²

4. Lee's Japanese cultural background

Lee Teng-hui was brought up during Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Consequently, he was fluent in both Taiwanese and Japanese. Lee had studied in Japan, read Japanese books, and maintained contact with his Japanese friends. Japanese culture thus came easily to Lee, and he had a deep appreciation of Japanese politics.²⁸³

Japan, in turn, responded well to Lee as President. Thus when Lee was criticized in Taiwan, he was praised in Japan. It should be remembered that Lee's fellowship is treasured in a country whose World War II record is still held against it by many Asian nations. Lee Teng-hui also cultivated relations with Japan's intellectuals. Moreover, Japan, culturally and traditionally, holds in high esteem the type of leader that Lee

²⁸¹ See, for example, Lee Teng Hui. *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity*. PHP Institute, Inc., Tokyo, 1999.

²⁸² See Chang, 2000, p. 36.

²⁸³ Wakabayashi, Masahiro. *Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Ten-hui*. Yuan-Liou, Taipei, 1998, pp. 18-21.

represented - one who was erudite, self-cultivated, philosophical, and politically powerful. The Confucian-authoritarian element in Japan's culture esteems this type of leader, but under factional politics and the cabinet system, it is thought such qualities cannot be developed; hence the attraction of Lee to Japanese scholars.²⁸⁴ For example, Japanese writer Shima Ryutaro, whose interview of Lee first appeared in the *Asahi Daily* under the title of "The Sorrow of being Born Taiwanese", said that he felt that "Lee Teng-hui really approximates an ideal Japanese".²⁸⁵

Under authoritarian rule, leaders are routinely praised for their virtues and criticism is not permitted. In democratic polities, the speech and behavior of leaders is analyzed in detail and subject to criticism. Lee Teng-hui appeared at the turning point from authoritarian rule to democracy, and Taiwanese found that there were no "perfect Presidents" in the new era. As suggested by Chairman of Yuan-liou Publishing Company, Wang Rong-wen, Lee was the first Taiwanese President who was willing to share his ideas of governing the country with the public.²⁸⁶ For example, Lee's *With the People Always in My Heart*,²⁸⁷ was published during his term in office. It told Taiwanese of his beliefs from a first-hand viewpoint. Such a strategy of confiding in the public brought him closer to it.

²⁸⁴ Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999, pp. 39-41. It is notable that the following was originally published in Japanese under the title *Taiwan no shocho*: Lee Teng Hui. *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity*. PHP Institute, Inc., Tokyo, 1999

²⁸⁵ Cited in Tu, Weiming. "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan." *The China Quarterly*. No. 148, December 1996, p. 1131.

²⁸⁶ Wang, Rong-wen was interviewed by *ETTV News* on May 16th 2000.

²⁸⁷ Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999.

Identity politics and the Chinese KMT

That Lee was of the people, a Taiwanese, was also significant in bridging the traditional gap between ruler and ruled. Before President Chiang Ching-kuo died, and even after Lee Teng-hui was appointed as Vice President, few in the political system took Lee seriously. This was because all of the important posts had been taken by the *Waishengjen* for a prolonged period of time. Local officials were used as tokens to symbolize the balance of different identities, and had never been given substantive power. During the authoritarian era, if a Taiwanese intended to become president, conflict between the old *Waishengjen* ruling elite and local people was inevitable. Yet the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo allowed Lee Teng-hui to be sworn-in as President immediately and without an ensuing power struggle. This was a major feat in the ethno-political landscape of Taiwan.²⁸⁸

After Taiwan democratized, the quest for popular appeal often took the form of appeal to ethnic identity. For its survival, the Chinese *Kuomintang* would resort to the identity politics of the “Lee Teng-hui card”. To a certain degree, the “Lee Teng-hui complex” was rooted in the Taiwanese identity claim, and it served to restrain the Democratic Progressive Party from attacking President Lee directly during elections.²⁸⁹ National identity, with its ethnic and cultural components, is not a fixed concept, but is constructed continuously. In Lee’s 12-year presidency, developments which influenced

²⁸⁸ Lee, Teng-hui. *Managing a Big Taiwan*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1996, pp. 16-18; Wakabayashi, 1998, pp. 134-136.

²⁸⁹ Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Liberal Times*. June 3rd 1997, p. 5.

the identity consciousness of the various ethnic groups are identified below. It should be noted that a countervailing development to the politics of competitive identity, was Lee's notion of the "New Taiwanese" (see below), in which loyal citizenship ("love of Taiwan") was more important for group identification than ancestry.

1. Changes in population and society

With the passage of time, the *Waishengjen* population that officially moved from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949 gradually decreased. In comparison, the majority of Taiwanese had no direct experience of Mainland China, and these two parties grew up under the influence of different historical narratives. However, over the half-century of intermarriage and social proximity, the ethnic divide between local people and *Waishengjen* gradually faded. For example, the majority of local people and *Waishengjen* do not have obvious differences in education, employment, lifestyle, and marriage customs. Many "half *Waishengjen*" were born from intermarriages of the local people and *Waishengjen*, and for the third generation ethnic divisions are a vague domain of distinction. Contrariwise, after marital law was removed, the interaction between Taiwan and China became frequent and extensive. Contact with the PRC seemed to enhance a traveler's identity of being Taiwanese as the basis of distinguishing himself or herself from people of the PRC.²⁹⁰

²⁹⁰ See Chang, 2000, pp. 57-59.

2. Large-scale elections

From the elections for Governor of Taiwan Province in 1994 to the presidential elections held in 1996, 2000, and 2004, Taiwan has engaged in significant democratic elections for the first time. Direct elections have enabled the people of Taiwan to exercise their rights and, in doing so, establish their sense of national identity as Taiwanese living in a democratic society. The results of opinion polls conducted in February 2000 by Taiwan's Mainland China Committee of the Executive Yuan, shows the percentage of people who considered themselves to be "Chinese" has been decreasing, while those who regard themselves as "Taiwanese" has been increasing.²⁹¹ A 1998 poll indicated that only 16.3 percent of people regarded themselves as Chinese, while 83 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese or both Taiwanese and Chinese.²⁹² In 1999, the interviewees who thought themselves as "Taiwanese" reached 45 percent for the first time, 39.4 percent perceived themselves as "both Taiwanese and Chinese", while only 13.9 percent viewed themselves as "Chinese".²⁹³

In comparison, the opinion polls taken in 1992 indicated the percentages of the above three identities were 19.3 percent (Taiwanese), 46.4 percent (both Taiwanese and Chinese), and 30.2 percent (Chinese).²⁹⁴ These findings reveal that in the decade of

²⁹¹ *The Independent Morning Newspaper*. February 21st 2000, p. 5.

²⁹² Nelan, Bruce W. "Will the US Have to Go to War for Taiwan?" *Time*. June 22nd 1998, p. 51.

²⁹³ Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), ROC Government: http://www.mac.gov.tw/mlpolicy/pos/p8903c_1.htm; Siao, 1999, pp. 112-113.

²⁹⁴ Surveys of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election conducted by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei; Lin, Tsong-jyi. "The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Democratizing Taiwan." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 135.

the 1990s, the percentages of people who identified themselves as Taiwanese and Chinese had reversed position.²⁹⁵ A cultural shift from the notion of being Chinese to one of being Taiwanese appears to have occurred. In the new democratic era, there seems to have evolved a "New Taiwanese" consciousness that embraces the notion of Taiwan as a national entity.²⁹⁶

The notion of a "New Taiwanese" helped to counter the divisive tendencies of identity politics and its use for political advantage by politicians. Thus during the Taiwan Provincial Governor elections at the end of 1994, President Lee Teng-hui had passed on the slogan of the "New Taiwanese" to James Soong as Soong's key advocacy, and it was used to oppose the DPP candidate Chen Ding-nan's appeal of "Taiwanese vote for Taiwanese". In the 1998 Taipei mayoral elections, Lee deployed the slogan of the "New Taiwanese" again for supporting Ma Ying-jiu. Indeed, the construction of national identity premised on "love of Taiwan" could break through the obstacle of identity politics. This was exemplified by James Soong who leant to speak Holo, thereby persuading some Taiwanese that he had been making an effort to engage in Taiwan localization.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ See also Liu, I-chou, and Ho Szu-yin. "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwanese People." *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1999, pp. 1-34.

²⁹⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

²⁹⁷ Li, Kuang-chun. "Some Reflections on the Social Orientating of Post-war Taiwanese Nationalism." *Third Annual Conference on Democracy on Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits: Nationalism and Cross-Straits Relations*. Harvard University, November 16th-17th 1999; Taiwaner, A. "Pseudo-Taiwanese: Isle Margin Editorials – Alter-Native-Taiwanese: Taiwan's Fifth Major Ethnic Group." *Positions*. Taipei, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1996; Siao, 1999, pp. 23-25.

3. Constraints from the PRC

Another factor that has influenced national identity formation has been the PRC's pressure on Taiwan to reunify politically with the Mainland. Taiwan's quest for sovereign rights, especially after it became democratic and strengthened its national identity, has been thwarted by Beijing. The PRC has consistently denied Taiwan international space by diplomatic pressure on the international community to abide by the "one China" policy, in which Taiwan is considered a province of the Mainland. Moreover, the Beijing leadership has used military threats from time to time to deter any move to *de jure* independence.

Specifically, during the presidential elections of 1996, the PRC used military threats to influence Taiwan's voters. However, this policy appeared to have hardened the resolve of the people of Taiwan, contributing to Lee Teng-hui's clear victory. In the 2000 presidential elections, the PRC refrained from military exercises but issued dire warnings against voting for the candidate who supported Taiwan independence; despite this, Chen Shui-bian was still elected President. Clearly, a strategy of intimidation – which eventually failed domestically under authoritarian rule – also failed when applied by the Chinese Communist Party government in Beijing. Taiwanese identity appears to sharpen its contours when challenged.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁸Kobayashi, Yoshinori & Lee, Teng-hui. *The Admonitions of the Lee Teng-hui School*. Prophet Press, Taipei, 2001, pp. 92-93; Chang, 2000, p. 59.

Lee Teng-hui and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

In view of the above, it is instructive to note that relations between President Lee and the DPP were ambiguous. They were politically opposed yet shared common experiences in their Taiwan identity formation. Lee had never viewed the DPP as the political foe, and the DPP did not know if it should take Lee as the enemy either. Not only did the DPP majority undergo similar experiences as Lee on the Taiwanization issue, but the values of democracy, freedom, and human rights for which the DPP had been striving were also the aspiration of Lee. Besides, the DPP's opposition was directed towards the KMT non-mainstream conservative faction, as was President Lee. Thus Lee's and the DPP's backgrounds were similar, their objectives were in accord, and they had the same political enemies. As a result, Lee Teng-hui was to some degree sympathetic towards the DPP.²⁹⁹

In addition, Lee had positioned himself as the "leader of the country" rather than the "Chairman of the ruling KMT party". Lee aimed to be a neutral President, who took the nation's interests and its entire political development as his paramount consideration, seeking to establish a mature system of competitive party politics. In President Lee Teng-hui's eyes, the DPP was a political party in its infancy, not an adversary. Since the emergence of party politics, the ruling Chinese KMT could no longer rely on its privilege and monopoly of one party rule; the KMT had to learn to compete with other political parties fairly, in order to generate new political

²⁹⁹ Ruan, Ming, Lin Ruo-si, Zhu Zheng-bang and Lu Jia-ling. *Democracy in Taiwan*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 173-177.

opportunities.

After his swearing-in as the eighth President of the ROC, Lee immediately granted amnesty to several political prisoners, including Huang Sing-jie. This was the first act of justice to sufferers of the “white terror”. The “Meeting of the Nation’s Important Issues” was convened a month later, giving the DPP a political position legally equal to the ruling party. This marked a milestone for party politics. During this time, the Chinese KMT not only disputed the extent of the democratic reform, but also the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. Nonetheless, strong popular opinion, backed by the DPP, provided political endorsement for President Lee to reform constitution.³⁰⁰ For the DPP, the democratic reform it had long advocated gained leverage from Lee. On July 1st 1996, Lee Teng-hui met Hsu Hsin-liang, who had just become DPP Chairman. They discussed cooperation between the two parties and the constitution’s amendment.³⁰¹ Such cooperation would have been inconceivable under traditional KMT thinking.

Since the “Meeting of the Nation’s Important Issues”, the DPP began to rely on Lee Teng-hui. Moreover, in view of his popularity, the DPP dared not attack Lee. This “Lee Teng-hui complex” had caused the DPP to constrain itself, a situation which placed the DPP in a disadvantageous position. Only after the DPP had encountered many fiercely fought elections, and needed to compete with Lee directly, did it start to

³⁰⁰ Nakashima, Mineo. *The Resourcefulness of Asia*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 179-183.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

remove itself from his shadow.³⁰²

Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, much of the DPP's policy platform had been taken over by President Lee Teng-hui. For instance, allowing for the direct election of the Provincial Governor, Mayors, and Country Magistrates was raised by the DPP, but Lee followed the tide of popular opinion and implemented it. It was Lee who was thanked for this. Direct presidential elections were also proposed by the DPP. Yet Lee Teng-hui carried this out after encountering strong opposition within the KMT, and became the first President voted in by the entire populace. Re-entering the United Nations was also an idea that originated with the DPP, and President Lee again adopted it midway in its development, bringing it to the forefront of government policy. Certainly, Lee did not attempt to copy the statements of the DPP; he only took up issues that received a positive public response. In Lee Teng-hui's view, he was simply fulfilling the people's wishes in accordance with democratic culture. As *CTS* reported on May 17th 2000,³⁰³ President Lee said that he had been supported by the Taiwanese people to achieve democratic reform; it all came from the will of the people, and democracy has been the only way to let Taiwan stand firmly in the world.

³⁰² See Chang, 2000, p. 65.

³⁰³ *CTS (China Television Station)*. "News Exploration", Taipei, May 17th 2000.

Table 1: Policies that the KMT borrowed from the DPP and enacted

The policy	Date the DPP raised	Date the KMT executed
1. Lifting of martial law	May 19 th , 1986	July 15 th , 1987
2. National Assembly re-election in its entirety	December 15 th , 1987	December 1991 & 92
3. The direct elections of Provincial Governor, Mayors, and Country Magistrates	March 12 th , 1988	December 3 rd , 1994
4. Allow exiled opponents of KMT to return to Taiwan	August 23 rd , 1988	July 7 th , 1992
5. Abolish the temporary articles of 1948	December 12 th , 1988	April 30 th , 1991
6. Direct presidential elections	December 25 th , 1989	March 23 rd , 1996

Source: Sheng, Virginia. "DPP's Soul-Searching: To Oppose or Pitch In." *Free China Journal*. Vol. 13, No. 17, May 10th 1996, p. 7.

In the Nation's Planning Committee, Lee Teng-hui invited Senior Opposition Leader Huang Sing-jie, who was appointed by Lee as Senior Commissioner of Government Affairs of the Presidential Office, to be Deputy Head Commissioner for the coming three years (1997 to 2000).³⁰⁴ Huang Sing-jie was at first willing to take up the post; however, cautionary advice from DPP members on how this would constrain his party caused him to reject the offer. Indeed, when Chiang Yen-shi was Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, he maintained smooth communication with Senior Opposition Leader Chang Jun-hong, and urged the DPP to attend the Nation's Planning Committee. Progress was made when Supervisory Commissioner Kang Ning-siang, who had ceased to be active in the DPP, was appointed as Commissioner of the Nation's Planning Committee. Moreover, academic Bao Yi-hong, who had close relations with Chang Jun-hong, was designated Research Commissioner.³⁰⁵

The cultivation of personal relationships (*guanxi* -- 關係) is a well developed art in Confucian-based societies such as Taiwan's. This occurred at a substantial level between Lee's KMT and the DPP. Apart from meeting at formal functions, Lee Teng-hui also met privately with such opposition figures as Huang Sing-jie, Hsu Hsin-liang, Chen Shui-bian, and Chen Tang-shan. Lee had contacted Huang Sing-jie and Hsu Hsin-liang to initiate cooperation between the two parties, and he had met with Chen Shui-bian during Chen's term as Taipei Mayor. Even though the purpose of the meeting was to maintain a friendly relationship between the country's President and

³⁰⁴ *China Times*. "After Seeking Advice from Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian Decided to Take Over the Position of Chief Commissioner of the National Governing Committee." Taipei, August 12th 2000.

³⁰⁵ *China Times*. "The Twelve Years of Lee Teng-hui in Office – Achievements and Faults." Taipei, March 19th 2000, p. 2; Chang, 2000, pp. 66-67.

Mayor of the capital city, Lee was drawn to the talented leaders of the new generation; after Chen Shui-bian was elected as President, Lee and Chen discussed the prospect of continuity of policy. In addition, Lee Teng-hui valued former Tainan Magistrate (and Foreign Minister since April 2004) Chen Tan-sun's talent and ideas, and the Presidential Office kept open the channels of communication with the DPP. When Chiang Yen-shi was Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, he regularly communicated with Huang Sing-jie, and formed contacts with Chang Jun-hong's New Century Parliament Office. During Wu Bo-siong's term as Secretary-General of the Presidential Office, Wu kept good relations with Hsu Hsin-liang as they were both Hakka and came from Taoyuan County. Also, during Chen Shui-bian's term as Taipei Mayor, Director of Secretarial Office of the Presidential Office, Su Chi-cheng, had directly contacted Chen Shui-bian's confidential employee, Ma Yong-cheng. Besides, there were many common friends between them. They could mediate and ensure smooth communication.³⁰⁶

Although the Chinese KMT gradually localized itself, its gangster and corruption politics was broadly criticized by the public. By contrast, the votes won by the DPP were increasing. Moreover, the DPP's seats in the National Assembly rendered it the second largest political party, and it acquired the majority positions of Mayor and County Magistrates.³⁰⁷

In the presidential elections of 2000, Chen Shui-bian depicted himself as "The Son of

³⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 67-68.

³⁰⁷ Ruan, Lin, Zhu, & Lu, 2000, pp. 245-252.

Taiwan", in direct ethnic competition with Lee Teng-hui. At the same time, Lien Chan asked Chen Lu-an, a former Defense Minister and ex-KMT member who ran as an independent presidential candidate in 1996, for support. The pro-China Chen Lu-an said that the only remaining value of the KMT was in promoting Taiwan's peaceful reunification with the PRC, and that Lien Chan was the best candidate for this task.³⁰⁸

Moreover, Lien Chan announced he had Madame Chiang Kai-shek's letter of support from the US and, in doing so, he attempted to use her authority to threaten President Lee Teng-hui. While Lien Chan could capitalize on his half-local Taiwanese heritage, his wife and people who surrounded him were nearly all *Waishengjen*; especially in the last phase of the presidential elections, this situation was more obvious. Lien's behavior aroused the ethnic identity complex between Taiwanese and Chinese, and his image was ill suited for making him Lee's successor. On that account, several close friends of President Lee, such as President of Chi Mei Corporation, Su Wen-long, revealed their support for Chen Shui-bian. Lee had used the "Lee Teng-hui complex" imbedded in ethnic distinctions to restrain the DPP; on the other hand, when this consciousness began to find its own identity, it had become one of Chen Shui-bian's weapons to constrain Lien Chan.³⁰⁹

Another factor of note in Taiwanese politics during Lee Teng-hui's 12 years in power was the role of the media. With the unfolding process of democratization and

³⁰⁸ *The Central Daily*. "Lien Chan met Chen Lu-an: Guaranteed Ten Reforms", March 1st 2000, p. 3; *The China Evening Newspaper*. "Chen Lu-an's best Candidate to Negotiate with China." February 28th 2000, p. 2.

³⁰⁹ Nakashima, 2000, pp. 22-23; Ruan, Lin, Zhu, & Lu, 2000, p. 247.

liberalization, freedom of the press was greatly increased. This represented a dramatic change from the press censorship of the past. Progress in press professionalism, however, did not match that of freedom. This was largely because the press was accustomed to being the tool of politics under the past dictatorship, and after Taiwan became democratized, it tended to become a commercial tool. The role of media had not yet matured into greater objectivity. Thus, for example, during the elections many cable television companies revealed their preferences towards specific candidates, and attempted to influence voters.³¹⁰ Still, the electronic media allowed politicians to talk in front of the camera and become a familiar sight. Controversial issues were openly and freely debated by the politicians, scholars, experts, and commentators daily. Media bias was, in this sense, balanced by media generated opportunities for open discussion.

The transformation of the Chinese KMT

In view of the above developments during the Lee Teng-hui era - when he won the factional power struggles within his party, pursued the emerging democratic trends, and applied his political strategies in networking and reflecting popular thinking - how was the Chinese KMT transformed? Nine major transformations may be identified.

1. Localization

³¹⁰ Chang, 2000, pp. 70-71.

The Chinese KMT was always a foreign political party that moved from Mainland China to Taiwan, and placed Taiwan under the authoritarian governments of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo for over 40 years. To the majority of local people, the ruling Chinese KMT was an occupier who never represented those over whom it ruled. After Lee Teng-hui became Party Chairman, he started promoting local people to positions of power; the presence of local high-ranking party personnel and Cabinet members increased rapidly. After the re-election of the entire National Assembly and the direct elections of the Provincial Governor and Mayors, the Chinese KMT had no choice but to allow for more elections. Because the first priority of the Chinese KMT was to win the elections, it was important to nominate the candidates who were popular at the primary level, and it was necessary to form alliances with the local factions. After experiencing democratization in Taiwan, the Chinese KMT had been gradually localized, and transformed into a local political party. In due course, despite the emergence of the DPP, the Chinese KMT had been able to maintain its own competitiveness.³¹¹

2. The Lee Teng-hui way

Before Lee was sworn-in as President, he had neither the intention nor opportunity to participate in Chinese KMT affairs, and so was not tainted by its negative reputation.

³¹¹ Chou, Yu-kuo. *Lee Teng-hui's One Hundred Days*. Mai-tien Publisher, Taipei, 1993, pp. 42-46; Chu, Yun-han & Tien, Hung-mao. "Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms, Institutional Change and Power Realignment." In Klintworth, Gary (ed.). *Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s*. Allen & Unwin, ANU, Canberra, 1994, pp. 10-15.

At the beginning, even though the Chinese KMT was conservative and corrupt, Lee Teng-hui as the new chairman projected a fresh and trustworthy image. The old guard of the Chinese KMT tried to force President Lee to quit his party chairmanship but he won the ensuing factional struggles. Lee's opponents had learnt to listen to him or leave the party, and in this way he had successfully transformed the Chinese KMT to a political party of his own stamp.³¹²

3. The Chinese KMT: from a monopoly of power to competitive party politics

During its authoritarian phase, the Chinese KMT maintained a monopoly of power, having access to the entirety of society's political and economic resources, and distributing these in a top-down fashion in accordance to party interests. Under the impact of democratic reform this was to change. Although the Chinese KMT still enjoyed some level of privileges, its deteriorating reputation and people's higher expectations, caused it to become less arrogant in order to compete with other political parties. For example, it engaged in advertising campaigns, set up its own website, and hosted musical concerts and dance parties. Nevertheless, the Chinese KMT had been in power for so long that it did not anticipate having to step down one day; hence, its campaign strategizing and capabilities lagged behind those of the DPP.³¹³

³¹² Wu, Wen-cheng & Jiang, Ping-lung. "The Changing Role of the KMT in Taiwan's Political System." In Cheng, Tun-jen & Stephen Haggard (eds). *Political Change in Taiwan*. Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 1992, pp. 75-94; Huang, Nian. *President Lee Teng-hui's Last One Thousand Days*. Lian-jing, Taipei, 2000, pp. 116-120.

³¹³ Shi, Fang-chu. "Where is the Key Opportunity of Democracy?" *T'ien-hsia (The CommonWealth)*,

4. The politics of gangsters and corruption

In light of the above, the Chinese KMT lost the key (and often overlapping) constituencies of urban dwellers, the better educated, the Chinese ethnic group, and the middle class. In order to survive, the KMT had relied on the support of the factional groups, without considering their reputation or methods. As a result, compared to other democratic countries, Taiwan had the highest percentage of Public Representatives and City or County Council chiefs, who had a criminal record. With their exposure, calls for reform emerged in the Judicial Yuan, and people's perception of the KMT had deteriorated.³¹⁴

5. From Chinese KMT ideology to Taiwanese consciousness

The Chinese KMT party used to be a Leninist political party that glorified the *Three Principles of the People* (Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Welfare),³¹⁵ promoted the goal of counterattacking the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and recovering

Taipei, Vol. 196 September 1997, pp. 60-65.

³¹⁴ Chang, Shih-ying. "The Characteristics and Change of Assembly Politics on Taiwan's Political Democratization." *Journal of Chinese Cultural University Political Science Graduate School*. Taipei, Vol. 6 January 1997, pp. 85-97; Wu, Ying-chun & Diao, Mon-pon. "How Will the National Competitiveness be lifted?" *T'ien-hsia (The CommonWealth)*. Taipei, Vol. 196 September 1997, pp. 40-46.

³¹⁵ It was used, as Corcuff terms it, as a "counter-ideology of political identity" to Chinese Communism (Corcuff, Stephane. "The Symbolic Dimension of Democratization and the Transition of National Identity Under Lee Teng-hui." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 75.)

Mainland China, and hailed the mottoes of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and President Chiang Kai-shek. After martial law was lifted, people were permitted to engage in more diverse ideas. In the past, the *Three Principles of the People* was expected to elicit public respect, while bronze statues of President Chiang Kai-shek and President Chiang Ching-kuo had been regarded as spiritually uplifting symbols; however, they disappeared gradually with the passage of time. In the process of localizing, the KMT had given up its former ideology and insistence on a specific type of political consciousness. The contrast is amply evident in the KMT's abandonment of the rhetoric for unification with Mainland China in favor of explaining the relationship across the straits as one of special country-to-country relations (elaborated in Chapter 6 of this thesis). These changes reflected the trend of popular opinion in Taiwan; on the other hand, Taiwanese consciousness became a tool for the KMT to compete with other political parties to win the support of uncommitted voters.³¹⁶

6. The KMT members started electing their personnel

During the presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, the KMT Central Commissioners and Central General Commissioners were appointed by the Party Chairman; in addition, the Party Chairman was recommended by the Chairman Group, and endorsed by Party Representatives. In 1988, at the 13th KMT Party Members Meeting, the KMT Members were allowed to elect their Party Representatives for the first time, and Party Representatives then voted for their Central Commissioners. In

³¹⁶ See Sia, 2000, pp. 211-212, 217.

1993, the KMT Party Chairmanship was open for Party Representatives to elect,³¹⁷ and the KMT had been transformed to a democratic party with an activist spirit.

7. Changes to the KMT enterprises

In the past, the Chinese KMT monopolized the market; after Lee Teng-hui became Party Chairman, he turned party enterprises over to modern management practices by setting up the KMT Enterprises Management Committee, and appointing Liu Tai-ying as Chief Commissioner. Reforms were carried out, foreign investments made, business sectors of interest included banking, insurance companies, financial centers, media, and stock markets. The seven companies that controlled stocks had followed the law and ensured transparency of their rules and regulations, as well as reports of the financial affairs and investment proposals. Moreover, the stocks of the KMT enterprises had gone on the market. Liu Tai-ying frequently sold property and engaged in stock transactions, and the enterprises he traded with all had good relations with the government high-ranking officials. Therefore, the KMT enterprises had become the main force in the financial market, established political and commercial alliances through common investments, and enabled the KMT party to become one of the more important variables in Taiwan's economy.³¹⁸

8. The KMT's reputation had worsened

³¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 226-227.

³¹⁸ Young, Jun-chi. "The Legalization of the KMT Party Properties." *National Policy Foundation* (NPF). July 24th 2001, pp. 23-25; Lee, Sing-fan. "The KMT Party Properties." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, May 3rd 2004, p. 3.

With 40 years of authoritarian rule, habits of malpractice in the KMT were entrenched. In the 12 years overseen by Lee Teng-hui the KMT achieved democratic reforms in a step-by-step process, and the result was impressive from the international perspective; however, the party image had not improved. The KMT's attempts to rectify problems of internal corruption and "gangster politics" were not able to keep pace with popular opinion.³¹⁹

9. The KMT's mounting electoral losses

Not surprisingly, votes for the Chinese KMT had been falling. For instance, in the elections of Delegates of the Legislative Yuan held in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998, the votes taken by the KMT covered 69.87 percent, 60.14 percent, 53.02 percent, 46.06 percent, and 46.43 percent, respectively, a drop from nearly 70 percent to under 50 percent.³²⁰

In the elections of Mayors and County Magistrates conducted in 1989, 1993, and 1997, the votes obtained by the KMT had decreased from one election to the next: specifically, the KMT obtained 53.50 percent, 47.47 percent, and 42.12 percent, respectively.³²¹

Since 1989, the Chinese KMT had been losing elections in Chairman Lee Teng-hui's

³¹⁹ Chung, Kuo-shou. "A Change of the Political Party is the Only Way to Prevent Gangsterism and Corruption." *Taiwan Daily*. Taipei, June 18th 1999, p. 12; Chen, Mao-shiong. "The Japanese Emperor and Yuan Shi-kai." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, March 11th 2002, p. 13.

³²⁰ Chang, 2000, p. 94.

hometown, Taipei County. As for the elections held in 1997, among 21 cities and counties, the KMT had lost elections in the urban areas with higher economic and education standards, and only won in six remote provincial cities and counties. In the 1998 Taipei mayoral elections, due to Mao Ying-jiu's personal image, and the votes obtained from the New Party through the formation of the alliance, the KMT had finally recovered the capital city. Yet, in the presidential elections of 2000, the KMT suffered losses once more; Lien Chan and Siao Wan-chang received only 23.1 percent of votes, which amounted to over two million votes behind Chen Shui-bian and Lu Siu-lian of the DPP.³²² The time had come for the KMT to hand over political power.

Conclusion

According to the author of *Lee Teng-hui's One Thousand Days*, Chou Yu-kou, Lee once revealed that since he was the first local President, the *Waishengjen* within the KMT would not let him assume the real powers of the presidency.³²³ In his first two years in office, Lee's policies had been restricted by the old guard of the *Waishengjen*. On the other hand, the publisher of the *Independent Evening Newspapers*, Hu Yuan-hui, suggested that Lee Teng-hui knew how to use the media skillfully in order to express and transmit his beliefs domestically and internationally, and gain crucial support from

³²¹ Sia, 2000, p. 125.

³²² Ruan, Lin, Zhu, & Lu, 2000, pp. 259-260.

³²³ Chou Yu-kou, interview, TVBS-N, May 17th 2000.

civil society.³²⁴ The Director of Public Affairs in the Presidential Office, Ding Yuan-chao, indicated that President Lee had achieved democracy by following the will of the people.³²⁵ Indeed, Lee had often emphasized the people's rights, and had enabled the entire populace to elect their President, Vice President, Provincial Governor, Mayors, and County Magistrates.³²⁶

Although Lee Teng-hui did not initially wield substantive power within in the Chinese KMT, he was the first Taiwanese President and KMT Chairman; therefore, Taiwanese had given Lee full support. However, Lien Chan's case was different; he only received 23 percent of votes from the people.³²⁷ Internal differences over the issues of unification with Mainland China and Taiwan independence came from the conflicts between the "foreign political forces" that took Taiwan as the base from which to counterattack Mainland China, and the local people who wanted to accomplish democracy and autonomy. From the time of President Chiang Ching-kuo's lifting of the prohibitions on forming political parties and the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party, to the first presidential direct election in 1996, the history of the "foreign political forces" that stressed unification with Mainland China had come to an end. Equal rights have been shared by all people of Taiwan, irrespective of their ethnic identity. Building on this chapter's basis of understanding domestic political developments, Chapter 6 will examine how Taiwan achieved diplomatic gains through

³²⁴ Hu Yuan-hui, interview, TVBS-N, May 17th 2000.

³²⁵ Ding Yuan-chao, interview, CTN News, May 18th 2000.

³²⁶ Chang, Parris (Su-cheng), Overseas Elected Member of the Legislative Yuan, interview, CTV's News Exploration, May 17th 2000.

³²⁷ Sai, 2000, p. 224.

its economic and democratic assets, why Taiwan's independence was advocated, and the attitudinal basis of cross-Strait problems – that is, differences in outlook between Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese.

Chapter Six

Lee Teng-hui's Diplomatic Strategy

Taiwan's isolation in international politics was compounded by a dearth of presidential visits abroad. The President, as the symbol of a country's sovereign rights and dignity, expects ceremonial recognition of this status during foreign visits. However, few states have diplomatic ties with the Republic of China and those that do, are not influential internationally. Conversely, and in accordance with the "one China" policy, almost all states that do not have diplomatic relations with the ROC do so with the People's Republic of China. Consequently, it has been difficult for the President of the ROC to go abroad or gain the symbolic recognition bestowed by displays of formal etiquette in host nations.³²⁸

Nevertheless, Lee Teng-hui did not want to be a President who never left his country. In Lee's perspective, Taiwan needed to adjust itself to the status quo in order to maneuver within it. Thus he would accept invitations, if he could gain a certain level of etiquette, and meet with foreign officials. This chapter discusses President Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy" (*wu-shi wai-jia*, 務實外交), designed to bring Taiwan out of the "one China" constraint which maintains that there is one China and Taiwan is part of it. Lee preferred to conceive of the relationship as "one China, one Taiwan". Also considered is the way in which Lee used his alumni association in the US to further this cause. Finally, the democratization of Taiwan is discussed as a variable in Taiwan-US,

³²⁸ Cheng, Fu. "The Expansion and Expectation of Pragmatic Diplomacy." *Policy Journal*. Taipei, Vol.

US-China, and Taiwan-China relations.³²⁹

President Lee's landmark Singapore (1989) and US (1995)

Visits and diplomatic accomplishments

As the 1980s drew to a close and so too the Cold War freeze of strategic alignments, rumors circulated that Indonesia was about to resume relations with the PRC. Fearing that Singapore could follow suit, Taipei sought to prolong the "Starlight Plan" which, since 1975, allowed Singapore's armed forces to train in Taiwan. Thus it had been scheduled for President Lee Teng-hui to visit Singapore in March 1989.³³⁰ This rare presidential visit abroad not only created a sensation domestically, but came amidst a flurry of events in Sino-Southeast Asian diplomacy. Unexpectedly, right before Lee Teng-hui was to embark upon his Singapore visit, Indonesia announced that it would resume diplomatic relations with the PRC. Meanwhile, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok-tong, indicated that Singapore was thinking of following a similar direction. Moreover, the Singaporean government had used the demeaning title of "President Lee who comes from Taiwan". From Taipei's perspective, President Lee

13, February 1996, pp. 8-9.

³²⁹ Wang, T. W. "Taiwan's Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui's Rule, 1988-2000." *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-Hui Era*. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2003, pp. 245-275.

³³⁰ Chou, Yu-kuo. "First Time Going Abroad, the Singapore Visit." *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, March 6th 1989, p. 1; *Taiwan Solidarity Union*. "Taiwan Solidarity Avenue -- The Classroom of Uncle A-Hui (Lee Teng-hui)." Taiwan, May 2002, <http://www.tsu.org.tw/tsa05-02.html>; Chen, Si-fan. "The New Diplomacy of the Bian (Chen Shui-bian) Government." *National Policy Foundation*, Taiwan, December 19th 2002, <http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/091/NS-C-091-591.htm>; Long, Simon. *Taiwan: China's Last Frontier*. Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 8-9.

should have been called “President of Taiwan” or “President of the Republic of China (ROC)”. On this basis alone, the visit could have been cancelled. Lee Teng-hui, however, felt that the matter was not sufficiently significant to warrant cancellation of the visit. Moreover, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, had promised to welcome Lee Teng-hui in person and Singapore would do its best in terms of etiquette. So the presidential visit went ahead.³³¹ The decision was well founded: Lee Teng-hui was received with the honors reserved for formal diplomatic relations. When the press asked Lee’s view of the controversial headline, “President Lee who comes from Taiwan”, he replied: “Not satisfied, but it can be accepted.” From this remark came President Lee’s reputation for “pragmatic diplomacy”.³³²

Visiting states that had no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan was one of the methods employed by Lee Teng-hui to encourage a diplomatic break-through.³³³ In this respect there was no better target country for Lee’s visitations than the United States. In addition, conditions for such a visit were rendered ripe by dissatisfaction within the US Congress over the PRC’s human rights record. This, coupled with a sympathetic disposition towards a newly democratic Taiwan, meant that Lee had Congressional support in his application for a visa to visit his alumni association in the United States from June 7th to 12th 1995. Support for Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States had broadened to include the US media and public pressure groups.

³³¹ Ger, Yun-kuan. “The Significance and Effect of Mr. Lee Teng-hui’s Leader Diplomacy.” *Modern China*. Taipei, No. 101, June 1994, pp. 68-73.

³³² Chao, Jen-ming. “The Republic of China’s Pragmatic Diplomacy in the 1990s.” *Problems and Research*. Taipei, No. 32, January 1993, pp. 1-16.

³³³ See “President Lee Reiterates One China Policy, Outlines Realism.” *Central News Agency*. May 8th 1989.

Furthermore, some US Congressmen started seeking an amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and pressuring the US Administration. As a result, President Bill Clinton conceded and on May 22nd 1995, the United States announced that it agreed for Lee Teng-hui to attend a function organized by his Cornell University alumni association. Strong protestations from the PRC ensured international media coverage – including that of CNN, BBC, and NHK - of this development and consequent tension in US-China relations. US Congressmen and local mayors turned out to welcome President Lee and participated in the alumni activities. The Taiwanese community in the US and Taiwanese students expressed support for Lee through flag-waving at the airport, hotel, and campus to greet President Lee. By contrast, overseas residents and students of the PRC demonstrated against Lee Teng-hui at Cornell University.³³⁴

President Lee's speech at Cornell University, titled "What people think and want are always on my mind", covered the history of Taiwan's democratic development in recent years and expressed the country's desire to return to international society.³³⁵ Lee's trip to the US had the effect of promoting awareness of Taiwan's situation, the problem of cross-Strait relations, and the role of the USA in this dilemma. Moreover, Taiwan's experience was honored in the US as the evidence that Western democracy could work effectively in a Chinese society.³³⁶ Thus while Lee's 1989 Singapore visit may be regarded as the opening of Lee's "pragmatic diplomacy", his successful US visit may be viewed as its climax. Such was the shock effect on Beijing that it engaged

³³⁴ TVBS, Taipei, June 9th 1995; CTV, Taipei, June 10th 1995; Chang, 2000, pp. 115-118.

³³⁵ Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999.

³³⁶ "World: Asia-Pacific Analysis: Tension across the Taiwan Straits." *BBC Online Network*. July 15th 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_394000/394142.stm

in missile tests in the Taiwan Strait and “live fire” exercises.

Lee Teng-hui had gone abroad six times during his 12-year presidency, and visited a total of 15 countries (only eight of which had diplomatic relations with the ROC). President Lee had attended two presidential inaugurations, one international conference, and one alumni association meeting overseas. Lee Teng-hui was enabled by two factors in the conduct of his visits abroad: Taiwan's robust economy and trade, and its equally robust democratic achievements. The former enabled Taiwan to offer financial aid, loans, investments, employment training opportunities and other related incentives to states that sought such assistance.³³⁷ This “dollar diplomacy” yielded new diplomatic relations with 11 poor countries, though not all remained loyal to the ROC.³³⁸ Lee Teng-hui had begun his presidency with 22 countries recognizing Taipei and brought the number up to around 30, depending on fluctuations. This is still a comparatively small number, and one that remains unstable. Nonetheless it does verify Taiwan's recognition as a sovereign state, even if it only in the shadow of China.

However, a larger number of countries - some 150 - engage in unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan through representative offices. These countries are not only attracted by economic and trade opportunities offered by one of the world's largest

³³⁷ For example, Taiwan consolidated existing relations with South Africa in 1991 through a \$60 million low interest loan. (Unfortunately for Taipei, Pretoria subsequently switched recognition to Beijing.) Taiwan also made a \$30 million loan to Nicaragua in 1994 and forgave \$17 million in past debts. As to countries that did not recognize Taipei but were worth encouraging in substantive relations, loans were made to the Philippines, Russia, Poland and Latvia in the early 1990s. (Wang, T. W., 2001, pp. 253-254.)

³³⁸ The 11 were: Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, Nicaragua, Central African Republic, Gambia, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Macedonia, PNG. Those that proved unreliable were Niger which changed sides five times; Macedonia which relented when the extension of a UN peacekeeping force in former Yugoslav Republic was threatened by China using its veto power; and PNG whose recognition of Taipei in 1999 lasted only 15 days. (Ibid, pp. 255-274.)

economies (ranking 12th at the end of Lee's presidency) and a leading global trader, but also Taiwan's democratic reforms. These are relevant to states that place a priority on democracy and human rights.³³⁹ For example, after Taiwan's presidential elections of 2000, the European Parliament adopted a resolution congratulating Taiwan on its democratic achievement.³⁴⁰ Should China contemplate exercising the military option for "reunification" with Taiwan, it must calculate the reaction of Western democracies. Hence there is a security dimension to Taipei's cultivation of unofficial diplomatic relations. This affects not only China's calculations, but also the current era's premier democracy – the USA.

Indeed, as indicated above in relation to Lee's US visit in 1995, Sino-American relations did not escape the influence of Lee's tenure as president. Newly democratic Taiwan represented a challenge to Washington's China policy. On July 9th 1999, when President Lee Teng-hui was interviewed by the Germany radio station, *Deutsche Welle*, he said that the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan was a special relationship between two countries (*guojia*, 國家).³⁴¹ Significantly, *guojia* can be translated into country, state or nation. Thus Lee abandoned the "two equal political entities" rhetoric and replaced it with "two countries".³⁴² This challenged the "one

³³⁹ Yu, Taifa. "Relations between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: Towards Reconciliation?" *Pacific Affairs*. Vol. 72, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 39-40.

³⁴⁰ See Hwang, Jim. "The Road Less Traveled." *Taipei Review*. Vol. 52, No. 9, September 2002, p. 9.

³⁴¹ *BBC News*. "Taiwan President Stands Firm." July 23rd 1999, BBC Online Network, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/401343.stm>; *Liberal Times*. Taipei, July 10th 1999, p. 1.

³⁴² On July 12th, the English translation became "two states of one nation", so as avoid the implication of abandoning the one-China (one-country) policy, and on July 22nd, it was finally rendered "special state-to-state" relations. (Sheng, Lijun. *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2002, p. 11.)

China” notion. Predictably, the PRC was again furious, and the United States sent envoys to China in an effort to reduce cross-Strait tensions.³⁴³ Nonetheless, it is worth noting that after President Lee’s state-to-state relations speech, a survey by Taiwan’s Institute of National Policy Research indicated that 70 percent of Taiwanese had supported his stance.³⁴⁴ It is also worth noting that in the 2004 presidential elections no party supported the “one China” model.³⁴⁵ This indicates the survivability of Lee’s two-states theory and its wider acceptance in Taiwan’s political culture.

Taiwan’s democratization as a variable and its pragmatic diplomacy

Superficially, President Lee Teng-hui had aggravated US-China relations, but of more substantial consequence was the impact of a democratized Taiwan on national consciousness. Geographically, Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu comprise the lawful sovereign territory of the Republic of China. This consideration allows for the geopolitical appreciation of Taiwan’s equally separate political development from

³⁴³ *BBC News*. “Taiwan Defends Statehood Call.” July 23rd 1999, BBC Network Online, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/402357.stm>; *BBC News*. “China Attacks Taiwan’s Criminal President.” BBC Online Network, July 15th 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/395367.stm>

³⁴⁴ Lee, Kuei-shen. “Local Culture.” *People’s Daily*. Taipei, September 1st 1999, p. 5; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 184-185; White, Lynn T. III. “America’s Interest in the First Democratic Chinese President.” In Lee, Wei-chin and Wang T. Y. (eds). *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2003, p. 234.

³⁴⁵ See Armitage, Catherine. “Political Wounds a Worry for Chen.” *The Australian*. March 22nd 2004, www.theaustralian.news.com.au

Mainland China; hence Taiwanese consciousness could be channeled toward effecting improved treatment from international society.

Taiwan had existed and grown stronger under the protection of the United States, following its policy direction. Even when the US changed its diplomatic recognition in 1979 from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China, Washington acknowledged a commonality for values and beliefs with Taiwan, as well as a commitment to maintain the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. This was expressed through the Taiwan Relations Act, which entailed a promise to supply Taiwan with arms sufficient to deter a PRC attack.³⁴⁶ With this commitment, the people of Taiwan largely felt secure. However, if Taipei perceived that Washington's China policy could endanger its own political development,³⁴⁷ it distrusted Washington's impartiality as strategic balancer, and so preferred to follow its own direction in order to create opportunities. Indeed, Lee Teng-hui's behavior aimed at increasing Taiwan's international exposure - such as his advocacy for Taiwan to be given a seat at the United Nations, his 1995 visit to his *alma mater*, Cornell University,

³⁴⁶ The Taiwan Relations Act, passed by both Houses of Congress, April 10th 1979, provides a framework for unofficial relations between the US and Taiwan. It may be viewed on <http://ait.org.tw/ait.html>. Its stated purpose is: "To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes." The TRA includes providing "Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" (Sec. 2). See Lasater, Martin L. "Critical Factors in Taiwan's Security." In Lasater, Martin L., Peter Kien-Hong Yu; with contributions from Kuang-ming Hsu and Robyn Lim. *Taiwan's Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era*. Frank Cass, London, 2000, pp. 3-42; and Fu, Jen-kun. "The Taiwan Relations Act and the Relocation of Taiwan." In Fu, Jen-kun. *Taiwan and the Geopolitics of the Asian-American Dilemma*. Praeger, New York, 1992, pp. 65-91.

³⁴⁷ Most memorable in this respect was President Bill Clinton's "three no's". When visiting China in 1998, he said: "We don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any international organization for which statehood is a requirement." (Quoted in Yates, Stephen J. "China's Taiwan White Paper Power Play." The Heritage Foundation. February 29th 2000, www.heritage.org/Research/AsianadthePacific/EM656.cfm)

and his 1999 “state-to-state” relations radio statement - were often deemed provocative to Beijing and hence a challenge to the USA which accepted the “one China” concept.

As one American analyst observed:

Throughout his presidency, Lee's approach to Taiwan's security was never to negotiate. This was perhaps an understandable reaction to Beijing's recurring threats of violence, but it was not consonant with America's policy of combining war deterrence with an expectation that China might thereafter become liberalized and perhaps unified.³⁴⁸

Moreover:

Preserving Taiwan's sovereign “existence” and “identity” – concepts that run strongly throughout Lee's usual discourse – could become difficult if China's development led to democracy . . . before China gives up its Taiwan claim. An outbreak of Chinese liberalism, if it occurred would probably weaken America's commitment to Taiwan's effective autonomy.³⁴⁹

It may be concluded that Taiwan's democratization in contrast to China's bellicosity and non-democratic character ensures a degree of international sympathy for its efforts to maintain a separate identity. Thus Taiwan's democratic transformation has become a variable in US-China, US-Taiwan, and PRC-Taiwan relations.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ White, 2003, p. 234.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 216.

³⁵⁰ See *Time*. April 1st 1996, pp. 62-64; Chang, 2000, pp. 144-145.

Certainly, after democratization, divergences between Taiwan and Mainland China increased, and the prospect for Taiwan to choose independence by democratic means became increasingly conceivable. In Taiwan's presidential elections of 2000, the United States sent officials to warn presidential candidates that the US would not support Taiwan independence.³⁵¹ The US had recognized a trend in Taiwan veering towards independence, and appeared to want to curtail it in advance. Nevertheless, the gap between Taiwan and China progressively widened and it was difficult to reverse, as evidenced by Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party being elected President on March 18th 2000. Consequently, the United States faced an even more intractable situation across the Taiwan Strait.

"Pragmatic diplomacy" was not Lee Teng-hui's innovation but a strategy of wide appeal which he promoted. It emerged in the context of democratization and a quest for survival and dignity for a new Taiwan. It may be argued that President Lee, who promoted "pragmatic diplomacy", was in step with popular opinion but his charismatic leadership qualities attracted attention and criticism, thereby imbuing "pragmatic diplomacy" with a strong Lee Teng-hui association.³⁵²

The *Waishengjen* elites of the KMT, who ruled the local population in a discriminating and harsh fashion, provoked Taiwanese nationalism and a concomitant tendency

³⁵¹ As evident in Clinton's 1998 speech (above). US policy is that it will not recognize or support any Taiwanese declaration of independence. See Scalapino, Robert A. "Cross-Strait Relations and the United States." In Zagoria, Donald S. (ed.). *Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse*, Praeger, Westport, 2003, pp. 8-9.

³⁵² Ruan, Ming, Lin Ruo-si, Zhu Zheng-bang and Lu Jia-ling. *Democracy in Taiwan*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 33-35.

toward independence. Coupled with Taiwan's long-term international isolation, the issue of Taiwanese dignity had been politicized. In view of the PRC blocking recognition of the ROC, a diplomatic breakthrough was deemed possible only by independence. This was not Taiwan's problem alone, but its solution was increasingly a solitary aspiration for the Taiwanese.³⁵³

Taiwan's increased economic and democratic assets

President Lee Teng-hui's 12 years in office brought about a number changes that reconfigured Taiwan's international position. These are identified below.

1. Democratization

In the past, Taiwan was renowned for its "economic miracle"; politically, it was an authoritarian system enforcing martial law. After President Lee carried out a series of democratic reforms, which began from the re-election of the entire National Assembly and continued to direct presidential elections, Taiwan completed the transition for a functioning democracy. Remarkably, the transition process had been peaceful and steady. As noted by Lee Teng-hui on the occasion of the 1995 *International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*: "The ROC has created not only an 'economic miracle' but also a 'political miracle' which some have termed a 'quiet

³⁵³ See Chi, Guang-yu. *Political Developments of the Republic of China – Transformations since 1949*. Yang-zhi Culture, Taipei, 1996, pp. 456-458; Wu, Rwei-ren. "Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism: Democratization and Taiwan's Passive Revolution." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 198-201; Huang, Wen-shiong. *The Value Concepts of the People in Taiwan*. Avanguard, Taiwan, 2000, pp. 208-209.

revolution’.”³⁵⁴

Moreover, Taiwan had overcome the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997-98, a crisis which had led to economic and political crises elsewhere in the region, notably Indonesia. In the presidential elections of 2000, Taiwan accomplished the peaceful change of political power. Taiwan's achievement has been exemplary, especially under pressures from PRC, such as the 1995-96 missile tests intended to intimidate Taiwan, and the long-held international isolation imposed on Taipei by Beijing.

2. Increased foreign investment

Taiwan's impressive economic performance earned it a place as one of East Asia's Newly Industrialized Economies (NICs). It is among the world's top 15 trading countries, and a leader in foreign exchange reserves. Increased living standards and associated pay scales meant labor-intensive industries were no longer competitive in Taiwan. Such industries moved to less developed economies, which in turn became more significant trading partners for Taiwan, for example Thailand. Secondly, Taiwan has attracted foreign labor to relieve the problems of labor shortages. These strategies of investing offshore and inviting foreign labor also carried positive diplomatic repercussions, allowing President Lee Teng-hui to visit such countries as the

³⁵⁴ Lee Teng-hui. "Democracy in the ROC: Drawing New Vitality from Cultural Regeneration." Keynote Address, *International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, and the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., Taipei, August 27th 1995.

Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia.³⁵⁵

3. The militarization and internationalization of the Taiwan Issue

On August 23rd 1958, the “823 Artillery War” or the “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis” occurred between Taiwan and China, and lasted continuously for 44 days. During the war, the PRC launched approximately 480,000 artillery shells, and this “823 Artillery War” proved to be a decisive battle for the defense of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Moreover, Taiwanese soldiers played an important role in this battle, which in turn significantly influenced the development of Taiwan's history and trilateral relations among ROC, the US, and the PRC – particularly the PRC's policy of “liberating Taiwan”.³⁵⁶

After the “823 Artillery War”, competitive relations became the norm between the ROC and the PRC in international society; both sides competed diplomatically but did not take military action. In due course, Taiwan's population did not perceive the military threat from the PRC as imminent, nor did international society consider the Taiwan Strait as a zone of military conflict. After Lee Teng-hui visited the US in 1995, the PRC undertook missile tests and military exercises as a response to Taiwan's

³⁵⁵ Chang, Hui-ying. *The Super Diplomat – Lee Teng-hui and his Practical Diplomacy*. Times Culture, Taipei, 1996, pp. 63-68; Government Information Office of Taiwan. “Taiwan's Foreign Labor Policy.” http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/festival_c/labor/f_labor.htm

³⁵⁶ Hsueh, Hua-yuen. “The 823 Artillery War and its Historical Significance.” *Taiwan News*, Taipei, 2001. <http://www.twhistory.org.tw/20010820.htm>; Global Security Organisation. “Second Taiwan Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands 23 August 1958 – 01 January 1959.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/quemoy_matsu-2.htm

“pragmatic diplomacy” and presidential elections. China’s “missile diplomacy” added a more readily discernible coercive element into the diplomatic war across the Strait for the first time since 1958. From the 1995 and 1996 show of force on the part of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Taiwan Strait acquired a higher profile as a potential war zone.³⁵⁷

Since Russia (under the Soviet Union) lost its superpower position, the PRC no longer needs to maintain a deterrent force on the northern border; its military deployments have shifted south, treating Taiwan as the main target.³⁵⁸ It has done this within the context of arguing that the Taiwan problem was China’s domestic affair, and therefore international society had no justification to interfere with it.³⁵⁹ However, when the US sent two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait (but not in it) during China’s military exercises and Taiwan’s presidential elections in 1996, the international dimension of the Taiwan issue could hardly remain unnoticed.

4. Taiwan was simplistically categorized with Hong Kong and Macao

During the Cold War, the ideological competition between democratic and communist

³⁵⁷ See Huang, Huang-siong. *Contemplation in Harvard – To See Taiwan from the World*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 70-74; Tien, Si-yi. “The Suggestions from the US Missile Experts.” *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, December 27th 2002, p. 3; Siao, Chun-chen. “The Relationship Across the Straits and the Situation of the Asia Pacific.” *Journal of National Policy*. Taiwan, Vol. 134, March 16th 1996, pp. 41-46; Liang, Wen-shing. “Research of PRC’s Ballistic Missile Development – Analysis of Influences of the Security of the Taiwan Strait.” *National Chung-san University*, Taiwan, July 30th 2003, pp. 23-28.

³⁵⁸ See annual issues of The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance*, in the 1990s, including the 2002-2003 issue, Oxford University Press for IISS, London, 2002, pp. 138-139.

³⁵⁹ Chang, 2000, pp. 154-155.

parties was often reflected in their support to the ROC or the PRC. After the end of the Cold War with its ideological tensions, the PRC rapidly occupied the main arena of the Taiwan issue, advocating its position and employing threats and protests to those in the international community who thought otherwise. In particular, after Hong Kong and Macao were returned to China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, the US adopted Beijing's perspective as the standard by which to judge the problem across the straits, allowing its responses to correspond to China's reactions.³⁶⁰

Overall, there were no important changes in the number of countries with which Taiwan had diplomatic ties, nor in the opportunities to participate in official international organizations and activities. Nonetheless, Taiwan enjoyed qualitative improvements, including the positive image produced by its democratization, as well as its greater entrenchment into the international system's complex interdependence.³⁶¹

The Family Metaphor: Taiwan as an adult, not a child who left home

From the time when Lee Teng-hui practiced "pragmatic diplomacy", criticism has

³⁶⁰ Kuan, Chung. "Relations among Taipei, Washington, and Beijing." *Central Daily*. Taiwan, April 25th 2001, p. 3; Pan, Si-tun. "Research on the Comparisons between Hong Kong and Macao." *National Policy Foundation*, Taiwan, June 19th 2002, pp. 63-68; Ruan, Lin, Zhu, & Lu, 2000, pp. 235-236.

³⁶¹ *Taipei Times*. May 31st 2000, p. 4; Wang, T. W., 2001, p. 267; Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. *Power and Interdependence*. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1977; Keohane, R.O. "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War." In D. Baldwin (ed.). *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 269-300.

centered not the diplomacy itself, but cross-Strait tensions. On the surface, “pragmatic diplomacy” had been proffered as the reason, but the underlying cause came from the fundamental contradictions between Taiwan and China. Those cleavages were not started by “pragmatic diplomacy”, nor did they end after President Lee stepped down.³⁶²

Speaking to the Delegates of the National Assembly in 1995, Lee linked “pragmatic diplomacy” to Taiwan’s survival in the following terms:

Undertaking pragmatic diplomacy does not mean that the ROC wants to keep a distance from unification, but it will allow the ROC to gain more international recognition, confidence, and assets to negotiate with the PRC. Otherwise, Taiwan is going to “be unified”, which means, “be swallowed” by the PRC.³⁶³

President Lee Teng-hui had explained his strategy of bringing back into international society a changed ROC, one which had independent sovereign rights and effective rule over the territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Therefore, while facing a hostile PRC - whether Taiwan wished to unify with it, to declare independence, or to have other proposals - the island could use its independent sovereign rights as the basis to establish an equal position in the decision-making process. President Lee was unwilling to see Taiwan treated by the PRC as a child who left home; rather, he

³⁶² See Chang, 2000, p. 156.

³⁶³ Ibid.

preferred the analogy of an independent adult.³⁶⁴ Taiwan's independent sovereign right was an essential condition, and no resolutions or proposals that could harm it would be tolerated.³⁶⁵

While Taiwan may depict itself as the independent descendent, who has established a separate household, when employing the Confucian family metaphor, the majority decides on political outcomes and ideology, and there is a high regard for communication, respect and compromise. By contrast, the authoritarian system robs and constrains the people's rights and freedom of expression. Even though such divergences of thought are related to the different political systems of Taiwan and China, they are more deeply linked to advances in societal development. Under a thousand years of feudalistic ideas and ancestral concepts, China has built up the view of concentrating power as a matter of course, and the individual's value and autonomy have never been paramount. On the other hand, the experience of more than 40 years of economic development and mass education has enabled Taiwan to form its own democratic system with associated freedoms.³⁶⁶ China's closed society with elite control and monopoly of information has allowed the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. Thus it has lagged behind Taiwan in many facets of social development, including education and the contestation of ideas.

³⁶⁴ Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999, pp. 159-161. On the use of the family metaphor by a PRC official, whereby the PRC is the parent and Taiwan, the child, while the US is the neighbor who encourages the child in bad behavior, see Romberg, Alan A. "Some Thoughts on Cross-Strait Relations." In Zagoria, 2003, p. 34.

³⁶⁵ Lee, *ibid.*

³⁶⁶ See Nakashima, Mineo. *The Resourcefulness of Asia*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 41-45; Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. "Democratizing China." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*. December 2003, Vol. 38, No. 4-5, pp. 377-394.

Conclusion

Once the People's Republic of China brought its military power into the diplomatic war across the Strait, it suggests that Beijing had lost its confidence in using diplomacy to constrain the Republic of China, and that Taiwan's democratization and "pragmatic diplomacy" had created threats to China. In February 2000, when the PRC announced its "One-China White Paper",³⁶⁷ it no longer appealed to the sentiment of nationalism, nor did it place expectations on the Taiwanese to act. Instead, China directly stated that if Taiwan continued to drag discussions on unification without a deadline, this alone would become one of the reasons for the PRC to decide to take military action. This reveals that Beijing recognized that it could not exercise the power of attraction for unification, and the passage of time would only consolidate Taiwan's desire for independence. Even though the PRC used military threats to persuade Taiwanese voters to veer towards unification, Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party was still elected as the new President in March 2000.³⁶⁸

The People's Republic used intimidation as a tactic in its international strategy, and pushed the Taiwan issue into the global arena. However, this made some members of the international community more convinced than ever that the cross-Strait problem

³⁶⁷ "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue." Taiwan Affairs Office, PRC State Council, Beijing, February 21st 2000.

³⁶⁸ See Hasegawa, Keitaro & Mineo Nagajima. *The Unpredictable Changes in the Post-Lee Teng-hui Period*. Taiwan Wisdom, Taipei, 2001, pp. 113-114; Ruan, Lin, Zhu, & Lu. 2000, pp. 246-248.

was not simply China's domestic affair, its hegemonic behavior may not be tolerated, and a democratic Taiwan was a significant issue for stability. More importantly, the conflict between Taiwan and China originated from the gaps of social development, which were difficult to bridge in the short term. As a result, the problem could not be solved through improvement of relations across the Taiwan Strait, but through transformational processes in the PRC. Chapter 7 will develop the ROC-PRC relations theme further by examining the power struggle between President Lee Teng-hui and the PRC in the 12-year period of 1988 to 2000.

Chapter Seven

Taiwan – China Relations

On March 4th 2000, when President Lee Teng-hui was participating in a physical education camp of parents and children in Tainan, southern Taiwan, he said that his own experience of the education systems of Japan, Taiwan, and the United States helped him understand what types of education were best for human development. Rather than traditional Chinese education, he favored taking human beings as the core to educate the next generation of Taiwanese. For a small country like Taiwan, there was nothing more important than democratization, liberalization, and the value base of society. In order to survive and develop, these elements were far more powerful than missiles and other weapons of war.³⁶⁹

Lee Teng-hui stressed that “Taiwan’s identity and democratization” were carrying Taiwan to its goal of establishing a new civilization, and providing a democratic model in Asia.³⁷⁰ In light of this, it is not surprising that during his 12 years in office, cross-Strait relations had reached new heights of controversy and had attracted

³⁶⁹ Chang, Hui-ying. *Lee Teng-hui 1988-2000 Twelve Years in Power*. T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), Taipei, 2000, p. 191; On the growth of pluralism through the legitimization of liberal thought, see Metzger, Thomas A. & Ramon H. Myers. “Understanding the Taiwan Experience: A Historical Perspective.” Hoover Institution Reprint Series, No. 133, Oxford University Press, 1989 (*The Pacific Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1989), pp. 306-7. On how reformist ideas impacted on traditional Chinese education, especially after the May 4th 1919 movement, see Goldman, Merle and Leo Ou-Fan Lee (eds). *An Intellectual History of Modern China*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. Indeed, Lee’s view on the need for a pluralistic education base is supported by the editors’ observation that: “Ideological propaganda at century’s end had become increasingly marginalized and intellectual creativity globalized” (p. 10).

³⁷⁰ Siao, Hsing-huang. *United Daily News*. Taipei, October 6th 1999, p. 25; Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Taiwan Times*. Taipei, March 25th 1999, p. 3.

international attention. Fundamental to Lee Teng-hui's China policy was the restructure of Taiwan so that the country's name accorded with its actual situation.³⁷¹

This chapter evaluates the national identity that emerged from various inputs which came during Lee's presidency: the threats and diplomatic isolation imposed by the PRC, the two-states theory, Singapore's role as mediator between Taiwan and China, and the secret contacts between envoys across the Strait.

Lee Teng-hui's contribution to Taiwan's national identity and the transition from "the ROC in Taiwan" to "Taiwan, the ROC"

As noted in this thesis thus far, Taiwan has a long history of foreign domination. From the Dutch and Japanese colonization to the Chinese KMT authoritarian rule, the local people of Taiwan and its territories (Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu) had not known what it was to be masters of their own country.³⁷² When the ROC became more established, Taiwanese society became further fragmented along ethnic lines. Although Lee Teng-hui was the Chinese KMT Chairman, he could not deny that even the KMT was a foreign political power. As a result, when Lee spoke of "the sadness of one's birth

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² As Lee Teng-hui states: "For centuries the people of Taiwan were denied the opportunity to govern themselves. No matter how hard they might strive, their homeland was not their own." (Lee Teng-hui. *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity*. PHP Institute, Inc., Tokyo, 1999, p. 19.)

place” to Shiba Ryotaro,³⁷³ he revealed that it was essential to turn the Chinese KMT into a local political party. Thus knowing that Taiwan's democratization needed to deal with the ethnic problem in the formation of national identity, Lee Teng-hui sought “localization and people's independence”.³⁷⁴

This, in turn, required “special relations between one country and another”.³⁷⁵ This would provide the foundation to build up the country, develop its international relations, and solve the problems across the Strait.³⁷⁶ Diplomatically, the ROC no longer claimed to be the only lawful government of China, admitting the legitimacy of the PRC in Mainland China. Lee Teng-hui had begun to resolve these contradictions since 1991: most notably, the termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, abolishing the Temporary Provisions, carrying out “pragmatic diplomacy”, and endeavoring to create the conditions for Taiwan and China to accept each other on equal terms.³⁷⁷ This did not mean that the quest for a national identity for Taiwan meant it must become independent. As Lee pointed out in his book, *With the People Always in My Heart*,³⁷⁸ it meant that the international status of Taiwan needed to be identified, and it was not necessarily tied to independence. On the other hand, it was more realistic to actualize the Republic of

³⁷³ Shiba, Ryotaro. *The Records of a Taiwan Tour*. Kaido O Yuku-Taiwan-Hen, Taipei, 1995, p. 531.

³⁷⁴ Lee, Teng-hui and Nakashima Mineo. *The Resourcefulness of Asia*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, pp. 34-36.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Ho, Luo. *Entire Records of Lee Teng-hui 1923-1996*. Life Think Tank, Taipei, 1997, pp. 510-513.

³⁷⁷ Ibid; Kobayashi, Yoshinori & Lee Teng-hui. *The Admonitions of Lee Teng-hui School*. Prophet Press, Taipei, 2001, pp. 89-90. See also Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 20-22.

³⁷⁸ Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 1999, pp. 62-63.

China in Taiwan or Taiwan in the ROC.

The Republic of China has been in existence since 1912, while the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. Lee Teng-hui regarded Taiwan as no longer constituting the original Republic of China, but a "New Republic"; that is, during the process of development, the identity issue has entered the phase of "Taiwan, the ROC", instead of "the ROC in Taiwan".³⁷⁹

The theory of two countries

Not surprisingly, the PRC had its own view of the preferred course of development. The PRC Chairman of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS),³⁸⁰ Wang Daohan, planned to visit Taiwan in April 1999. However, his visit was postponed many times, and finally deferred to the end of October. Given that October 1st 1999 was the 50th anniversary of China's proclamation as the People's Republic, it seemed to Lee Teng-hui that Beijing was intending to take this opportunity to proclaim once more the applicability of the Hong Kong model of "one country, two

³⁷⁹ *Yearbook of the Republic of China*, 2000, ROC Yearbook Publisher, Taipei, p. 56.

³⁸⁰ As elaborated below, ARATS was established in December 1991 to promote cross-Strait ties and eventual reunification. Its counterpart in Taiwan, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), was established in November 1992 as a nongovernment organization (as the government was committed to no contacts, no talks, and no compromises with the PRC). SEF, like ARATS, was concerned with developing cross-Strait relations, though the 1992 ARATS-SEF Consensus on the "one China" principle was eroded after Lee Teng-hui's theory of two countries, proclaimed in July 1999 (discussed below). (On the ARATS-SEF Consensus, see Xu, Shiquian. "The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations between the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation." In Zagoria, Donald S. (ed.). *Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse*, Praeger, Westport, 2003, pp. 81-102.)

systems”³⁸¹ to Taiwan. Thus if Taipei did not clearly declare that Taiwan – China relations were “special country to country relations”, it would have lost a valuable opportunity. Had Taiwan adopted the Beijing position that “Taiwan is a province of China, and Beijing is the central government”, then no dialogue would be necessary. The “theory of two countries” was thus deemed necessary for effective dialogue to be conducted with the PRC through Wang Daohan; so this declaration was made in July 1999.³⁸²

The problem of how to conceptualize the cross-Strait relationship originates with the “one China” policy. In 1972, Special Assistant to the US. President, Henry Kissinger, publicized the “one China” policy in the Shanghai Communiqué in the following terms: “The United States acknowledges and does not challenge that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China.”³⁸³ Despite Washington’s interpretation, for Taipei “one China” meant the Republic of China. For Beijing “one China” became a method of reining in Taiwan, specifically, in terms of: “There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat of China’s central

³⁸¹ “One country, two systems” (essentially meaning, one sovereignty, but two distinctive socio-economic entities) was introduced by the PRC’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping as a method of peaceful “reunification” with Taiwan, but was first applied to the return of Hong Kong, as stipulated in the December 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. (See Lasater, Martin L. “Chinese Unification Policies.” In Martin L. Lasater, Peter Kien-Hong Yu; with contributions from Kuang-ming Hsu and Robyn Lim. *Taiwan’s Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era*. Frank Cass, London, 2000, pp. 50-52.) The definition of “one country, two systems” given by the *Beijing Review* is that “in the People’s Republic of China, the one billion people on the mainland practice socialism while Hong Kong and Taiwan remain capitalist” (October 29th 1984, p. 16).

³⁸² Lee and Nakashima, 2000, pp. 42-45.

³⁸³ Kissinger, Henry. *The White House Years*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson & Michael Joseph, London, 1979, pp. 714, 721, 749, 782, 1049-1097; Kissinger, Henry. *Da Wai Jiao* (Big Diplomacy). Triumph, Taipei, 1998, pp. 984-988. See also Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994.

government is in Beijing.”³⁸⁴ If Taiwan remained passive in the face of such rhetoric, it could no longer expect to exist as a *de facto* independent sovereign state. Indeed, Taiwan would have encountered a severe challenge if the PRC proclaimed to the global media on the 50th anniversary of its inception that Taiwan was a special administrative region of China. Already its diplomatic isolation was keenly felt: once a state concluded diplomatic ties with China, it was required to sever relations with Taiwan. Taiwan's continued political survival was needed for its program of democratization and pluralism, and vice versa. Thus Taiwan's existence and its societal development have been Lee Teng-hui's preoccupation.³⁸⁵

On occasion, even humanitarian disasters have served as the arena for cross-Strait political recrimination. In Lee Teng-hui's era this occurred with Beijing's response to the “921 big earthquake”. On September 21st 1999, a 7.3 grade earthquake struck Taiwan, causing more than 2,000 casualties. Nationwide efforts at rescue and reconstruction were joined by foreign humanitarian relief teams and materials. The people of Taiwan, so long condemned to international isolation, received unprecedented assistance from the international community.³⁸⁶ By contrast, Beijing had not provided aid to Taiwan; instead, it criticized President Lee Teng-hui for promoting the two-states theory. Such an attitude appeared to have further alienated Taiwanese from China. The PRC was perceived as taking ideological advantage of

³⁸⁴ “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China.” Taiwan Affairs Office, PRC State Council, Beijing, August 1993. In the post-KMT era, soon after Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, the PRC changed the wording of “Taiwan is part of China” to “Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China” (see Romberg, 2003, p. 25). Although the two parts were more equally presented, still China was one and its sovereignty indivisible.

³⁸⁵ Chou, Jing-wen. *The Records of Lee Teng-hui in Power*. INK, Taipei, 2001, pp. 225-230.

³⁸⁶ Chang, 2000, pp. 223-224.

Taiwan in the midst of its suffering. Beijing even requested that foreign assistance to the earthquake victims be sent first Beijing for subsequent transfer to Taiwan.³⁸⁷ According to Japanese historian Fuyuko Kamisaka, a number of Japanese banks adhered to China's instructions. Kamisaka criticized China's tactic of taking advantage of Taiwan's misfortune.³⁸⁸

Lee Teng-hui *vis-à-vis* China

As noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis ("The political emergence of Lee Teng-hui"), Lee Teng-hui was born and raised in Taiwan, and had never lived on the mainland. His Taiwanese consciousness and "Taiwan First" policy caused the PRC to distrust him, while his close relations with Japan angered Beijing. Having grown up in the Japanese colonial period, Holo and Japanese were his native languages, while Mandarin was learnt much later. As a result, when Lee met with Japanese guests, he conversed in Japanese. He even admitted that until the age of 22 he considered himself Japanese. Not only was Lee criticized for this by the Mainland Chinese but also by some sections of Taiwanese society.³⁸⁹ These included the pro-China group who accused Lee of

³⁸⁷ Kamisaka, Fuyuko. *The President in the Tiger's Mouth – Lee Teng-hui and Ceng Wen-hui*. Prophet, Taipei, 2001, pp. 271-273.

³⁸⁸ Ibid. It is noteworthy that the same criticism again surfaced with regard to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in the post-Lee era, in that a UN body, the World Health Organisation (WHO), was not allowed in Taiwan despite the ROC having "observer" status. It had to go through Beijing to address concerns of the epidemic's spread in Taiwan. (SARS first appeared in China in November 2002. The WHO declared the outbreak of this virus contained in July 2003, after the last territory on the WHO warning list, Taiwan, underwent the mandatory 20 days without reporting a new case of SARS. - "Last Sars Hotspot Contained." BBC News, July 5th 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3046984.stm>)

³⁸⁹ Chang, 2000, p. 205; Tu, Weiming. "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in

betraying Taiwan. On the whole, however, Lee's battle with the PRC to retain Taiwan's *de facto* independence had won him greater support than distrust among his compatriots.³⁹⁰ While the Japanese and his fellow Taiwanese may have been understanding of Lee Teng-hui's position, the same cannot be said of Singapore which appeared at first to be a genuine mediator in the cross-Strait relationship. Indeed, it may be said that when it came to the cause of Taiwan sovereign independence, Singapore's Lee (the former prime minister who still remained influential) betrayed Taiwan's Lee. This episode and two others are discussed below in the context of Lee Teng-hui *vis-à-vis* China: they complicated cross-Straits relations but they also strengthened Taiwanese consciousness.

Singapore's abortive efforts at mediation, 1994

On May 16th 1994, when President Lee was returning to Taiwan from his South Africa visit, he made a stopover in Singapore. In the VIP room of the Changi Airport, he met with Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok-tong to discuss establishing a state-owned shipping company among Taiwan, Mainland China, and Singapore. The ship's origin would be Singapore with a Singaporean flag; Taiwan and China would provide 45 percent of the capital respectively, and the remaining 10 percent would be offered by Singapore. An agreement was reached since both Taiwan and China had considered it as a suitable proposal to avoid political issues of sovereign rights and jurisdiction in

Contemporary Taiwan." *The China Quarterly*. No. 148, December 1996, p. 1131.

³⁹⁰ Kamisaka, 2001, pp. 217-218; Ruan, Ming *et al.* *Democracy in Taiwan*. Yuanliou, Taipei, 2000, p. 196.

direct shipping across the Taiwan Strait.

On June 20th 1994, PRC President Jiang Ze-min wrote to Goh Chok-tong to thank him for the arrangement, and the Singapore Representative had forwarded a copy of this letter to President Lee Teng-hui on July 19th. On August 6th, after Goh Chok-tong made the careful evaluation with former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, they had asked that the agreement be revised so that Singapore's funding share would be raised to 34 percent, and Taiwan's and China's portion be decreased to 33 percent each. On September 21st, Lee Kuan Yew traveled to Taiwan and President Lee welcomed him by hosting a dinner party; however, Lee Kuan Yew told Lee Teng-hui that if Taiwan agreed to take part in this common enterprise, it could demonstrate to the PRC that Taiwan was part of China, and would unquestionably move towards unification in the future. Lee Kuan Yew even mentioned the timetable of unification, stating that it was possible within 50 years.³⁹¹

Knowing that the democratically-minded Lee Teng-hui would never find compatible grounds for unification with a Communist regime, Lee Kuan Yew suggested that Taiwan should at least acknowledge China's "nationalism" (the term used was: *kuo ja chi yi*, 國家主義). In addition, Lee Kuan Yew stressed that Taiwan should not believe that the United States would protect it, if it was not in the Washington's interests to do so. To Lee Teng-hui, who had always insisted on democracy and had no intention of compromising with China's "nationalism", the idea of the shipping company was

³⁹¹ *China Times*. "Jiang Jie-Ming: 'Hope to See Unification Across the Strait in the Next 50 Years.'" October 23rd 1999, Taipei, p.1; *United Daily Newspaper*. "Beijing Wants to Make a Unification Timetable." June 20th 2000, Taipei, p. 1; Kobayashi and Lee, 2001, pp. 89-90.

discontinued.³⁹²

Originally, President Lee Teng-hui was intending to entrust Singapore as a mediator for the marine transportation business between Taiwan and China; yet, a mediator such as Singapore must have appeared to be more a liability than an asset. Hence Lee Teng-hui turned against the venture.³⁹³ After that, Lee Kuan Yew did not visit Taiwan during Lee Teng-hui's presidential term.³⁹⁴

The Thousand Islets Lake Incident, 1994

After the lifting of martial law in Taiwan, it became common for Taiwanese to visit Mainland China. On March 31st 1994, a tragic incident occurred in the Thousand Islets Lake (Qiandao hu): 24 Taiwanese tourists, the tour guide, and eight crew members were consumed by fire. According to subsequent investigations, the 24 tourists were robbed and killed, and their bodies burned to destroy the evidence of murder. There was thought to be a cover-up by the PRC government because members of the Public Security forces were the perpetrators.³⁹⁵

³⁹² *Liberal Times*. Taipei, June 26th 2000, pp. 1-2; Kobayashi & Lee, 2001, pp. 89-90. See also Roy, Denny. "Taiwan's Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within." Occasional Paper Series, *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*. March 2003, p. 5;

³⁹³ *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, May 13th 1997, pp. 1-2.

³⁹⁴ Kamisaka, 2001, p. 282.

³⁹⁵ Lin, Chia-lung. "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 233.

However, at the time the PRC's Public Security called it an "accident", and refused Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation permission to go to China to conduct investigations. It also stopped Taiwanese victims' remains from being returned. Taiwan was infuriated by this attitude, since the incident not only affected those involved but also offended the nation. Afterward, China had claimed that the "Thousand Islets Lake Incident" was not an accident; the fire was set by bandits, and three who were allegedly responsible had been put to death immediately. Yet, the investigations carried out by Taiwan had exposed that the three arrestees did not set the fire; they had been in jail for a long time and were already sentenced to death. Meanwhile, the National Security Bureau of Taiwan secretly received the circular order of the real criminals, and surprisingly, they were the Public Security police officers of the PRC. To date, the real criminals have not been arrested, and President Lee publicly condemned the Mainland Chinese government as bandits.³⁹⁶ The effect on domestic public opinion was that support for independence rose to unprecedented levels: "For the first time, supporters of independence and those self-identified as Taiwanese constituted 33 percent and 41 percent of Taiwan's population, respectively."³⁹⁷

³⁹⁶ Lin, Chia-lung, 2002, pp. 232-235; *CTS News Magazine*. "The Meeting Between Ku Cheng-fu and Wang Dao-han. The Relationships Across the Strait (1)." Taipei, No. 866, October 7th 1998, <http://www.cts.com.tw/nm/sm/sm08660.htm>; Cheng, Yu-ching. "Analysis of Mainland China Policy White Paper." *Fortune China Monthly*. Taipei, No. 7, August 1994, <http://www.chinabiz.org.tw/maz/InvCina/199408-007/199408-005.htm>; Yu, Yu-ling & Wang, Cho-chong & Chen, Shei-hui. "Conflicts and Analysis: Interactive Relations Across the Strait." *China Times*. Taipei, January 3rd 2000, <http://www.future-china.org/fcn-tw/200001/2000010404.htm>

³⁹⁷ Lin, Chia-lung, 2002, p. 233.

Failures in cross-Strait diplomacy, 1990-1995

Despite cross-Strait tensions, Lee during his presidency had always kept a non-official channel of communication open with the PRC leadership, including those at the highest level - Deng Xiaoping and, later, Jiang Ze-min.³⁹⁸ This communication needed to be nongovernmental because Beijing did not recognize Taiwan as a separate sovereign entity. Thus the ROC's 1991 Guidelines for National Unification forbade direct trade and communication links. Instead cross-Strait affairs were dealt with by the National Unification Council (NUC) of the Presidential Office, that created policy on dealing with the PRC; the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the ROC cabinet – the Executive Yuan – implemented NUC policy and principles. MAC, in turn, supervised the “nongovernmental” Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) which made direct contact with PRC officials and supervised the documentation of trade and travel between the two sides. The PRC equivalent of SEF, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), was tied to the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council.

The expected keynote meeting between the two sides was in Singapore in 1993 when ARATS chairman Wang Daohan met with SEF chairman Koo Chen-fu, but nothing of consequence was achieved. A second meeting was scheduled for 1995; it did not take place due to Beijing's disapproval of President Lee's US visit (instead the second

³⁹⁸ Pertinent Taiwanese sources for this section are: Huang, Yue-hong and Ying Nei-jing. “The Hot-line Between Lee and Jiang Continuously Linked until Lee Teng-hui Left His Term in Office.” *Industry and Commerce Times*. Taipei, July 20th 2000, p. 1; *China Evening Newspaper*. “The Past Government's Secret Envoy Behavior.” Taipei, July 21st 2000, p. 1; Lee, Wen-long. “The Exposure of the Secret Envoy Event Manifested Lee Teng-hui's Strategic Structure.” *The New Taiwan Journal*. Taipei, July 22nd 2000, p.25-28. and Chang, Wei-kuo. “The Exposure of the Secret Envoy Incident Embarrassed Jiang Zeming.” *The Democracy Platform*, Taiwan, August 18th 2000, pp. 52-55.

Koo-Wang meeting occurred in Beijing in 1998). In April 1994, presidential envoys from both sides met in Zhuhai, southern China, exchanging gifts from Lee Teng-hui and Jiang Ze-min. On the eve of the lunar New Year of 1995, before Jiang announced his "Eight Points" towards Taiwan, the PRC hinted that it expected Taiwan to give respect and a friendly response to President Jiang's announcement.³⁹⁹

After the New Year, Lee Teng-hui particularly pointed out that "Jiang's Eight Points"⁴⁰⁰ were worthy of respect. On April 8th 1995, Lee raised his "Six Principles".⁴⁰¹ Neither side changed its position but there was a softening of tone.⁴⁰² The last meeting between envoys took place in March 1995, in Macao. The Chinese side was told that

³⁹⁹ Shi, Su-ching. "The Secret Envoys across the Strait and Lee Teng-hui: The Political Powers of Su Chi-cheng, Cheng Su-ming, and Ying Yeng-liang." *Business Weekly*. Taipei, No. 661, July 24th-30th 2000, http://magazine.pchome.com.tw/businessweekly/661/businessweekly_2-1.html

⁴⁰⁰ These are: 1) adherence to the "one China" principle; 2) opposition to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"; 3) "consultations on an equal footing can be held" within the principle of "one China"; 4) "reunification" should be peaceful but force is not ruled out if there is foreign interference with China's "reunification" and promotion of the "independence of Taiwan"; 5) the establishment of direct links between the two sides; 6) Chinese culture should be seen as a unifying force; 7) "all parties and personages of all circles in Taiwan are welcome to exchange views with us" on the "reunification" issue; and 8) leaders from Taiwan are "welcome to pay visits" to China in the "appropriate capacities" and the PRC side is "ready to accept" invitations. (Excerpted from Jiang Zemin. "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland." *Xinhua* (FBIS transcribed text), January 30th 1995.)

⁴⁰¹ These are: 1) unification should be sought on the basis of historical reality, that being that the two sides are "separately governed"; 2) "step up cross-Strait exchange on the basis of the Chinese culture"; 3) take advantage of the two sides' complementary economies; 4) "join international organizations on equal footing" – i.e. equal status; 5) persist in the peaceful resolution of disputes; and 6) "jointly maintain the prosperity of and promote democracy in Hong Kong and Macao". (Excerpted from Lee Teng-hui's Six Principles speech to the ROC National Unification Council, April 8th 1995; see Lasater, Martin L. "Chinese Unification Policies." In Martin L. Lasater, Peter Kien-Hong Yu; with contributions from Kuang-ming Hsu and Robyn Lim. *Taiwan's Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era*. Frank Cass, London, 2000, p. 62-63)

⁴⁰² See Lasater, *ibid.*, pp. 56-64. Indeed, in October 2004, the People First Party introduced a bill that would create a cross-party panel to structure Taiwan's relations with China. There was a clear determination to diminish presidential control of the cross-strait relationship: "DPP Legislator Tsai warned the opposition parties to brace for another constitutional row if they persist in make a law that would hurt the authority and integrity of the Cabinet and the Presidential Office." ("Opposition Parties Seek to Create Panel for Cross-Strait Policy." *Taiwan News*. October 30th 2004, <http://taiwansecurity.org/TN/2004/TN-301004.htm>)

President Lee was going to visit the Middle East and the US, and hoped China could understand. According to the message PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen forwarded to Jiang Ze-min, the PRC did not think that the US Administration would agree to the Lee visit. Consequently, China's attitude was that Taiwan had its position, and China had its situation, too; thus, the PRC would still engage in criticisms. In April 1995, Lee went to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan as scheduled, and in June, he visited Cornell University in the US and delivered his speech, "With the People Always in My Heart". China did not reveal any strong reactions at the early stage. Besides, Vice President of ARATS, Tang Shu-bei, came to Taiwan before Lee's tour to the US as planned. Yet, in April 1995, the New Party's delegate of the Legislative Yuan, Yu Mu-ming, disclosed the activities of unofficial Beijing-Taipei meetings. Face-to-face dialogue was brought to an end. Moreover, according to China's information, the meetings of envoys had been monitored by the anti-Jiang faction.⁴⁰³ Relations between Beijing and Taipei plummeted after May 22 when the US announced that it was granting a visa to Lee Teng-hui to pay a private visit to the US. Domestic politics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may well have contributed to foiling Lee's shadowy cross-Strait diplomacy,⁴⁰⁴ in addition to his own risk-taking in visiting the US.

Upon reflection, it may be observed that one of the outcomes of democratization in Taiwan was that transparency had become a paramount consideration and secret

⁴⁰³ Wang, Jing. "The Secret History of the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*) and the Chinese Communist Party." *The Journalist* 2.0. Taipei, No. 699, July 28th-August 3rd 2000, http://magazine.pchome.com.tw/journalist/699/journalist_8-1.html

⁴⁰⁴ The linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy is widely appreciated in international relations, and has been discussed in the context of cross-Strait relations in Goldstein, 1997. Goldstein draws on the conceptual work of Putman, Robert D. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games." *International Organization*. Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988; and Gourevitch, Peter. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization*. Vol. 32, No. 4, Autumn 1978.

diplomacy was considered suspect. Lee was not as free as he might have wished to talk with the Communist regime. The NUC, MAC and SEF were criticized in the Legislative Yuan as lacking legitimacy as they were dominated by the KMT and especially by President Lee.⁴⁰⁵ The DPP had feared that the KMT would engage in party-to-party talks that would lead to unification; while at the other end of the spectrum, the powerful Taiwanese business lobby wanted direct links established and the safety of their investments assured. With different domestic views vying for attention and the perceived lack of transparency and accountability of any unofficial cross-Straits discussions, Taiwan's democratic politics were taking their toll on cross-Straits relations. Meanwhile, Lee's 1995 US visit caused strong opposition in Beijing to non-official cross-Straits dialogue. Hence the meetings between the Taiwan and PRC envoys that had been held irregularly were terminated in 1995.⁴⁰⁶

Conclusion

Relations across the Taiwan Strait in these 12 years had been, to a considerable degree, the history of a power struggle between Lee Teng-hui and China. In international society, President Lee had used "pragmatic diplomacy" to challenge the PRC. On the

⁴⁰⁵ See Goldstein, *ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ Chou, 2001, pp. 192-204; Zheng, Shu-ming. *Attitudes -- Zheng, Shu-ming's Life Notes*. Ping-an, Taipei, 2001, pp. 238-242.

issue of unification, Lee had adopted the method of negotiation between the two sides, and the “special country-to-country relations” to defend Taiwan. The PRC, for its part, had been provoked by Lee Teng-hui and viewed him with hostility. The Beijing authorities employed military threats and the policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically from other countries as well as from international governmental organizations, consequently causing international concern over the perceived volatility of the Taiwan Strait.⁴⁰⁷

China is a huge country whose national power and international position dwarf Taiwan; however, its cross-Strait policies appear to have been largely reactive to Lee Teng-hui. The PRC chose to employ the threat of force to restrict Lee's actions; it had been overly anxious to resolve the Taiwan issue, and had seemed to regard Taiwan as an opponent. Therefore, President Lee's consistent objective had been to persuade the PRC to treat Taiwan with equality. Beijing's hostile attitude towards Lee Teng-hui and its increasing concerns about Taiwan may have been indicative of self-doubt over the direction of future developments in Chinese history: which side of the Taiwan Strait will exercise the greatest power of attraction (as distinct from coercion) in resolving the Taiwan issue?⁴⁰⁸

President Lee's ability to exercise the soft power of attraction came not only from necessity – that is, the absence of sufficient coercive and diplomatic power at his disposal *vis-à-vis* the PRC - but from his conformity with the requirements of the times

⁴⁰⁷ Chang, 2000, pp. 208-210; Fei, Bian. “Jiang Bing-kun and Albright.” *Taiwan Daily*. Taipei, March 5th 2000, p. 2.

⁴⁰⁸ See Ibid.

in Taiwan's socio-political development. Taiwanese sought to strive for their nation's dignity, to be the masters of their own country, and to oppose communism. Consequently, no matter how controversial Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan-China policy was, he had managed to win popular support. In an effort to understand Taiwan's emerging culture, chapter 8 will discuss the growth of trade brought about by "oceanic culture", electoral gimmickry and idiosyncrasies, national identity, the activities of non-government organizations, and how Japan's colonial assimilation policy and the Chinese KMT's authoritarianism sparked Taiwanese consciousness.

Chapter Eight

The Cultural Flows of Taiwan

Taiwan was originally the name of an aboriginal tribe in Anping, Tainan. When the *Han* people arrived in Anping, they asked the Aborigines, "Where is this?", and the Aborigines had answered, "Taywan". Therefore, while some *Han* people called it "Dayuan", others had translated it to "Taiyuan" or "Taiwan". Japanese scholars in the

early 20th century (in the context of Japanese colonial rule) divided Taiwan's Aborigines into nine tribes: Taiya, Saixia, Bunong, Cao, Lukai, Paiwan, Beinan, Amei, and Yamei. There were also those who had lived in the lowlands and had been influenced by the *Han* culture; they were called the Pingpu (literally, "plains") Aborigines. Scholars in Taiwan have traditionally accepted this grouping of nine or 10.⁴⁰⁹ However, with the passage of time and contact with immigrants, these Austronesian-speaking indigenous people have undergone identity changes.

Among the major tribes, the biggest was Amei, with a population of more than 100,000, in the Hualien to Taidong area.⁴¹⁰ The second largest tribes, each with some 50,000 people, were Taiya of the northern mountains area, and Cao of the Mount Ali region.⁴¹¹ Taiya and Siaxia tattooed their faces and bodies, while all the tribes were accustomed to drinking alcohol and chewing betel nut. Relations between the *Han* people and the Aborigines can be traced back to the seventh century. When the Dutch came to Taiwan in 1624, they observed Aborigines transacting, intermarrying, and living together with the *Han* people.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁹ See *Discovering Taiwan* (Vol. 1). T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), 1992, Taipei, pp. 65-68; Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, p. 3; and Hsieh, Shih-Ching. "From Shanbao to Yuanzhumin: Taiwan Aborigines in Transition." In Rubinstein, Murray A. (ed.). *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present*. M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1994, p. 404.

⁴¹⁰ Wang, Shao-po. *Taiwan History and Taiwanese People*. Dong-da Book Company, Taipei, 1988, pp. 25-28.

⁴¹¹ Chen, Ching-ming, Huang Chao-ren & Shi Chi-hui. *Getting to Know Taiwan*. Li-ming Culture Enterprise Company, Taipei, 1996, pp. 189-192.

⁴¹² Chong, Chung-ching. *Taiwan History Summary*. Chun-ding Culture Publisher, Taipei, 1997, pp. 145-148; Ying, Yun-fan. *Discovering Taiwan* (Vol. 2). T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), Taipei, 1998, pp. 229-240.

In the 17th century, the *Han* people started arriving in Taiwan from the west, the Japanese entered the island from the northeast, the Dutch moved in from the south, and the Spanish arrived from the north. In order to survive, many of the new arrivals began to compete with the Aborigines, and among them, the Pingpu or plains Aborigines suffered most. On the other hand, most of the *Han* people who undertook the risk of going to Taiwan were male, so many of them had married Pingpu women.⁴¹³ Thus the Pingpu experienced changes in identity, but so too did the *Han*. Recent histories of Taiwan, particularly in the 1990s with the onset of Taiwanization-via-democratization,⁴¹⁴ have tended to veer away from the promotion of “Taiwanese identity as Han identity” and have endeavored to “reinstate Aborigines in Taiwan’s history”.⁴¹⁵ In doing so, Taiwan’s peculiarities as an island of seaborne interaction with existing non-Han populations is reinforced.

It is from this vantage point that this chapter seeks to examine the country’s “ocean culture”, the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, the influences of Chinese culture and Confucianism, Taiwanese people’s distinctive ethic of *phah pian* (打拼), meaning “to struggle for”, the efforts made by the overseas Taiwanese to advance democratization, the identity construction of the Hakka people, politics as a consumer product, and how Taiwan had survived adversity. These generate a field of cultural experiences against which an understanding of Taiwan’s identity needs to be positioned. Or, to use the

⁴¹³ Lee Siao-feng & Liu Feng-song. *An Examination of Taiwan’s History*. The Independent Evening Newspaper, Taipei, 1994, pp. 22-25.

⁴¹⁴ For example, as demonstrated in the output of Academia Sinica’s Institute of Taiwan History.

⁴¹⁵ Brown, Melissa J. *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004, p. 35.

water metaphor of “ocean culture”, they represent the “cultural flows”⁴¹⁶ that have shaped Taiwan.

Taiwan's ocean nature

When Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he spoke of Taiwan being the “root of Oceanic culture” with its “pluralist, indigenous, and international” features, as opposed to being merely a “frontier” of Chinese culture.⁴¹⁷ Ocean is a metaphor for tolerant power; it does not belong to any continent or island, but touches all. As a result, it can adjust to divergences and promote interchange.⁴¹⁸ Ocean as metaphor is also in keeping with late modernity's (or post-modernity's) concerns with globalization as characterized by dynamic “flows” (across many sectors, such as capital, trade, technology and people) and as “process geographies”⁴¹⁹ or “areas as spaces of action, interaction and motion”.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁶ The term is borrowed from the “Cultural Flows” project at Monash University in Melbourne Australia, as it aptly captures 21st century intellectual endeavors to “address questions of identity” and respond to “changing global realities.” See Burgess, Chris. “The Asian Studies ‘Crisis’: Putting Cultural Studies into Asian Studies and Asia into Cultural Studies.” *International Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, p. 124. www.arts.monash.edu.au/lcl/research/culturalflows.html

⁴¹⁷ Goh, Sui Noi. “It's Taiwan Culture.” *Straits Times*. Singapore, August 5th 2000, p. 19, quoted in Chung, Chien-peng. “Taiwan's Future: Mongolia or Tibet?” *Asian Affairs: An American Review*. Vol. 27, No. 4, Winter 2001.

⁴¹⁸ Lee, Qiao. *The Shaping of Taiwanese Culture*. Vanguard, Taipei, 1992, pp. 88-90; Liao, Chong-shan. “Taiwan's Main Body and Ocean Nature.” Taiwanese Culture Service, 1996, gopher://twserv.csie.nctu.edu.tw:70/11/society/ocean_taiwan Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1995, p. 179.

⁴¹⁹ Appadurai, Arjun. “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination.” In Appadurai, Arjun (ed.). *Globalization*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2001, pp. 7-9, cited in Burgess, Chris. “The Asian Studies ‘Crisis’: Putting Cultural Studies into Asian Studies and Asia into Cultural Studies.” *International Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, p. 127.

⁴²⁰ Burgess, *ibid.*

In contrast, “‘trait’ geographies (areas as relatively immobile aggregates of traits like language or culture)”⁴²¹ resemble earth as the mother of human beings. Therefore, people have depended on earth and been possessive towards the land. Since the natural environment and the climate are fixed, so a characteristic of continental culture is a tendency towards being conservative and isolationist.⁴²² For instance, in 1988, a PRC produced documentary called *River Elegy* had discussed the blue ocean culture and the yellow continent culture. It was pointed out that several of the oldest civilizations originated from river basins - the Yellow River, the Nile, the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Indus. However, since these civilizations were unable to embrace the broader blue ocean, they had been conquered or defeated by other newly born civilizations, which came from the sea in succession. It was also argued that China had been weakened by its tenaciousness in guarding the conservative continental civilization of the Loess Plateau; if China wanted to rise, it had to move towards the ocean from the continent, and combine the “yellow” civilization with the “blue” civilization. In *River Elegy*, it was explained that the Yellow River had always thought its home was the Loess Plateau, until the day came when it discovered that its true home was the ocean. One implication of the flow of the Yellow River to the ocean was that China had to move towards liberalization.⁴²³

⁴²¹ Burgess citing Appadurai, 2001.

⁴²² Liao, Chong-shan. *Taro, Yam, and Island Nation Sentiment*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1993, pp. 83-95; Hsu, Hsin-liang. *The Rising People*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1995.

⁴²³ Su, Shiao-kun & Wang, Lu-shun. “Sky-Blue Color.” *River Elegy*. Vol. 6 China the Beautiful, PRC, 1988, <http://www.chinapage.com/big5/history/hs.htm>; Ruan, Ching-yue. “Sky-Blue City.” *Cultural Studies Monthly*. No. 5, Taipei, July 15th 2001, http://www.ncu.edu.tw/~eng/csa/journal/journal_park23.htm; *New China Broadcast*. “Author’s View On River Elegy: The Government’s Response.” Beijing, Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), August 1st 1989; Shi, Chi-ping. “From the River Elegy to the Record of China’s Repentance.” *Business*

Chinese migrations occurred mainly from southern coastal China over the past seven centuries and intensified in the 19th and 20th centuries. Living as they did predominantly on the coast, migrants chose maritime routes to their new abodes in Southeast Asia and beyond. The ocean characteristics - such as an adventurous spirit and adaptability to changing circumstances - became the hallmarks of the Chinese Diaspora around the world. A distinctive feature of immigrant societies in general, such as that of the USA, Australia, Canada and, indeed, Taiwan, has been its multicultural character. After initial clashes, people tolerate each other as their newfound identity consolidates to establish a new country.⁴²⁴ Although Taiwan's immigrants had been influenced considerably by *Han* culture, the impact of ocean culture was such as to cause them gradually to become more self-aware, tolerant, democratic and abiding by rule of law rather than rule of man. Even with a certain degree of Chinese culture, a new culture has been created in Taiwan.⁴²⁵

As pointed out by Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan is surrounded by ocean, and the lives of Taiwanese people have been influenced by it deeply; therefore, the sea has been guarding the island and comforting its people.⁴²⁶ Indeed, all migration waves to Taiwan were (and had to be) seaborne, be they those who arrived 50 years ago or three

Weekly. Taipei, July 31st 2000, <http://www.businessweekly.com.tw/bwnet/column/shi/662.htm>; Lu, Cheng-da. "Thoughts After Watching the Record of China's Repentance." Taipei Ricci Institute, Taipei, 2000, <http://www.riccibase.com/dofile/peace30.htm>.

⁴²⁴ Davidson, James W. *The Island of Formosa: Past and Present*. SMC Publishing INC, Taipei, 1992, pp. 18-22.

⁴²⁵ Lin, Mei-rong. *Taiwanese Culture and the Reconstruction of History*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1996, pp. 88-92.

⁴²⁶ Chen Shui-bian. *The First Sailing of the Century*. Eurasian, Taipei, 2001, pp. 39-41.

hundred years ago.⁴²⁷ Thus President Chen Shui-bian stressed the ocean qualities in his inauguration speech in 2000, pointing out that though Taiwan was only a small island on the shore of the Pacific Ocean, if all Taiwanese were not afraid of difficulties, and moved forward together, then their dreams could be within reach.⁴²⁸ Taiwanese consciousness thereby grew from a sense of oceanic place to create aspirational space.⁴²⁹

Oceanic trade routes

After the Portuguese⁴³⁰ and Spanish arrived in Taiwan from the east in the 16th century, a cosmopolitan trade environment developed among Chinese, Japanese, and European merchants. Their exchanges had become more active after the arrival of the Dutch in the 17th century,⁴³¹ and formed the triangle of trade across Taiwan, Fukien (Fujian) Province, and Japan's Kyushu Island, thereby ushering in the modern history of Taiwan.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ On ocean culture, see Chen, Nai-jing. "Build an Ocean State and Let People come Close to the Ocean First." *The New Taiwan Journal*. Taipei, June 28th 2004, pp. 52-55; Lee, Siao-fon. "The Specialities of Taiwanese History and Culture." Lecture, Presidential Office, Taipei, July 23rd 2001; Lee, Shin-yi. "From Ocean Capital to Ocean State, the Prospect of Ocean Taiwan." *The New Taiwan Journal*. Taipei, June 28th 2004, pp. 85-86.

⁴³⁰ The Portuguese "discovered" the island for Portugal in 1590 and gave it the name *Ilha Formosa*, "the Beautiful Island".

⁴³¹ The Dutch controlled southern Taiwan and the Spanish controlled the north.

Had the Europeans not made their debut from the east, Taiwan might have had a prolonged dormant period and the history of *Han* immigrations to Taiwan would have occurred much later than the 17th century.⁴³²

As matters transpired, trade brought cultural vigor to Taiwan from all directions. During the 17th century the volume of shipping traversing Taiwan, Japan and Southeast Asia had notably increased.⁴³³ While Taiwan traded with Japan, deer fur (primarily used for the winter cold) and silk had been the major exports. When the Dutch occupied Taiwan in 1624, deer fur became an even more valued export. The *Han* immigrants had been encouraged to capture yet greater numbers of deer, a situation which relatively worsened the relationship between the Aborigines and *Han* people. Nonetheless, deer fur was undoubtedly the main source of Dutch trading profit: between 1633 and 1660, 10,000 to 160,000 pieces of deer fur were transported from Taiwan to Japan annually.⁴³⁴

Besides deer fur, there were numerous other items traded. Thus between 1649 and 1655, the exports from Taiwan to Japan were largely raw silk, silk goods, porcelain, painted items, ink stones, books, ancient goods, brown sugar, and medicines; while the

⁴³² Tung, Jing-tai. *Moving Ahead Formosa – First Encounter, Taiwan in the 17th Century*. Owl, Taipei, 2001, p. 9. Taiwan, in fact, was not declared a province of Ching (Manchu) Dynasty China until 1886. Nine years later, following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895.

⁴³³ Reid, Anthony. *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 1: The Lands Below the Winds*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988; Reid, Anthony. *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993.

⁴³⁴ Tung, Si-yong. "Taiwan's Trade Viewed from Dutch Historical Sources in the 17 Century." *Theses Collection of the Chinese Ocean Development History*. Volume 7, First Part, Taiwan Central Research Center, Chong-shan Humanities and Social Sciences Research Institute, March 1999, p. 51.

imports comprised gold, silver, copper, knives, seafood, and mountain goods.⁴³⁵ With regard to the China trade, the Dutch had wanted to attract the Chinese going to Taiwan for trade and acquisition of consumer goods. On December 7th 1632, 45 Chinese fishing vessels arrived in Taiwan, and transported salt, fishnets, fishing necessities, silk fabrics, china, rice, tea, brown sugar, and bricks. On their return journey to China, the fishermen often brought back with them deer meats, salty mullets, and mullet roes.⁴³⁶

Anthony Reid has remarked that: "In cultural terms as in others, the age of commerce (in the 17th century) was a high point of globalization and cosmopolitanism for Southeast Asia. In every field we can point to enthusiastic cultural borrowing . . ."⁴³⁷ Can the same be said of Taiwan? While Taiwan did not lie across the lucrative spice trade that flowed through the Strait of Malacca, its own Taiwan Strait was nonetheless a vital part of the maritime route from Europe to China and Japan via Southeast Asia. The cultural implications for Taiwan were numerous, and have been felt to the present day.

As Formosa turned out to be one of the transport centers of the European and Asian trade network, it was not only the gathering site of the ocean immigrants from Europe

⁴³⁵ Lin, Ren-chuan. "Examining the Rise and Fall of the Famous Sea Merchant Zheng." *Zheng Cheng-gong Research Theses Collections – The Sequel*. Zheng Cheng-gong Academic Research Discussion Group, Taiwan, 1984, p. 195.

⁴³⁶ Chao, Yong-her. "Taiwan's Fishing Industry Summary Record in Ming Dynasty." *The History Research in Earlier Period of Taiwan*. Lianjin, Taipei, 1979, pp. 169 & 219; Jiang, January 2000, pp. 78-79.

⁴³⁷ Reid, Anthony. "Global and Local in Southeast Asian History." *International Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, pp. 5-21.

and Asia, but also the northern boundary of early Austronesian cultural development,⁴³⁸ and the emergence of a miniature form of the “global village”. This was apparent over time, in wave-like influences: Aboriginal tribes interacted with the Holo and Hakka *Han* immigrants; they were affected by the Europeans, followed in the 17th century by Koxinga's (Zheng Chenggong's) arrived in Taiwan from China, right through to the Japanese colonial period after 1885. Ethnic diversity was also apparent as a snapshot in time, such as the Dutch period (1624-1661):

The population in the southwestern core of Dutch control was ethnically diverse. Han Chinese traders, merchants, fishermen, and some farmers were present, as well as Japanese traders, Dutch missionaries, VOC [*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* – the Dutch East India Company], and African slaves in the service of Dutch officials and missionaries.⁴³⁹

Besides the maritime cosmopolitanism of Taiwan, there was also the traditional value system of the indigenous inhabitants who still formed the largest ethnic group at the time of the Dutch census in 1650.⁴⁴⁰ As will be discussed below, the Aborigines gave to Taiwan's emergent national culture their own democratic orientation and respect for the environment. By comparison, the *Han* brought an “immigrant spirit” of open-mindedness, hard work and Confucian morality. The Christian religious establishments, like the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, introduced Christian concepts of

⁴³⁸ New Zealand marks the southern boundary, Easter Island in the Pacific Ocean is the eastern frontier, and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean is the west.

⁴³⁹ Brown, 2004, p. 37.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

brotherhood and equality but also their own attention to local culture and the promotion of democracy. In addition, the Japanese historical interlude permitted the foundation of law and order and the reinforcement of Confucian morality in terms of the cultivation of upright character. Finally, the West (Europe and the United States) influenced Taiwan in terms of democracy, freedom, human rights, rationality, the rule of law, and scientific concepts.⁴⁴¹

The Aboriginal contribution

Taiwan's Aborigines, who comprise about two percent of Taiwan's population or 369,700 people,⁴⁴² have been living in Taiwan and its neighboring islands before the mass inflow of the coastal people from Mainland China in the 17th century.⁴⁴³ Compared to Austronesian-speaking people elsewhere, Taiwan's Aborigines have been less influenced by Islamic and Christian cultures, retaining to a large measure their animist beliefs.⁴⁴⁴ Their belief in sacred aspects of their environment clashed with their commercially and militarily minded colonizers, as demonstrated by the Tkdaya

⁴⁴¹ Peng, Ming-min. *The Taste of Freedom – Peng Ming-min's Memoirs*. Peng Ming-min's Culture and Education Foundation, Taipei, 1995, p. 31; *The Whole Record of Taiwan*. Jin-siu Publishing Company, Taipei, 1990, pp. 201-204.

⁴⁴² Dai, Bao-chun. "Ketagalan Boulevard and Rectifying the Name of the Mountain Counties." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, June 30th 2000, p. 15.

⁴⁴³ Under Ming loyalist, Koxinga's rule (1661-1683), Han Chinese arrived in large numbers - 30,000 in 1661 alone. (Brown, 2004, p. 40.)

⁴⁴⁴ Mo, Chung-yaun & Chen Bo-chung. "The Education of the Aborigines." The Report of the 24th Education Reform Committee, Taiwan, June 25th 1993; Government Information Office. "Culture of the Aborigines." *Cultural Taiwan*. GIO, Taiwan, 2004.

tribe resisting their Japanese overlords in the “Wu-Ser Incident” (霧社事件) of October 27th 1930. The spirit of the Aborigines going up against the Japanese Emperor in order to fight for autonomy gained them the reputation of being “descendants of the dragon”. The background to this incident is that since 1928, the Japanese forced the Aborigines to provide labor for construction projects, such as Wu-Der temple and Wu-Ser public school. The Japanese ordered the Aborigines to bring timber from the mountains back down to the plain. For this they were treated as slave labor. But more shocking than not being paid wages was the sacrilegious nature of the activity. The Tkdaya people viewed the Dai-Ba Sharp Mountain as their “holy mountain”, the large wooded land as their “holy land”, and the forests as the homeland of their spirits.⁴⁴⁵

Thus the Japanese colonial government neglected the beliefs of the Aborigines, causing them great anguish. Compounding the problem, the Japanese built Shinto temples at Aboriginal settlements in order to “civilize” them and, more urgently in the late 1930s as Melissa Brown points out, to prepare them for war as “loyal subjects of the emperor”.⁴⁴⁶ Administrative orders were given to force the Aborigines to give up their own religion and beliefs, and convert to Shintoism.⁴⁴⁷

Next to be affected was the Aborigines’ naming practice. Most Aborigines’ names differ from the *Han* people’s surname and first name form; they use the *Fu Chi Lien*

⁴⁴⁵ Lee, Yun-chi. *The Unyielding High Mountain – the Wu-Ser Incident*. The Modern Times, Taipei, 1977, pp. 1-35; Chen, Ji-chun. *The Wu-Ser Incident*. Globe, Taipei, 1977, pp. 1-43.

⁴⁴⁶ Brown, 2004, p. 56.

⁴⁴⁷ See Yubu Syat, Shu Si-kai & Shi Cheng-fon. *The Wu-Ser Incident: Taiwanese People’s Collective Memory*. Vanguard, Taipei, 2001, pp. 1-70; Dern, Shun-young. *The Wu-Ser Incident*. The YuShan Corporation, Taipei, 1998, pp. 1-56;

Ming (父子連名), a joint name for father and son. This means that child's name is combined with the father's name, while the father's name is joined with the grandfather's name. To take the example of a chief from the time of the "Wu-Ser Incident", the father of Emir (chief) Mona Rudao was called Rudao Bai. The purpose of such a practice is to indicate the line of the tribe, prevent the occurrence of incest or marriage among close relatives, and it is regarded as glorifying the spirits of their forbears. Nonetheless, the Japanese colonizers ignored the Aboriginal people's social morality and traditional culture, and forced them to adopt Japanese names. To the Aborigines, this was tantamount to cutting off their roots and breaking relations with their ancestors.⁴⁴⁸

Finally, although the hereditary system of emir exists in the tribe's political structure, dictatorial rule has never been implemented. As long as the Aborigines do not violate the tribe's *gaga* (regular patterns), they can benefit from human rights, freedom, equality, and dignity akin to the democratic culture of Western liberal countries. Yet, during the Japanese colonial period, the Aborigines had been punished and oppressed, their living space constrained, and many Aboriginal women were forced to marry Japanese men. Consequently, the spirit of revolt grew.⁴⁴⁹

On October 7th 1930, a young Aboriginal couple held their wedding on the Lu

⁴⁴⁸ Dern, Shun-young. *Heavy Fogs and Clouds -- After the Wu-Ser Incident: the Story of a Taiya Family*. The YuShan Corporation, Taipei, 1998, pp. 51-86; Kao, Wan-jing. *The Aborigines Who would Rather Die than Surrender -- the Story and Theology of the Wu-Ser Incident*. Faith & Happiness, Chayi, 1995, pp. 24-81.

⁴⁴⁹ Kao, Wan-jing. "Discussing the Meaning of Aborigines' Autonomy in the Wu-Ser Incident, Respecting the History of Aborigines and Sharing the Value of Historical Assets." *70th International Academic Research Seminar of the Wu-Ser Incident*, convened by the Aboriginal Committee of the Administrative Yuan, National Taiwan University, Taipei, 2000.

Mountain, and all guests were celebrating. A Japanese policeman called Yoshimura was invited to the wedding. An aborigine enthusiastically shook Yoshimura's hand to show his hospitality. However, the Japanese policeman raised his baton in alarm and beat the aborigine savagely, reprimanding him for soiling his white glove. The chief's son came immediately to toast Yoshimura in order to express his apology; nevertheless, Yoshimura's anger was unassuaged and he beat up the chief's son as well. In order to rectify the situation, Emir Mona Rudao brought wine to Yoshimura's house to apologize for what happened; yet, Yoshimura was still domineering, and refused to accept an apology. Emir Mona Rudao and his fellow Aborigines came to the conclusion that oppressions of this type would inevitably cause their tribe to lose their traditional social structure. Rather than accepting the tyrannical rule of the Japanese for the sake of physical survival, the Aboriginal people chose to fight for their cultural survival.⁴⁵⁰

This occurred on the morning of October 27th 1930, when the Japanese conducted the opening ceremony of an athletic meeting of the Wu-Ser public school. As the Japanese flag was hoisted, Aborigines charged into the hall and attacked the Japanese with knives, killing 134 Japanese.⁴⁵¹

After the incident, the Japanese Governor-General's Office immediately ordered 1,163 policemen from Taichung, Hualiang, and Shingchi, more than 800 soldiers from

⁴⁵⁰ Chiu, Zuo-lon. *The Wu-Ser Incident*. China Times Culture, Taipei, 1990, pp. 41-92; Dern, Shun-young. *Cherries of the Wind – the Truth of the Wu-Ser Incident*. The YuShan Corporation, Taipei, 2000, pp. 31-59.

⁴⁵¹ National Institute for Compilation and Translation. "The Wu-Ser Incident." *Sociology of the Elementary School*. Vol. 8, NICT, Taiwan, 2003, pp. 62-65.

Taichung and Hualiang, and 1,381 transport troops to suppress the rebellion.⁴⁵² The Aborigines used the terrain to fight the Japanese military and police who, in turn, used their superior military technology as well as (internationally banned) poison gas to destroy the Aborigines. Finally, faced with no escape route, Mona Rudao refused to surrender or be killed by the Japanese and so decided to lead the group into mass suicide. During this incident more than 900 Aboriginal people died. They were disadvantaged in men and materiel in their 50-day struggle against a modernized Japanese force.⁴⁵³ They lost the battle but won a major propaganda victory for Taiwan's legendary struggles against foreign rule. The 1930 "Wu-Ser Incident" of the Aboriginal peoples enhanced Taiwan's symbolic capital – just as the "228 Incident" of the *Han* people - in positioning Taiwan as a distinctive culture that resists assimilation into a larger empire, be it Chinese or Japanese. Indeed, the emergence of "Taiwanese Consciousness" may be dated to the Japanese period and its consolidation to the Chinese *Kuomintang* rule which followed. As the noted authority on "cultural China", Tu Weiming, has observed:

. . . it was against the backdrop of the Japanese assimilation policy that Taiwanese consciousness first emerged as an experienced reality and a cultural construct. However, it was under the hegemonic ideological control during the Nationalist period (1949-87) that a heightened consciousness of nativistic and subaltern identities was

⁴⁵² Ibid; Shu, Jei-ling & Lin Dao-yi. *The Testimony of the Wu-Ser Incident*. Taiyuan, Taipei, 2000, pp. 12-68.

⁴⁵³ Shei, Sheng-Zan. *The Events of Taiwan*. Creative Power, Taipei, 1995, pp. 21-46; Kao, Wan-jing. *The Wu-Ser Incident: Taiwanese People's Collective Memory*. Avanguard, Taiwan, February 2001, pp. 23-24.

formed.⁴⁵⁴

It is to this second period of consolidation of Taiwanese consciousness under the Chinese *Kuomintang* that the discussion now turns, with a focus on the radical influence of the Church.

The Taiwan Presbyterian Church

By the 20th century, traditional Taiwan society had been restricted by the doctrines of Confucianism, such as *chong* - 忠 (loyalty) and *siao* - 孝 (filial piety), that the local people had been willing to obey the Chinese *Kuomintang* authoritarian rule - a foreign political power that came from Mainland China. In comparison, the local elites of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church had been protesting for humanitarianism, social justice, and human rights. This issued from a Christian perspective which champions people's rights or dignity in the face of totalitarian governmental restrictions. To the Chinese KMT government, the Taiwan Presbyterian Church had been a revolutionary group that stood for "Taiwan Independence". The Taiwan Presbyterian Church issued three important political declarations: "Statements of the Nation" made on December 29th 1971; "Our Petitions" publicized on September 18th 1975; and the "Declaration of Human Rights" proclaimed on August 16th 1977.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁴ Tu, Weiming. "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan." *The China Quarterly*. No. 148, December 1996, pp. 1118-9.

⁴⁵⁵ Dong, Fang-yuan. "Jesus Taught Us to Sell Clothes in Order to Buy Knives." *Lily Taiwan*. No. 4,

The call to “let Taiwan become a new independent country”, raised in the “Declaration of Human Rights”, had been a taboo topic for the Chinese KMT which emphasized the existence of one China, of which Taiwan was a province. Even though the KMT’s territorial sovereignty only covered Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, it still proclaimed the unity of Mainland China, and would not allow the Taiwanese to divide the territory of the nation. Hence, the announcement of the “Declaration of Human Rights” caused the Taiwan Presbyterian Church’s leader at that time, Clergyman Kao Jun-ming, to be handed down a six-year sentence for “armed rebellion”. The pretext which the KMT used was that Kao assisted Shi Ming-de to go into exile.⁴⁵⁶

After Clergyman Kao Jun-ming and a number of members of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church were arrested and sentenced, other members of the Church took care of the “families of political criminals” and conducted demonstrations. The KMT questioned the Church’s legitimacy in engaging in political activities, as was evident with street demonstrations, so tension between the Church and the government escalated. The Church stood on the side of the opposition movements, and the KMT began to monitor the Taiwan Presbyterian Church as a political force.⁴⁵⁷

June 27th 1997, Taiwan, <http://www.taip.org.tw/document/lily/v4t10.htm>; Kagan, Richard C. *Chen Shui-bian: Building a Community and a Nation*. Asia-Pacific Academic Exchange Foundation, Taipei, 1998, pp. 65-67.

⁴⁵⁶ World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI). “The Major Events of the Taiwan Independence Movement.” Taipei, October 8th 1998, <http://www.wufi.org.tw/events.htm>

⁴⁵⁷ Chai, Li-jen. “Important Events of the Taiwan Church during the Past Hundred Years.” *Campus Magazine*. CES Mission Connection Net. Taipei, September-October 2001, <http://www.ces.org.tw/main/mission/activity/article18.htm>

The Christians conceived of themselves as no longer being the commoners during the period of feudalism, but potentially citizens and masters of a democratic country. They considered that they had to take political responsibility for making Taiwan independent and localized. This outlook can be traced to the mid-19th century when missionaries of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church had been preaching a modernizing ethos for Taiwan that entailed Western medical treatment and education, including the introduction of romanized script for teaching the local languages to illiterates – all of which helped Taiwanese to develop a local self-awareness.⁴⁵⁸

Since the Taiwan Presbyterian Church consistently employed the local languages to preach and educate, it was possible for the Christians in the community to maintain a strong Taiwanese consciousness despite receiving education formulated by the foreign governing powers of the Japanese empire and then the Chinese KMT. Thus Mandarin took command in Taiwanese society as the national language after the Chinese KMT moved to Taiwan, and the best speakers of “mother tongues” such as Holo, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages, were Christians of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church. “Localization” thereby became a distinguishing characteristic of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, a mechanism for coping with foreign political influence and, finally, a channel for independence. The aspiration for the last of these was demonstrated in 1977 in the Taiwan Presbyterian Church’s “Declaration of Human Rights”. “[O]nce the US admits the PRC,” it proclaimed, Taiwan is urged to “become a new independent country”.⁴⁵⁹

⁴⁵⁸ Kao, Jing-lang. “Taiwan: The Old Myth and the New Fact.” *People’s Daily*. Taipei, April 14th 1988. <http://www.wufi.org.tw/geospch.htm>

⁴⁵⁹ Kuo, Shiu-juan. “Social Care – The Awakening of the Gospel Church.” *Campus Magazine*. Taipei,

The contrast between the KMT and the Church was unmistakable. During the periods of the enforcement of martial law and “white terror”, the Chinese KMT army had left painful memories of suppression, wrongful arrests, and brutal killings of Taiwanese. The Taiwan Presbyterian Church, by comparison, had been courageous in such a climate to announce the political declarations related to the future security of Taiwan, including the KMT's impossibility of “counterattacking” the Chinese Communist Party and recovering Mainland China. Although some local Church members paid the price of being political outlaws, they had set the foundation for Taiwan's democratization.⁴⁶⁰ By contrast, the Confucian rhetoric of “great harmony” employed by the Chinese KMT did little to advance Taiwan's cause.

The Chinese theory of *Ta Tung* and the Taiwanese theory of *Phah Pian* – “to struggle for”

Irrespective of whether the younger generations in Taiwan take the theory of “*Ta Tung*” (great harmony, 大同) as the blueprint of their ideal future world, they have sung publicly the national anthem words - “to establish the Republic of China”, and to promote “*Shi Shei Ta Tung*” (great harmony around world, 世界大同) - about 6,000 to

June 1995, http://www.cef.org.tw:50003/public/Galilee/JHK_410.html

⁴⁶⁰ Wellesley College – Taiwanese Students Association. “About the Images -- The Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-Shek”, 2000. <http://www.wellesley.edu/Activities/homepage/tsa/army.html>

10,000 times, from elementary to high school.⁴⁶¹ Thus, the vision of *Ta Tung* seems to have permeated socio-political thought in Taiwan, and become the national ideal. The 19th century political reformer from Canton, Kang Yo-wei, who amalgamated elements of Western and Chinese philosophy to save China from dynastic decay, advanced the philosophical system *Shi Shei Ta Tung* (great harmony around world); this held that men and women were equal, all individuals were independent and free, and all human rights were given by God.⁴⁶² *Ta Tung* itself is a Confucian ideal associated with the “primordial ideal state” and the “beneficent rule” of sages like Emperor Yao.⁴⁶³ It is thought society degenerated after this golden age, but that it could be revived as an ideal future state. From the Confucian standpoint, in order to reach the concept of *Shi Shei Ta Tung*, the individual needs to strive to achieve sincerity, uprightness, and self-cultivation, to regulate the family, the state, and thence to the world. Confucius said that political belief should begin from the individual's self-cultivation, not from the social system;⁴⁶⁴ this distinguishes Eastern from Western orientations to political philosophy.⁴⁶⁵

Many Taiwanese have been named *Ren* (kindness) or *Yi* (justice); for example, Yo-ren (to have kindness), Ren-tai (kindness and safety), Yi-shiung (a hero concerned with

⁴⁶¹ Huang, Wen-shiong. *The Value Concepts of the People in Taiwan*. Avanguard, Taiwan, 2000, p. 19.

⁴⁶² Kang, Yo-wei. *Ta Tung Shu* (The Book of Great Harmony). Longtien, Taipei, 1979; Lo, Jung-pang (ed.). *Kang Yu Wewi: A Biography and Symposium*. University of Arizona Press, 1967.

⁴⁶³ de Bary, Wm Theodore and Irene Bloom (comp.). *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (2nd edn). Vol. 1, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 342.

⁴⁶⁴ See, for example, *The Analects of Confucius* 14: 45, reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁶⁵ Kang, Yo-wei. *The Selections of the Academic Writings of Kang Yo-wei*. Kuji, Shanghai, 1990. For a critique on the Confucian position, see Metzger, Thomas A. “Utopianism and Confucius' Humanism.” In Lu, Martin, Rosita Dellios and R. James Ferguson (eds). *Toward a Global Community: New Perspectives on Confucian Humanism*. Bond University, Gold Coast, 2004, pp. 222-242.

justice), or Chong-yi (to respect justice). The popular use among Taiwanese of Confucian moral principles for the naming their children and grandchildren is indicative of the pervasive influence of traditional *Han* culture; it represents a considerable contribution to the spiritual and cultural heritage of Taiwan.⁴⁶⁶ Indeed, within Taiwan's history of cultural development, *Han* culture mixed with the Aboriginal culture is considered to occupy the first phase, with the second period being distinguished by the introduction of Japanese and modern Western cultures, while a third stage is said to belong to multi-party liberalism promoted after World War II.⁴⁶⁷

While Confucian philosophy embraces the notions of courtesy, justice, honesty, shame, kindness, wisdom, trust, loyalty, filial piety, love, and peace; yet, "painstaking" – so pertinent to Taiwan's social experience – is not found in this cluster of social morals. "To struggle for" is how Taiwanese perceive the value of "diligence"; it is regarded as the origin of the country's spirit of modernization, and a newly formed principle of Taiwanese social morality.⁴⁶⁸

Phah pian (打拼) has become so fundamental to Taiwanese culture that it has broadly developed into the motivating power for Taiwanese to overcome a difficult political

⁴⁶⁶ Lee, Teng-hui. *With the People Always in My Heart*. Yuan-liou, Taipei, 1999, pp. 29 & 55. This was heightened by the KMT's "recovery of the mainland" idea, with its associated duty of guardianship of Chinese culture in the face of Communist hostility to such "feudalism". However, even after the "recovery of the mainland" was no longer an option or policy, Chinese culture had been deeply instilled through the education system (see Tu Weiming, 1996, p. 1134).

⁴⁶⁷ Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Heart of the New Taiwanese – A New Picture of National Recognition*. Yue-dan, Taipei, 1999, pp. 30-31; See also Marsh, Ian, Jean Blondel, Takashi Inoguchi (eds). *Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia*. United Nations University Press, New York, 1999, p. 4, which cites a comprehensive survey in Taiwan indicating that liberal democratic values are more widespread and accepted than Confucian inspired "Asian values".

⁴⁶⁸ Siao, Hsing-huang, *ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

environment, as well as forming a method of approach toward becoming a modern industrial society. Yet the spirit of “to struggle for” finds its origins in Taiwan’s agricultural and immigrant societies. The “diligent” spirit of hard-working farmers is matched by the spirit of struggle in the immigrant society; both had to deal with the environmental changes – physical, social and political - in order to survive.⁴⁶⁹ Thus apart from the meaning of diligent spirit, *phah pian* in this notion of survival also means “to establish” and “to fight”. It has been argued that Taiwan’s economic development is not so much a product of the ideological structure of the *Three Principles of the People*, or “President Chiang Kai-shek’s great summons of opposing the PRC and Russia, and recovering Mainland China”, but by a Taiwanese socio-cultural propensity for *phah pian*.⁴⁷⁰

In 1998, when President Lee Teng-hui campaigned for Ma Ying-jiu (who was born in Hong Kong) for the Taipei mayoral elections, Lee stressed the unity of the Taiwanese identity irrespective of whether one is an aborigine, or one’s ancestors arrived on the island four hundred years ago, or moved to Taiwan more recently from Mainland China 40 or 50 years ago. In other words, people who were willing to make an effort in this land were all “New Taiwanese”.⁴⁷¹ As well, President Chiang Ching-kuo had said on July 17th 1987, “I have lived in Taiwan for 40 years, and I can be called Taiwanese, too”.⁴⁷² In terms of self-identification, the ethnic group that views itself strongest as

⁴⁶⁹ Siao, 1999, pp. 14-15 & 32-33.

⁴⁷⁰ Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Liberal Times*. Taipei, January 7th 1997, p. 4; *ibid.*, pp. 145-147.

⁴⁷¹ Shi, 2000, p. 1.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

Taiwanese is Aboriginal; next is Holo; then Hakka, and the weakest is *Waishengjen*.⁴⁷³ Conversely, the ethnic group that regards itself strongest as Chinese is *Waishengjen*, next is Aboriginal, then Hakka, and the weakest one is Holo.⁴⁷⁴ It is notable that the Aborigines are capable of identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese, suggesting a more syncretic adaptation to layers of cultural exposure or, to employ the “cultural flows” metaphor, greater “fluidity” in identity claims.⁴⁷⁵ It may also be a case of balancing two dominant identities for political reasons - that is, balancing perceived Holo chauvinism with a KMT patron-client relationship, as demonstrated by a marked tendency for Aborigines to vote KMT.⁴⁷⁶

Taiwanese identity had been frozen in the decades of authoritarian rule, but with the lifting of martial law in 1987, people were released to find for themselves the nature and desirability of a Taiwanese identity. To a certain degree, national identity, cultural identity, and political identity have circulated with one another into inter-related “flows” – to recall the ocean and postmodern metaphor at the opening of this chapter. Thus what was meant by the “Lee Teng-hui complex” was that it combined President Lee’s charisma, local consciousness, and support for Taiwan’s position and national identity into a powerful package which attracted voters for different reasons – as well as an effective combination of reasons – helping Lee to win the presidential election in 1996. On the contrary, in the 2000 presidential election, the China policy campaigned

⁴⁷³ Siao, Hsing-huang. *The Taiwan Times*. Taipei, May 13th 1995, p. 3.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ See Brown, 2004, p. 17.

⁴⁷⁶ See Corcuff, 2002, ch. 7; Eyton, Laurence. “Taiwan: Pan Blues Give Power to the People.” *Asia Times*. March 3rd 2004. <http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2004/AT-030304.htm>

by Lien Chan betrayed Lee Teng-hui's "Theory of Two Countries" (or "Two-State Theory"). Despite President Lee's endorsement of Lien Chan, Lee's supporters were unwilling to transfer their votes to Lien. Consequently, the "Lee Teng-hui complex" may be viewed as having influenced voting behavior, Taiwan's position and foreign policy, and the further consolidation of democracy.⁴⁷⁷

After the March 2000 presidential election, Lee indicated that the Chinese KMT lost the election due to internal divergences on the question of national identity, causing a split among the party members.⁴⁷⁸ In the first direct presidential vote in 1996, the four presidential candidates had clearly indicated their differences on national identity. For example, Peng Ming-min of the DPP considered himself a Taiwanese whose identity was not incompatible with being Chinese. While Lee Teng-hui of the KMT also admitted himself as Taiwanese, he too did not forget to mention that "I am also Chinese", and "Taiwanese is also Chinese".⁴⁷⁹ Lin Yang-gang of the New Party was unwilling to abandon his Taiwanese identity either, but positioned it below his Chinese identity. The independent candidate, Chen Lu-an, regarded himself as Chinese. There was no issue of being Taiwanese in his mind, and he even hinted that Taiwanese should not be considered as Chinese.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁷ Schubert, Gunter. "A New Rising Nation? – The Discourse on National Identity in Contemporary Taiwan." 1998, <http://www.inprnet.org.tw/inpre/cefc6.htm>

⁴⁷⁸ Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwan's Political Constructions*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1999, pp. 180-181.

⁴⁷⁹ Su, Huo-Yen. "Taiwanese Voters' National Identity and Voting Behavior among the Political Parties: Research Results between 1991 and 1993." *Taiwan Political Journal*. No. 1, Taiwan, 1996, pp. 85-127.

⁴⁸⁰ Shi, Zheng-feng. *The Racial Groups and Nationalism – The Political Analysis of Collective Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1998, pp. 234-235.

During the presidential election of 2000, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian called himself "the son of Taiwan", incorporated the idea of the "New Taiwanese" from Lee Teng-hui, and stated that he admitted Taiwan was a Chinese country.⁴⁸¹ On the other hand, the DPP Vice Presidential candidate, Annette Lu (Lu Siu-lian) directly criticized Lien Chan as a "fake Taiwanese", or "half Taiwanese", since Lien was born in China, and his mother was Mainland Chinese. In addition, Annette Lu described James Soong as "real Chinese", and "fake Taiwanese", because Soong was born in China, and his parents came from Mainland China.⁴⁸² Conversely, the KMT presidential candidate, Lien Chan, insisted he was "old Taiwanese", and "the genuine local product", and was willing to embrace the "new Taiwanese", by which he meant those who moved to Taiwan from Mainland China. However, Lien Chan intended to avoid using the word "Chinese".⁴⁸³

On the other hand, the People First Party's presidential candidate, James Soong, who left the KMT to enter the elections, also employed the "New Taiwanese" as his mainstream slogan to capture "local Taiwanese" votes. Meanwhile, he used his Chinese status to consolidate the Chinese vote. Soong positioned the country ambiguously, and skillfully avoided speaking about the differences between Taiwanese and Chinese. Soong had described himself as "the genuine Taiwanese child, who was

⁴⁸¹ Su, Wen-bin. "God's Indications Were Defeated by the Son of Taiwan." *Central News Agency*. Taipei, March 18th 2000, http://e2000.yam.com/s_explain/200003/18/12624800.html

⁴⁸² Chen, Mao-shiong. "The Real Taiwanese and the Fake Taiwanese." *South News*. Taipei, April 8th 2002, http://home.kimo.com.tw/snews1.tw/CHEN/Chen_newpage/chen_01/chen_87.htm; Chen, Shao-ting. "Discussion on Taiwan's National Position." *People's Daily*. Taipei, January 22nd 1999, p. 6.

⁴⁸³ The Editorial. "The Old Taiwanese vs. the New Taiwanese." *China Times*. December 24th 1998, p. 8; Ruan, Ming. "Lien Chan Firmly Opposed the Taiwan KMT." *South News*. Taipei, December 26th 2002, http://home.kimo.com.tw/snews1965/specil_coul/Yuan/Yuan_00/Yuan00064.htm

brought up by eating Taiwanese rice, and drinking Taiwanese water".⁴⁸⁴ Nonetheless, he had been unable to iron out the local people's doubts towards his immovable Chinese identity.⁴⁸⁵

As Shi Zheng-feng points out, the New Party's presidential candidate, Lee Ao, spoke openly of his Chinese identity, and said that he looked down on Taiwanese. The most contradictory case was the independent presidential candidate, Hsu Hsin-liang, who left the DPP to enter the elections. Even though Hsu Hsin-liang (a Hakka) had admitted himself he was Taiwanese, his national position had inclined towards unification. Yet Hsu asserted earlier that the country should become the "Newly Rising Taiwan Nation", a slogan which implied separation from Mainland China.⁴⁸⁶

In 1995, President Lee Teng-hui said that it was necessary to make the KMT a local party that belonged to Taiwanese. At the same time, some candidates suggested, "Taiwanese should vote for Taiwanese"; thus, the Chinese started experiencing a crisis in their own identity - of being regarded as outsiders or foreigners.

Yet the word "Taiwanese" itself has tragic origins. When Japan colonized Taiwan, it practiced a national discrimination policy towards the local people, and this was the first time that local people deliberately called themselves Taiwanese, with the intention of opposing the Japanese. As Tu Weiming explained:

⁴⁸⁴ Liu, Nien-sha. "The Wrong Way and the Moral Path of Localization." *National Policy Foundation (NPF) Commentary*. NPF, Taipei, June 22nd 2001, <http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/IA/090/IA-C-090-091.htm>

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

The term 'Taiwanese' (*Taiwanren*) was first used roughly 20 years after Japan had established its colonial rule over the island. Notwithstanding its original narrow application to the Han Chinese in the area of Tainan where the provincial Qing government resided, the term was extended to refer to the residents of the entire island as Japanese colonization, through transport, agricultural production and industrialization, spread.⁴⁸⁷

Later, the Mainland Chinese had replaced the Japanese in governing Taiwan, and they degraded and oppressed the original residents of Taiwan particularly in the "228 Incident". Therefore, the locals or Taiwanese had begun to oppose the outsiders or *Waishengjen* which marked the second implication of being Taiwanese – first as an anti-Japanese identity, then as an anti-Chinese one.⁴⁸⁸ These are elaborated below.

The effect of Japan's colonial rule and the effect of the Chinese KMT "foreign" rule

When Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895, it wished to mold Taiwanese from the "grass roots" into becoming diligent, honest, and firmly faithful to imperial Japan. While attributes of diligence and honesty are commendable, they were introduced at a cost.

⁴⁸⁶ Shi, 2000, p. 6.

⁴⁸⁷ Tu Weiming, 1996, p. 1124.

⁴⁸⁸ Edmondson, Robert. "The February 28 Incident and National Identity." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 32-35; Huang, Huang-siong. *Contemplation in Harvard – To See Taiwan from the World*. Yue-dan, 1999, pp. 32-33; Wu, Jaushieh Joseph. *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 35.

People were told to forget their own histories, to give up their original customs, and to long for the new sacred imperial nation - Japan. The Japanese rulers ignored the geography and history of Taiwan,⁴⁸⁹ and instead glorified the history and customs of Japan. The Japanese expected Taiwanese to speak the Japanese language, and encouraged them to change their names to Japanese names. In order to carry out these changes, the Japanese colonial government rewarded Taiwanese who obeyed. For instance, supplies of food and clothing, and opportunities for employment and school admission were more generous to those who assented to Japanese expectations. Consequently, while only 160 Taiwanese had their names changed to Japanese names at the start of the colonial period, 50 years later the number had increased to 20,000.⁴⁹⁰ In 1919, with the aim of pacifying the growing national identity demands of Taiwanese, the Japanese colonial government announced the introduction of Taiwanese education, and canceled the system of separate schools for Japanese and Taiwanese. On the surface, this measure had given Taiwanese equal opportunity to study; yet in reality, the learning opportunity of Taiwanese remained restricted. For example, after Lee Teng-hui graduated from elementary school, he wished to study in the government teacher-training school. Even though his academic record had been excellent, he was

⁴⁸⁹ This was not the case with the Japanese scholars, who laid the foundation for Taiwan Studies during the colonial period, and studied Taiwan for colonial purposes. As Vuylsteke noted:

These scholars actually had a dual mission: they were not only providing their various disciplines with the base-line data on which all further research could be constructed, they were also laying the intellectual groundwork for the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere . . .

(Vuylsteke, Richard R. "Taiwan Studies: A Research Field Comes of Age." *Free China Review*. Vol. 44, No. 2, February 1994, p. 6.)

⁴⁹⁰ Wu, Wen-hsing. *Research on the Upper Echelons of Taiwanese Society during the Period of Japanese Colonization*. Cheng-chong Bookstore, Taipei, 1992, pp. 313-319; Lee, Qiao. *The Shaping of Taiwanese Culture*. Avanguard, Taipei, 1992, pp. 97-98; Morris, Andrew. "The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing Project." *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 3-24.

not admitted, and could only study in a private Christian junior high school. The target of the Japanese government was to train those who were demonstrably loyal and law-abiding, and to prevent expanding the intellectual horizons and opportunities of colonized residents. Therefore, Japan had prohibited Taiwanese from studying political science, sociology, law, and philosophy that related to people's rights and liberal thinking. In 1935, amongst 139 students of Taipei Imperial University, only 29 were Taiwanese. In 1945, when Taiwan was liberated from Japanese colonization, of Taipei Imperial University's student population of 1666, only 322 were Taiwanese, and the majority of students studied agriculture and medical science.⁴⁹¹

Although the *Waishengjen* had similar ancestral and culture origins to the Taiwanese, their Chinese-centered superiority complex ("Middle Kingdom complex"), and the privileges attendant on their authoritarian rule, had caused them to gush forth into Taiwanese society, dislodging the culture much as the Japanese had. In order to cut off Taiwanese children's ability of communicating with their parents and grandparents, the Chinese KMT had forcedly employed the united *Kuo Yu* – 國語 (national language) -- Mandarin -- to educate the local people. Moreover, the *Waishengjen* intentionally created the image that local languages such as the Aboriginal, Hakka, and Hokkein were uncouth, localism was low-grade, and local people in general were socially inferior. Even in novels and dramas, Taiwanese were regularly depicted as coarse, humble, indecent, evil, and ugly, and local actors and actresses could only play the role of unintelligent workers and servants. On the contrary, the *Waishengjen* were portrayed

⁴⁹¹ Yang, Chao-jia. *The Memoirs of Yang Chao-jia*. San-ming Bookstore, Taipei, 1977, pp. 99-103; *Discovering Taiwan* (Last Vol.). T'ien-hsia (The Commonwealth), 1992, Taipei, pp. 381-383 & 416-417; Myers, Ramon H. & Adrienne Ching. "Agricultural Development in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule." *Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 23, No. 4, August 1964, p. 561.

as masters, who were well educated, sincere, and honest.⁴⁹²

Local languages were criticized for their paucity of vocabulary and peculiar accent. On the other hand, when Taiwanese spoke Mandarin, their accents were characterized as sub-standard. Taiwanese dramas were restricted as to when they could be broadcast, how many could be shown, and how much could be spent on producing them (compared to "Mandarin" programs). Like the Japanese colonizers, the Chinese KMT had removed local traditions and histories, and caused Taiwanese to drift away from their former way of life and development. An unwillingness to accommodate local cultures, histories, geography, literature, music, and languages could have obliterated Taiwanese culture.⁴⁹³ Instead, it hardened people's resolve to struggle; Taiwanese society became politicized and even more culturally sensitive.

Common consciousness and inherent tensions in Taiwanese identity formation

In order to distinguish the Chinese of the People's Republic of China from the Chinese of the Republic of China, the implication of being Taiwanese expanded further. Nowadays, Taiwanese should include the four ethnic groups within the area of Taiwan,

⁴⁹² Chong, Yi-ren. *Sing Suan Liou Shi Nien – Er Er Ba Shi Jen Er Chi Bu Duei Chung Chong Yi Ren Huai Yi Lu* (The Sixty Years of Bitterness – Leader of Troop 27 during the 228 Incident -- Chong Yi-ren's Memoirs). Liberty Times Publisher, Taipei, 1986, pp. 277-322; Wu, Fong-shan. *The Memoirs of Wu Shan-lian*. The Independent Newspaper, Taipei, 1991, pp. 100-108.

⁴⁹³ Sakai, Toro. *New Perspectives on Taiwan*. Yusanser, Taipei, 2001, pp. 148-157; Huang, Jun-jei. *Taiwan Consciousness and Taiwanese Culture*. Cheng-chong Bookstore, Taipei, 2000, pp. 122-133.

Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu: the Aborigines, Hakka, Holo, and Chinese (post-Civil War arrivals). Such is the newest implication of Taiwanese identity, and the common consciousness of the four major ethnic identities.⁴⁹⁴

However, this is not without its inherent tensions, especially in the formation of inter-ethnic alliances, a situation brought out by examination of the Hakka. As noted in the Introduction of this thesis, Hakka is a minority ethnic group in Taiwan. It comprises 10 to 15 percent of the population, the exact figure being in dispute. Hakka are popularly regarded to be conservative, self-aware, persistent, and with high self-esteem; accordingly, they should not have a problem with self-identity. Nevertheless, the *Waishengjen* had monopolized political resources and power, while the Holo held stronger economic power and maintained a larger population (about 70 percent). To survive under such conditions, Hakka took on a low profile, gave up their mother tongue, learnt from other ethnic groups, and became a minor group in Taiwanese society. The Hakka, through their history of voyaging, are commonly depicted as possessing two characteristics that come from such travels: one is their purported stubbornness, and another is the concept of "outsiders". Notably, some Taiwanese who ridicule Hakka as "guests" have angered Hakka people. On the other hand, due to the similarity of languages and subtle relations among the strong and weak ethnic identities, some Hakka tend to have friendlier relations with other smaller groups, such as Aborigines or *Waishengjen* rather than Holo.⁴⁹⁵ Thus the Hakka demonstrate the

⁴⁹⁴ Huang, Li-ching. "We Are All New Taiwanese." *The Central Multi-Monthly Journal*. Taipei, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1999, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁹⁵ Corcuff, Stephane. "Taiwan's 'Mainlanders', New Taiwanese?" *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 163; Corcuff, Stephane. "History, The Memories of the Future." In *ibid.*, p. 248; Shei, Chong-kuan. *The Hakka*

implication of inter-group dynamics in Taiwanese identity formation.

Another group of Taiwanese who have contributed to national identity is one which left Taiwan. Since 1980, the overseas Taiwanese have been striving for Taiwan's democratization. While most of the overseas Taiwanese grew up under the rule of the Chinese KMT, they went to the US to study, and later entered the professions there. The democratic environment and their educational background obtained in the United States caused them to become dissatisfied with Taiwan's authoritarian rule. Especially after the Formosa Incident (also known as the Kaohsiung Incident), those overseas Taiwanese who had experienced the "white terror" of the authoritarian system expressed their opposition to the Chinese KMT through words and deeds – they vowed to agitate for Taiwan's democracy.⁴⁹⁶

For over 10 years, the overseas Taiwanese participated in the important events of the nation: the removal of martial law, liberalizing bans on forming political parties and publishing newspapers, terminating the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, pushing for the re-election of the entire National Assembly, giving people the right to elect their Governor, Mayors, Country Magistrates, and President and Vice President directly, abolishing the black list of political criminals, giving people freedom of speech, and permitting discussion of the "228 Incident". On the whole, the overseas Taiwanese had not been cowed by threats

People Across the Strait. Taipei, Youth, 2000, pp. 68-82; Chai, De-ling. "Canceling the Privileged Role of Mandarin." *The Hakka Magazine*. Taipei, <http://hakka.demo.kmu.edu.tw/h1.htm>; Shi, Cheng-feng. *Ethnic Politics and Strategy*. Qianwei, Taipei, 1997, p. 99.

⁴⁹⁶ King, Alice M. "A Short History of Formosan Independence Movement." *The Independent Taiwan*. Kearny, New Jersey, No. 34, December 28th, 1974, pp. 16-22; Huang, Huang-siong. The written text of the speech of North America Taiwanese Professors Association's Annual Meeting. July 27th 1997; Huang, Huang-siong. The written text of the speech of South America Taiwanese People's Summer Meeting. July 6th 1996.

from the Chinese KMT; they had refused the inducements and advantages provided by the KMT, provided funds and other assistance to the opposition groups, and protested on the streets for freedom and the rights of political criminals and Taiwanese. Some overseas Taiwanese had been imprisoned or had gone into exile for years.⁴⁹⁷ The overseas Taiwanese had been striving for Taiwan's democratization for years in the fighting spirit of *phah pian* (discussed above).

The above noted implications of Taiwanese identity suggest that to be Taiwanese is to have one's identity forged in suffering and struggle. As noted by President Lee Teng-hui, looking back at the history of Taiwan, people had been unable to govern their motherland for a very long period of time; the misery of being born Taiwanese was an inability to help one's country and people.⁴⁹⁸ This complicated history has nevertheless bestowed upon Taiwan a rich diversity of cultural resources to deal with misfortune. From Lee's standpoint, growing up in Taiwan enabled him to accumulate diverse experiences and cultivate a range of ideas through his exposure to various education systems. He had put these experiences to beneficial use. The same could be said for Taiwan: difficult and diverse circumstances have built Taiwan's character and this is its fortune.⁴⁹⁹ Struggle and determination, in the end, had been met with a peaceful, bloodless, transition to democracy. The Chinese KMT did not violently turn on the people; rather it reformed itself for a new political era. This was done through the medium of a local Taiwanese KMT member – Lee Teng-hui. But the energy and

⁴⁹⁷ Dang, Winston T. *Taiwangate: Blacklist Policy and Human Rights*. Center for Taiwan International Relations, Washington, DC, 1991, pp. 172-179; Huang, July 27th 1997; Huang, July 6th 1996.

⁴⁹⁸ Lee, Teng-hui, 1999, p. 34.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

activation came from society. Lee tapped into the grassroots movements to drive his government's reforms.

The emergence of civil society and consumer politics

When Taiwan suffered from a severe earthquake on September 21st 1999, local non-government organizations (NGOs) immediately provided aid, materials, and funds to those who needed help. Moreover, many new NGOs emerged, with a focus on a range of topics and groups, such as culture, the disabled, the elderly, children, and abused women, demonstrating notions of self-reliance and self-support in community affairs.⁵⁰⁰

The other side of the civil society coin is a relaxation in political control. The development of a multi-party political system allows for choice and this has meant that politics has come to resemble more a consumer product than an arena for struggle in the context of historical adversity. Because politics had been a sensitive issue fraught with danger, people who wished to keep out of harm's way avoided political involvement and unnecessary discussion. Nonetheless, when they did meet others who shared their political views, their discussions were emotionally charged. Since the democratization process began, politics became a popular subject: Taiwanese engaged in frequent political discussions and the worse case scenarios would be the quarrels between the

⁵⁰⁰ Shi, Zheng-feng. *Taiwanese People's National Identity*. Avanguard, Taipei, 2000, pp. 12-13.; Siao, 1999, pp. 79-82.

taxi drivers and customers, or within families. Political discussion and debate programs on television have been marketed to the public as if they were dramas and entertainment.⁵⁰¹

Moreover, at the onset of elections, campaign materials such as flags and posters typically bedeck the towns and cities, campaign vehicles shuttle through streets, a carnival atmosphere takes over. The campaign headquarters have become more refined; both presidential and lower echelon candidates have demonstrated concern over the *feng shui* (風水) of their offices, with the prime purpose of attracting good fortune to win the elections.⁵⁰² Furthermore, since the Taipei mayoral elections held in 1998, promotional products such as dolls, clothes, aprons, hats, gloves and other such items have been sold. Chen Shui-bian is credited with starting this fad during the 1998 mayoral election⁵⁰³

The issue of generational change in voter experience is also important in explaining changes to the way in which politics has been experienced in Taiwan since democratization. By the time of the presidential elections of 2004, those under 50 years of age had no historical memory of suffering and deprivations under the Chinese KMT authoritarian rule that gave rise to the “228 Incident”. People below 30 years of age did not carry the tragic memories of opposing the “white terror” together with the opposition groups; others, under 20 years of age, did not nurse a sense of crisis towards the *Waishengjen* who took over the island or the KMT authoritarian rule specifically.

⁵⁰¹ See Chang, 2000, p. 313.

⁵⁰² *Liberal Times*. July 6-7th 1996, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁰³ Huang, Huang-siong. 1999, pp. 108-109, 117.

The political parties were no longer a mark of sharing the bitter hatreds of enemies; they became more than a matter of political choice in that their marketing caused them to resemble consumer products of different varieties that could be substituted. Thus an element of change may be discerned in Taiwan's political landscape: one that stretches from political struggle to – in some respects - consumer fad. Taiwanese consciousness acquired an “end of history” dimension, to borrow Francis Fukuyama's phrase for the end of the Cold War.⁵⁰⁴ With the end of *phah pian* – struggle – comes a certain Taiwanese “unselfconsciousness”. While this may be a measure of success in the Taiwanization of the island's domestic socio-political existence, it is by no means the end of Taiwan's struggle for international recognition.

Conclusion

Taiwan's cultural connotation is rich, and the Chinese influence is only one of many. As Lee Teng-hui stated, people who identify Taiwan as their homeland, and are willing to make an effort for the island and its people, are all Taiwanese. Indeed, Lee's concept of “New Taiwanese” has attempted to unite the various identity groups within Taiwan. This leads to the concerns of the final chapter, Chapter 9, in the post-2000 era, because the cultural flows of Taiwan have resulted in a post-Lee Teng-hui assertiveness that

⁵⁰⁴ Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. Penguin, USA, 1992.

goes beyond “struggle” but falls short of independence – the ultimate political expression of de-sinicization. Despite Lee’s clearer trajectory toward independence in his unofficial capacities, the dangers attendant on formal independence were still too credible to dismiss lightly. Neither China nor the US would tolerate such an eventuality.

Moreover, there is the pragmatism of Taiwanese to consider. Maintenance of the status quo has ensured not only Beijing’s continued insistence on Taiwan being a part of China, but also the high degree of Taiwanese pluralism-cum-pragmatism: being Chinese and Taiwanese are not deemed mutually exclusive culturally - or commercially – in the minds of many Taiwanese. The post-2000 era saw China become Taiwan’s primary trading partner, having overtaken the USA. Being Taiwanese and Chinese – under the banner of “New Taiwanese” – could be the legacy of the Lee Teng-hui era which saw the notable shift from Chinese national identity to Taiwanese consciousness. Still, the risks of retrogression into “Great China Consciousness” and away from Taiwanese consciousness meant that the achievements of the Lee Teng-hui era of 1988-2000 needed to be bolstered in the post-Lee period.

Chapter Nine

The Post-Lee Teng-hui Era

On October 14th 2001, former President Lee Teng-hui and Professor Peng Ming-min (Senior Advisor to President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP presidential candidate in 1996), held a discussion called, “A Centennial Conversation between Two Political Prophets: Their Lives Experienced in Two Nations”. The discussion was held at the International Convention Center in Taipei, and the two countries referred to above were Japan and China. Lee Teng-hui and Peng Ming-min were both born in Taiwan in 1923, when the island was colonized by Japan, and had received tertiary education in Japan before the end of World War II. After they finished their studies, both longed to return home to serve their country. Yet, after their return to Taiwan, they found the situation to be different from their expectations. As a political scientist, Peng Ming-min pointed out differences in language, values and culture between the original residents of Taiwan and the *Waishengjen* - the Chinese who took over Taiwan in 1945. Moreover, the brutal “228 Incident” had occurred in 1947 before *Waishengjen* officially moved to the island with Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime in 1949, thus heightening the tensions between local people and the newly arrived *Waishengjen*.⁵⁰⁵

This massacre had stirred Peng into action: he wrote a political tract urging Taiwanese to resist the KMT’s autocratic rule. The day before Peng publicized his statement, he

⁵⁰⁵ Huang, Joyce & Lin Chieh-yu. “Political Prophets Meet in Taipei.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, October 15th 2001, p. 1.

had dinner with Lee Teng-hui. Whereas Peng might be arrested and jailed anytime, Lee, who had experienced the “white terror” and had been arrested by the KMT, chose not to confront directly the undemocratic regime. Thus Lee devoted himself to agricultural reform; nevertheless, his belief in democracy, human rights, and social justice had remained unchanged. The outcome of such divergent approaches was that Peng Ming-min had been arrested for his ideals, while Lee Teng-hui ended up working for the central leadership of the KMT. He had been given the opportunity to introduce reforms from within the political system. Compared to the political infighting with which Lee had to contend, Peng considered himself luckier than Lee.⁵⁰⁶

Lee explained that his slogan, “New Taiwanese”, conformed with the outlook of his presidential predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo. In the final few years of Chiang's life, he had been aware that it was impossible to counterattack and recover Mainland China. When President Chiang told Lee, “I am also Taiwanese”, Lee believed Chiang to be genuine.⁵⁰⁷ Consequently, Lee Teng-hui retained Chiang's beliefs. To promote Taiwanese consciousness and the spirit of democratization among Taiwanese, Lee and Peng suggested that school texts should include more coverage on the culture, history and geography of Taiwan instead of Mainland China; thus, the younger generations would acquire a stronger local identity.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁶ Lee Teng-hui and Peng Ming-min. “A Centennial Conversation Between Two Political Prophets: Their Lives Experienced in Two Nations.” Broadcast by *CTV, CTS, ETTV, FTV, SETN, PTV, TTV*, and *TVBSN*. Taipei, October 14th 2001.

⁵⁰⁷ Chou, Li-yun, Lee Ming-yao & Lin Chao-yi. (Special interview with former president Lee Teng-hui). “Kuomintang is Going Backward, Lee Blamed for Its Wrong Decision – Chiang Ching-kuo Had Already Walked the Route of Localization, But the KMT is Back to the Chiang Kai-shek Era.” *Taiwan Daily*. Taipei, 2003, February 12th, p. 2.

⁵⁰⁸ Huang & Lin, October 15th 2001, p. 1; *CTV, CTS, ETTV, FTV, SETN, PTV, TTV*, and *TVBSN*. October 14th 2001.

As suggested by former President Lee Teng-hui, after the Ching dynasty, there were no emperors, but all political parties used the emperor concept to rule the country. This meant the military did not belong to the state, but to a particular person, political faction or party.⁵⁰⁹ Thus Lee stressed the importance of separating state and government. In addition, he interpreted globalization as allowing each country the opportunity of survival and development, and Taiwan should not lose this opportunity. On the other hand, Peng Ming-min focused on the shortcomings of the opposition alliance comprising the KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party. He argued that they created obstacles for the Chen Shui-bian administration because they neither admitted that they lost the presidential elections of 2000, nor understood the notion of a “loyal opposition” that should criticize the government for the sake of the country, society, and people.⁵¹⁰

This chapter investigates the pro-China group in Taiwan, the Taiwan Research Institute (TRI), former President Lee's meeting with the Dalai Lama in Prague, the former president's medical trip to Japan and the important role it played in the Japanese elections, the founding of the Northern Taiwan Society, the alliance between former President Lee and President Chen Shui-bian, Cornell University's establishment of the Lee Teng-hui Institute for Scientific Research, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US, First Lady (President Chen's wife) Wu Shu-chen's trip to the US, and the founding of the Lee Teng-hui School. The

⁵⁰⁹ For background to this era from the perspective of democracy, an insightful work is Gilley, Bruce. *China's Democratic Future: How Will it Happen and Where Will It Lead?* Columbia University Press, New York, 2004, ch. 1 & 2.

⁵¹⁰ Huang & Lin, October 15th 2001, p. 1; CTV, CTS, ETTV, FTV, SETN, PTV, TTV, and TVBSN. October 14th 2001.

purpose of these investigations is to observe Taiwan's further democratization after the first non-KMT party assumes office; and, in doing so, the developmental direction of Taiwanese identity. To understand the legacy of the Lee Teng-hui era it is thus necessary to examine what came after. That the Lee era – and Lee himself - continued to hold sway over developments thereafter is evident in former President Lee Teng-hui urging voters in the 2004 legislative elections to support candidates with Taiwanese consciousness, and his accusation that the parties of the Pan-Blue alliance were “deceiving themselves” in thinking that the “Republic of China” still existed.⁵¹¹ Thus Lee's rhetoric remained a feature of Taiwan's political life, even as China became increasingly seductive economically and worrying militarily.

The anti-Lee Teng-hui forces and the *Waishengjen*'s sense of crisis

On March 19th 2000, the day after the KMT was defeated in the presidential elections, the pro-China group blamed Lee alone for the loss of the Chinese KMT, and accused him of abandoning Lien Chan in favor of Chen Shui-bian. However, during the elections, when Lee Teng-hui was campaigning for Lien Chan in southern Taiwan, Lien was cooperating with former Defense Minister Chen Lu-an, who left the KMT to run as an independent presidential candidate in 1996, in northern Taiwan, to promote an anti-Lee Teng-hui alliance. Moreover, Lien Chan campaigned on the premise that if

⁵¹¹ “Lee Says Powell's Remarks Should Motivate Taiwan.” *Central News Agency*. October 31st 2004, <http://taiwansecurity.org/CNA/2004/CNA-311004.htm>

voters chose the DPP then China's war threats would materialize. This proved counterproductive as Lien was perceived by many to have turned his back on local consciousness, the sovereignty of Taiwan, and Lee's democratic reform.⁵¹²

Later on the same day, an anti-Lee Teng-hui demonstration in front of the Taipei headquarters of the KMT demanded Lee's resignation as KMT Chairman, and by midnight the protesters relocated to President Lee's official residence making the same demand.⁵¹³ Representatives of the local governments in southern Taiwan threatened to mobilize the pro-Lee voters and bus them to Taipei to challenge the anti-Lee crowd. They were persuaded against this action, lest the confrontation between the two sides in front of Lee's official residence turned violent.⁵¹⁴

On May 27th 2000, more than two months after the elections, when former President Lee Teng-hui was attending an athletics meeting near his house in Dashi, a 70-year-old retired Chinese Colonel, Shi Li-sing, spilled red ink onto Lee's head to blame him for "destroying the Chinese Nationalist (*Kuomintang*) party and leading the ROC to misery".⁵¹⁵ The next morning, over 40 residents of Dashi town had surrounded Shi Li-sing's house in Chongli City, Taoyuan, to express their strong protest and ask Shi to apologize publicly for his behavior.⁵¹⁶ Shi Li-sing, on his part, had moved to his

⁵¹² See Ruan, Ming. "Lee Teng-hui Experiences Awakening." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 30th 2001, p. 3.

⁵¹³ Lin, Oliver, Jou, Ying-cheng & Erin Prelypchan. "KMT Faces the Music." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, March 20th 2000, p. 1.

⁵¹⁴ *FTV & TVBS*. Taipei, March 19th 2000.

⁵¹⁵ *ETTV*, Taipei, May 27th 2000.

⁵¹⁶ *PTV*. Taipei, May 28th 2000; *TVBS*. Taipei, May 28th 2000.

daughter's house to escape public condemnation, leaving the Neighborhood Chief to carry out the reconciliation, and convey the protesters' message to Shi. Meanwhile, a police presence on the site ensured the process of criticizing Shi had been peaceful.⁵¹⁷ The "527 Spilling Red Ink Incident" was only a symbolic expression of antagonism by elderly soldiers towards Lee Teng-hui. However, it caused concern to the Taiwanese over Chinese people's reaction to the change of political power, and the possibility of conflict between the two national identities within Taiwan.⁵¹⁸

As noted in this thesis, the *Waishengjen* came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT forces and, despite comprising no more than 15 percent of the population, they acquired privileges across many sectors, including politics, economy, society, and culture, over a prolonged period of time. This led to the *Waishengjen* and local people forming two distinct societies; although some inter-marriages did occur, it was difficult to cross the gap between the two identity groups. To many *Waishengjen*, their paramount political value system comprised loyalty to President Chiang Kai-shek and later President Chiang Ching-kuo, loyalty to the Chinese KMT, and protection of the Republic of China. Under the nationalism of the Republic of China that positioned the leader, doctrines, and country as one entity, the identity of *Waishengjen* had won supremacy. Moreover, the *Waishengjen* rulers had separated *Waishengjen* and the local people of Taiwan in terms of where they lived, worked, and were educated. Unsurprisingly, the *Waishengjen* thought that they deserved to gain advantages due to their identity. However, after Lee Teng-hui - a Taiwanese-Hakka - took office as President, the

⁵¹⁷ *Formosa TV*, Taipei, May 28th 2000; *TTV*. Taipei, May 28th 2000.

⁵¹⁸ *China Evening Newspaper*, Taipei, July 10th 2000, p. 2.

Waishengjen identity began to face challenges, especially under the prejudice of it being preferable to give the leadership to a “foreigner/outsider” than to a “family servant”.⁵¹⁹

In all, the *Waishengjen* have viewed themselves as elites in relation to the local people, even mocking President Lee's local accent, but at the same time, these *Waishengjen* felt a gradual loss of their privileges, resulting in a sense of crisis. Under the high expectation of taking back the presidential seat from the Taiwanese, the loss of James (Chu-yu) Soong of the People First Party had disappointed the *Waishengjen*. The majority of those who demonstrated in front of the KMT Taipei Headquarters had been Soong's supporters; they were unwilling to accept the result of the presidential elections.⁵²⁰ On the other hand, the local people of Taiwan were not insensitive either; they also felt nervous while facing strong ethnic hostilities.⁵²¹ For example, while the *Waishengjen* Ma Ying-jiu, who defeated Chen Shui-bian and becomes Taipei Mayor for the second term (1998-2006) could still be tolerated, if the seat of President were also taken back by *Waishengjen*, then the situation might not have been so tolerable. Inter-communal violence remained, in the minds of many, a menacing potentiality.

⁵¹⁹ Li, Kuang-chun. “Mirrors and Masks – An Interpretative Study of Mainlanders' Identity Dilemma.” *Memories of the Future – National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*. M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, pp. 102-122; Shi, 2000, pp. 199-200.

⁵²⁰ Shi, *ibid*.

⁵²¹ Soong, Jei-lai. “The Expanded National-Cultural Movements.” *Taiwan New Literature*. Taipei, No. 15, pp. 7 & 49.

The Taiwan Research Institute and Lee's post-presidential diplomacy abroad

The Taiwan Research Institute (TRI), established in 1994, has earned a strong reputation in such professional fields as finance, economy, business administration, and strategic and security issues. Since this academic research institute maintained a low profile, its existence among Taiwanese was not widely known. On May 30th 2000, the Institute's new office building was opened in Taipei, and many high-level academic, business, and political figures, including former President Lee Teng-hui, and President Chen Shui-bian, attended the inauguration ceremony. Lee stated in his address that he hoped the TRI would become the bridge between the government and its people.⁵²²

President Chen Shui-bian, in his speech, called the former president "the father of Taiwan's democratic reform", and said that he would continue the work that Lee started:⁵²³

Taiwan's democratic system has moved from totalitarianism to democracy, and the local culture has changed from being oppressed to winning respect. History will give President Lee Teng-hui a fair evaluation and Taiwan will continue to follow his direction of localization and democratization.

⁵²² *FTV*. Taipei, May 30th 2000; *PTV*. Taipei, May 30th 2000; *TTV*. Taipei, May 30th 2000; *TVBSN*. Taipei, May 30th 2000.

⁵²³ *FTV, PTV, TTV & TVBSN*, *ibid*.

During the celebration, Lee spoke with reporters for nearly an hour, the longest amount of time he had spent with the media in the past 12 years.⁵²⁴ When Lee was asked about the six countries that had extended invitations to him, the former president mentioned that he would travel in the near future to a foreign country that does not have diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but no further details were revealed. Lee Teng-hui emphasized that even though he was no longer in office, the PRC still wants to restrict his freedom of travel; nevertheless, an effort had to be made. It was pointed out by Lee that China had been using the media, particularly those in Hong Kong, to mislead Taiwan. Lee said that the tensions across the Taiwan Strait were superficial, Taiwanese did not have to worry about the status quo, since they only need to know the actual military condition of the PRC. China purchased outdated weapons from Russia, and although it possessed nuclear weapons, other countries did as well. While other states have progressed in military modernization, the PRC lacked financial resources to research and develop newer high-technology weapons; however, the situation was expected to change in five to six years.⁵²⁵

Lee Teng-hui, like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, and Deng Xiaoping of the PRC, retained a certain patriarchal oversight of his nation after leaving office. Lee Teng-hui, the democrat, had not retired from his life-long mission and its Confucian-imbued sense of duty. Beijing understood the importance of Lee's assumed "Mandate of Heaven" (by which dynasties were legitimized historically), irrespective of a new government being elected into power in Taiwan. Beijing warned the world accordingly.

⁵²⁴ Lin, Chieh-yu & William Ide. "Lee Calls China's Bluff to Allay Public Concern." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, May 31st 2000, p. 1; *ETTV*. Taipei, May 30th 2000; *SETN*. Taipei, May 30th 2000.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

The power of post-presidential Lee in advancing Taiwan's cause was not to be underestimated. The Lee era thereby reverberated into the post-Lee era.

Lee Teng-hui visited Britain in June 2000, saying it was for the purpose of seeing his granddaughter who was studying in the UK.⁵²⁶ Prior to the visit, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zhu Bangzao, warned in a news conference: "Lee Teng-hui is not an ordinary citizen, and we strongly oppose Lee's visit to the UK and have made a solemn representation to British government."⁵²⁷ Zhu said that the PRC cautioned other countries from giving Lee Teng-hui a stage. Even though he was no longer Taiwan's leader, he has been an internationally renowned "troublemaker", who has always engaged in separatist activities. (By way of comparison, it is worth noting that Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara also invited Lee at this time. Even before the invitation was issued publicly, the PRC criticized Governor Ishihara in severe terms. Chinese officials indicated that they were doing their utmost to stop Lee Teng-hui from going to Japan.)⁵²⁸ A British Foreign Office spokeswoman described the former president's trip as a "private visit made by a private citizen, which will not make any shift in the British policy".⁵²⁹

⁵²⁶ *BBC News*. "China Protests Lee's Visit to Britain." UK, June 27th 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/809050.stm>; Lee, Jing-yi. *Writing Down Lee Teng-hui Closely – Red Woods Life Notes*. Yuan-liu, Taipei, 2001, p. 40.

⁵²⁷ *BBC News*. "China Slams Taiwan's UK Visit." UK, June 27th 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/808039.stm>; Staff Writer with Agencies. "China Riled by Lee Visit to Britain." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 28th 2000, p. 1.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ *BBC News*, June 27th 2000; Chou, Jing-wen. "Under China's Suppression: Lee Teng-hui Met with Margaret Thatcher." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, June 29th 2000, p. 1.

Lee arrived in London on June 27th and the following day a number of British parliamentarians held a luncheon in his honour.⁵³⁰ However, *The Times* reported that due to China's strong protests, the University of Manchester had canceled a lunch invitation issued by the Vice-Chancellor, of which Lee was originally the guest of honor.⁵³¹ On June 30th 2000, under pressure from Beijing, the University of Manchester decided not to allow Lee to give his speech publicly.⁵³² Nonetheless, the former Taiwanese president was not too surprised about the change, and told former Vice Secretary-General and Head of the Fourth Research Center at the Taiwan Research Institute, Lin Bih-chao, to deliver the speech for him.⁵³³ Lin delivered Lee Teng-hui's speech titled, "Creativity and Taiwan's Economic Development", which attributed Taiwan's survival of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis to its business sector being able to take advantage of international trends and opportunities, and to upgrade technical skills – "which is what we call the Taiwan economic miracle".⁵³⁴

As a measure of Lee's success in his UK visit it is worth noting that the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society awarded the former president an honorary permanent membership, and hosted a luncheon for Lee to meet with other members of the Society. PhD candidates from various nations were invited to engage in a seminar with Lee;

⁵³⁰ Lee, Jing-yi, 2001, p. 41.

⁵³¹ Chou, Jing-wen. "Under China's Suppression: Lee Teng-hui Met with Margaret Thatcher." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, June 29th 2000, p. 1; *The Times*. London, June 28th 2000, www.thetimes.co.uk; *Liberty Times*. "Lee Teng-hui Awarded Honorary Membership by the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society, but the Ceremony Not Open to the Public." Taipei, June 29th 2000, p. 1.

⁵³² Staff Writer with CNA. "Lee's Aide Gives the Speech in Manchester." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, July 1st 2000, p. 1.

⁵³³ Lee, Jing-yi, 2001, p. 43.

⁵³⁴ *The Central News Agency*. June 30th 2000, p. 1, www.cna.com.tw/index0630.html

their dissertations having been selected for the final round of the Society's International Economic Dissertations Competition.⁵³⁵

Another unofficial diplomatic undertaking by the former president occurred a few months later, in October 2000, when Lee went to the Czech Republic. There he participated in the fourth Forum 2000 Conference, a non-official meeting among the political, religious, and cultural leaders around the world.⁵³⁶ On October 15th, Lee spoke with Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel, who invited Lee to attend the conference, at a cocktail reception in honor of participants. Other participants included the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, former South African president, Frederik De Klerk, former Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Perez, and former Polish prime minister, Hanna Suchocka.⁵³⁷ Remarkably, before Lee was leaving for Prague, the head of the Tibetan Foundation in Taiwan made a special trip to the Taiwan Research Institute, to convey the message that the Dalai Lama wished to have a private talk with the former president in Prague.⁵³⁸

In view of Beijing's usual objections to foreign governments – including, in this instance, the Czech Republic – to hosting visits from Lee, and in order to prevent the PRC from becoming alarmed by the prospect of a Taiwan and Tibetan leadership

⁵³⁵ Lee, Jing-yi. 2001, p. 44; Staff Writer with CNA of *Taipei Times*. July 1st 2000, p. 1.

⁵³⁶ Staff Writer. "Lee Mixes Politics With Pleasure at Forum 2000 Event." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, October 17th 2000, p. 1; Staff Writer with Agencies. "Lee to Request Visa for Japan Visit, Scholar Says." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, October 19th 2000, p. 1.

⁵³⁷ Staff Writer of *Taipei Times*. October 17th 2000, p. 1; Staff Writer. "Lee Recommends Taiwan's Lessons." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, October 18th 2000, p. 1.

⁵³⁸ Lee, Jing-yi. 2001, p. 144.

meeting, both Lee and the Dalai Lama had wished to meet as confidentially as possible.⁵³⁹ They had previously met in Taipei in March 1997 and after the rendezvous in the Czech Republic in 2000 they were to meet again the following year at the Taiwan Research Institute in Taipei. The Dalai Lama told Lee that during this trip he better understood the energy released by Taiwan's democracy. The Dalai Lama had also met with President Chen Shui-bian.⁵⁴⁰

In November 2000, Lee had undergone cardiac surgery.⁵⁴¹ A follow-up medical examination was required within six months. Thus the former president planned to travel to Japan for the examination on April 24th 2001, to be conducted by the Japanese surgeon, Mitsudo Kazuaki, who supervised the Taiwanese medical team that performed Lee's operation in 2000. However with Beijing protesting that the 78-year-old Lee Teng-hui was "as strong as an ox" and needed no such medical attention in Japan, the Japanese government did not risk issuing Lee a visa. On the other hand, the major Japanese newspapers, including *Mainichi*, the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, and *Asahi*, and television companies such as *NHK*, *TVB*, and *Fuji* expressed support for the former president. They provided headline coverage of the story on April 16th 2001, petitioning the Japanese government to grant Lee a visa.⁵⁴² Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui had accused

⁵³⁹ Ibid., pp. 145-146.

⁵⁴⁰ *BBC News*. "Dalai Lama Meets Wirth Taiwanese President." UK, April 5th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1254232.stm>; *BBC News*. "Taiwan Hails Dalai Lama's Support." UK, April 5th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1261328.stm>

⁵⁴¹ *FTTV*. Taipei, April 16th 2001; *CTV*. Taipei, April 16th 2001.

⁵⁴² *CNN.com/WORLD* "Anger, Elation Over Visa for Former Taiwan Leader" April 21st 2001, <http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/21/taiwan.lee.../index.html>; *BBC News*. "Japan Stalls Over Taiwan Visit." UK, April 17th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1281548.stm>

Huang, Joyce. "Lee Trip Gains More Supporters." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, April 17th 2001, p. 1; *BBC News*.

the Japanese government of surrendering to China's warnings, saying that the courage of the Japanese government was as "small as a mouse" and that his visa application for Japan involved no political agenda. "I am no longer the president, and I am just an ordinary citizen. Some people say that my trip to Japan is politically motivated and that is complete nonsense."⁵⁴³

Pressure from public opinion led to Japanese Government spokesman, Yasuo Fukuda, to concede that: "If Lee's visit is only for medical reasons, we could consider it from a humanitarian standpoint."⁵⁴⁴ Moreover, as Japanese Foreign Minister, Yohei Kono, pointed out: "Mr. Lee is a very influential person politically, I think we are about to enter a difficult period in our diplomatic relations with China."⁵⁴⁵

On April 22nd, when Lee Teng-hui arrived at Kansai airport, Osaka, for his medical visit, more than 200 journalists were awaiting him. Hundreds of well-wishers and members of the press also awaited him at his Osaka hotel, the Imperial. It appeared that Beijing's threats had galvanized Japanese popular opinion which in turn led to the

"Japan Pressured Over Taiwan Visit." UK, April 16th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1279937.stm>; *BBC News*. "Lee Teng-hui Cancels US Visit." UK, April 26th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1297881.stm>

Staff and Wire Reporters. "Japan Risks Beijing's Wrath Over Lee's Visa." *CNN.com/WORLD* April 17th 2001, <http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/17/taiwan.japan/index.html>

⁵⁴³ Chu, Monique. "Lee Denies Politics Behind Visit." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, April 16th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁴ *BBC News*. "Taiwan Hails Japan Visa Move." UK, April 23rd 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1290768.stm>; *BBC News*. "US Risks China Anger Over Visa." UK, April 20th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1287792.stm>; Chang, Mao-sung. "Japan May Let Lee Seek Treatment." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, April 17th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁵ *CBS News.com*. "Visas Vex Beijing." US, April 20th 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/20/world/main286896.shtml>

government approving Lee's visa. Thanks to Beijing, Lee Teng-hui's medical trip became the focus of Japanese media attention,⁵⁴⁶ so much so that it eclipsed the story of Junichiro Koizumi's victory in the election of Party leader. The news of Lee Teng-hui was either published in the headline or his photo was bigger than Koizumi's. It was remarked that some readers could be forgiven for mistaking Lee Teng-hui as the newly elected leader of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).⁵⁴⁷

Besides public expressions of support at his hotel and hospital, Lee was welcomed by members of Japan's political and literary circles. For instance, Member of the House of Representatives, Yuriko Koike, and (right-wing) writer Fuyuko Kamizaka, visited Lee Teng-hui at his hotel room. The head of the Official Interchange Association (Japan's *de facto* diplomatic link with Taiwan), Toshio Goto, hosted a formal banquet to welcome Lee on the evening of his arrival. In addition, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, and leading government spokesman, Yasuo Fukuda, sent flower bouquets to the hospital to express their regards to the former president.⁵⁴⁸

Lee's medical trip to Japan has even been credited with playing an important role in helping Junichiro Koizumi win the LDP chairmanship, after failing in the elections of 1995 and 1998.⁵⁴⁹ At first, Koizumi did not agree to Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan,

⁵⁴⁶ See Chu, Monique. "Lee Snaps at China on his way to Japan." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, April 23rd 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁴⁷ *Asahi Shimbun Paper*. Tokyo, April 23rd 2001, p. 1; Lee, Jing-yi. 2001, p. 181.

⁵⁴⁸ Chu, April 24th 2001, p. 1; Lee, Jing-yi. 2001, p. 185; *FTV*. Taipei, April 25th 2001; *TVBS*. Taipei, April 25th 2001.

⁵⁴⁹ Tsao Jui-tai (Yuda Institute of Business Technology), cited in Chu, Monique. "Lee Helped Junichiro Koizumi to Victory." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, April 27th 2001, p. 1; *FTV*. Taipei, April 26th 2001; *TVBSN*. Taipei, April 26th 2001.

while the other two candidates, Taro Aso and Shizuka Kamei, supported it. Later, Mori, who belonged to the same faction as Koizumi, expressed his support for the former president. Meanwhile, Lee's medical trip had caught the imagination of the Japanese public and attracted widespread discussion; thus, there was strong media and public pressure for the Japanese government to issue Lee a visa. Koizumi quickly capitalized on this and changed his mind in favor Lee's visit. Ryutaro Hashimoto remained the only candidate opposing the issuing of a visa and held the Japan-China relationship as the priority.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yohei Kono, who belonged to the same faction as Hashimoto, threatened to resign if Mori issued Lee a visa. As a result, the media accused the Japanese government of being manipulated by the PRC, and engaging in undignified behavior. This episode fuelled long-standing calls for government reforms, a development which helped Koizumi with his views on financial reform and the privatization of postal service. Moreover, under the reform pressure from the people, many legislators turned to support Koizumi, leading to his landslide victory.⁵⁵⁰

If Lee's illness led to mega diplomacy with Japan, the same could not be said of Taiwan's reputed "illness" in relation to the world. On June 13th 2001, Lien Chan gave a speech at Oxford University in which he said that Taiwan was "seriously ill" because of cross-Strait relations and the positioning of the country's status was mistaken. Lien noted that a businessman in Taiwan had agreed with him by commenting that Taiwan

⁵⁵⁰ Chu & *FTV & TVBSN*, *ibid.*

was more backward and disordered than 40 years ago.⁵⁵¹ However, Lien said that if Taiwan could accept Mainland China's "one China" principle, all the troubles that Taiwan faced would be solved spontaneously.⁵⁵² Lien's speech was depicted in the Taiwanese media as shaming Taiwan in the UK; commentators argued that Taiwan had made progress in the past 40 years, because its people engaged in nation-building across numerous sectors - politics, military, economy, technology, environment, education, and culture for the long term. As soon as Taiwan accepted the "one China" principle raised by the PRC, the country would become a Special Administrative Region of China like Hong Kong, and President of the ROC would become a Chief Executive. Taiwan's difficulties would not be resolved naturally.⁵⁵³ Former President Lee Teng-hui was shown as a contrasting political figure in that he promoted Taiwan political consciousness to ensure that the country's independent sovereignty would not be jeopardized by the Chinese KMT led by Lien Chan, or the People First Party led by James Soong.⁵⁵⁴ In fact he had more in common with the incumbent president, Chen Shui-bian, and the political trajectory of the DPP. Ironically, the DPP's success may be seen as a legacy of the Lee Teng-hui era.

Lee's support for Chen at the Northern Taiwan Society's inauguration

⁵⁵¹ *CTS*. Taipei, June 13th 2001; *Liberty Times*. Taipei, June 14th 2001, p. 2; *PTV*. Taipei, June 13th 2001.

⁵⁵² *CTS & Liberty Times & PTV, ibid.*

⁵⁵³ *FTV*. June 13th 2001; Ruan. June 30th 2001, p. 1; *TVBSN*. June 13th 2001.

⁵⁵⁴ *FTV & Ruan & TVBSN, ibid.*

On June 16th 2001, former President Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian attended the opening ceremony in Taipei of the Northern Taiwan Society, a consultative association of nearly 90 cultural, academic, legal, and medical leaders in northern Taiwan.⁵⁵⁵ President Chen spoke of politics no longer being the monopoly of a minority, since all politicians were elected to office by the public and were executors of the people's will, and that democracy only continued to exist with the involvement of intellectuals and the conscience of society. In addition, Chen admitted that the performance of both ruling and opposition parties had been far from satisfactory over the past year, and he hoped that the Northern Taiwan Society would offer professional advice to the government.⁵⁵⁶ Also, former President Lee, speaking in the Holo dialect, warned that even if power had been transferred peacefully, some politicians still ignored the popular will and refused to change their ideological postures. During this period, politicians needed to gain the confidence of the people and commit to the reforms.⁵⁵⁷

It was no coincidence that President Chen Shui-bian and former President Lee Teng-hui shared the stage together, since most members of the Northern Taiwan Society promoted local consciousness, and were long-term supporters and friends of both leaders. The Northern Taiwan Society, the Southern and Central Taiwan Societies (established in 2000), and the Eastern Taiwan Society that would be set up in October 2001, would develop a national system to support the DPP administration by offering

⁵⁵⁵ Lin, Mei-chun. "Chen-Lee Alliance Steals the Limelight." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 17th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁵⁶ *PTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001; *SETN*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁵⁷ *PTV & SETN*, *ibid*.

suggestions and criticisms.⁵⁵⁸ While Lee did not reveal the politicians' names that he criticized, political commentator Jin Heng-wei said he thought that former President Lee was talking about the Chinese KMT Chairman Lien Chan, and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong.⁵⁵⁹

Lien Chan and James Soong were political enemies before the 2000 presidential election, yet it has been observed that both sides found it difficult to accept that they were defeated, and teamed up to obstruct President Chen's rule.⁵⁶⁰ While the elections of Delegates of the Legislative Yuan were held in 1998, the presidential election was held in 2000; hence, the opposition alliance among the Chinese KMT, the PFP, and the New Party, accounted for two-thirds of seats in the legislature.⁵⁶¹ These three parties, which came to be known as the Pan-Blue alliance, propounded a "Greater China Nationalism" with support for the "one China" principle. The New Party was formed by the ex-KMT members, who left the KMT to reject former Chairman Lee Teng-hui's decision to localize the Chinese KMT. Likewise, the PFP was set up by former KMT Secretary-General, James Soong, who left the party to contest the presidential election since he was not nominated by the KMT. Although Chen Shui-bian had won voter support and was elected as President, the opposition legislators boycotted policies proposed by the Chen administration, especially after President Chen refused to accept the "one China" principle. Thus, because the power of the opposition legislative

⁵⁵⁸ *FTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001; *TTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁵⁹ Lin, Mei-chun. June 17th 2001, p. 1; *TVBS*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁶⁰ *FTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001; *TVBSN*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁶¹ Lee, Chang-kuei. "Lee-Chen Alliance Shows Merits." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 30th 2001, p. 2; *SETN*. Taipei, June 29th 2001; *CTV*. Taipei, June 29th 2001.

alliance had exceeded the executive minority government, the Chen administration was unable to put many of its most popular plans into practice. With the aim of helping Taiwan resume the democratic process, former President Lee decided to give up his retirement and dedicate himself to the promotion of Taiwanese consciousness.⁵⁶²

At the first direct presidential election held in March 1996, Lee Teng-hui of the Chinese KMT won 54 percent of votes, while Peng Ming-min of the DPP came second with 21 percent of votes; thus, they together gained 75 percent of popular support.⁵⁶³ As indicated by former special assistant to former Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General, Hu Yao-bang, and Visiting Professor of Tamkang University, Ruan Ming, it demonstrated that the majority of Taiwanese recognized Lee's democratic reforms within the KMT system, while others acknowledged Peng's democratic advocacy outside the KMT.⁵⁶⁴ During the 2000 presidential campaign, Lee lost his direction in the promotion of local consciousness with Lien Chan, so the Chinese KMT had lost public opinion and the election. Since only 39 percent of voters elected Chen Shui-bian, it signaled that a considerable section of Taiwanese society was as puzzled as Lee. Ruan Ming has argued that if Lee had abandoned Lien Chan to help Chen Shui-bian to win, even if Chen could not obtain 75 percent of votes, he would have at least received more than 50 percent.⁵⁶⁵ Lee's post-retirement activities added the needed stimulus to the revival of Taiwanese consciousness, and his participation roused mainstream public opinion, thereby lifting the fog that had immobilized the progress of

⁵⁶² *FTV*. Taipei, June 29th 2001; Lee, Chang-kuei. June 30th 2001, p. 2; *TTV*. Taipei, June 30th 2001.

⁵⁶³ *China Times*. Taipei, March 24th 1996, p. 1; *United Daily Newspaper*. Taipei, March 24th 1996, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁴ Ruan. June 30th 2001, p. 3.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

Taiwan's democracy.⁵⁶⁶

Thus when former President Lee and President Chen made a joint public appearance at the inauguration of the Northern Taiwan Society and, furthermore, Lee expressed his support for Chen, a significant event had occurred. It indicated that Lee Teng-hui acknowledged Chen Shui-bian as his successor of the local consciousness movement. Moreover, it indicated the emergence of the partnerships between Lee and Chen, and between Lien Chan and James Soong, and the legislative elections that were going to be held in December 2001 would become a confrontation of national identities between Lee-Chen's "Taiwan First" ideology, and Lien-Soong's "one China" ideology.⁵⁶⁷ James Soong criticized the partnership between Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian as indication of Lee's desire to act as the "power behind the throne",⁵⁶⁸ while Soong was lambasted by the media for the inadequacy of his understanding of "local consciousness", and his inability to engage in substantive discussion on the differences between "Taiwan First" and "one China" stances. Local or Taiwanese consciousness originated from the notion of "Taiwan First", emphasizing Taiwanese people's interests and the priorities of the nation of Taiwan. By contrast, the first priority of the "one China" ideology remained the imperative and interests of unification with Mainland China.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶ Huang, Joyce. "Lee Says China Needs to Change." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 30th 2001, p. 1; Ibid; Staff Writer with Agencies. "President Chen." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, March 19th 2000, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁷ *FTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001; *TVBSN*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁶⁸ *Taipei Times*. "Lien's Depravity Left Lee no Choice." Taipei, June 17th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

The unsatisfactory interactions between the minority ruling DPP and the majority opposition alliance in the Legislative Yuan rendered Taiwan's political, economic, and social conditions unstable. As a result, the opposition alliance lost popular support as it became apparent that only a change in the Legislative Yuan would produce stability and further economic development. However, if Lien Chan did not lead the KMT onto the "pro-China" path, former President Lee would not come out of retirement to help President Chen. Lee Teng-hui emphasized on a number of occasions that he hoped the "localization" or the "Taiwan First" policy, which he had advocated in the past 12 years, would continue. Yet only Chen Shui-bian could accomplish this task, since Lien Chan betrayed the former president by cooperating with the pro-China People First Party and the New Party. Under the strong coalition between the Chinese KMT, the PFP, and the New Party, 70 percent of Delegates of the Legislative Yuan supported "Greater China Consciousness", while only 30 percent supported Taiwanese consciousness.⁵⁷⁰

Nonetheless, the opinion polls pointed out that only 30 percent of people in Taiwan were pro-unification, and 70 percent either supported retention of the status quo or Taiwan independence.⁵⁷¹ Thus, the legislature elected in 1998 could not represent the popular will of Taiwanese. On the other side, the upcoming alliance between former President Lee and President Chen would change the political landscape.

When Lee was interviewed by a pro-independence magazine, he revealed that if the DPP won 85 legislative seats, about 35 independent or opposition legislators would

⁵⁷⁰ CTV. Taipei, June 16th 2001; Lee, June 30th 2001, p. 2.

⁵⁷¹ CTV & Lee, *ibid.*

cross over to its side. Therefore, the DPP would be able to form a stable majority alliance in the Legislative Yuan, which would allow the Chen administration to function much more effectively.⁵⁷² According to DPP Legislator Hong Chi-chung, the former president successfully attracted the media's attention, and it was not easy to estimate the real influence of Lee Teng-hui. This was because the 35 legislators from different parties that would collaborate with Lee and Chen were unknown; hence, the Chinese KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party had to find who betrayed them and mend the fractures within their parties.⁵⁷³

In contrast, former interior minister Huang Chu-wen had forecasted that approximately 50 or 60 Delegates of the Legislative Yuan would support the Chinese KMT.⁵⁷⁴ Even though not every one of them could be elected, the KMT would have the power to form a majority partnership with the PFP. Nevertheless, some Delegates of the Legislative Yuan would cross over to help former President Lee after the elections. On condition that there were enough, these legislators would start a new political party as early as July 2001, and Lee Teng-hui would help to attract votes for them.⁵⁷⁵

When Lee traveled to the US in June 2001, he told the press that he wanted to help stabilize Taiwan's democracy by helping young and talented politicians who were capable of serving in the Legislative Yuan in the interests of democracy.⁵⁷⁶ Lee denied

⁵⁷² Lin, Chieh-yu. "Age of Bian-Lee Alliance Dawns." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 17th 2001, p. 3.

⁵⁷³ *SETN*. Taipei, June 16th 2001; *TVBS*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁷⁴ Lin, Chieh-yu. June 17th 2001, p. 3; *TTV*. Taipei, June 16th 2001.

⁵⁷⁵ Lin & *TTV*, *ibid*.

⁵⁷⁶ Huang, Joyce. "Lee Claims He is Not Attempting to Hurt the KMT." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 26th

the media accusations of betraying the Chinese KMT and secretly helping Chen Shui-bian to win the presidential election; the former president said he was the KMT Chairman and he was not a disloyal person. Lee added that although many people criticized him, he did not mind; he had given his heart to Taiwan, and freedom and democracy could never be given up.⁵⁷⁷ At a banquet in his honor, Lee urged approximately 1,700 overseas Taiwanese to support President Chen Shui-bian, because only in this way Taiwan could continue prospering.⁵⁷⁸ Lee said that even though Chen Shui-bian was inexperienced as President, he and his administration would gradually find the right way when handling foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and economic issues.⁵⁷⁹ Criticism was reserved for the KMT legislators using their majority in the Legislative Yuan to block the passing of laws that would help the government.⁵⁸⁰

On June 27th 2001, Cornell University held a special luncheon for Lee, and the Chancellor announced the establishment of the Lee Teng-hui Institute for Scientific Research, a research center specializing in nano-technology, including bio-technology, genetic engineering, medical science, and physics.⁵⁸¹ The former president briefly attended the inauguration ceremony, and told reporters that the research center would develop not only new, but ethical technologies that would contribute to world peace and advance human progress, including the creation of new materials that would be less

2001, p. 1.

⁵⁷⁷ Huang & *TTV* & *TVBSN*, *ibid*.

⁵⁷⁸ Huang & *TTV* & *TVBSN*, *ibid*.

⁵⁷⁹ *FTV*. Taipei, June 26th 2001; *TVBS*. Taipei, June 26th 2001.

⁵⁸⁰ *FTV* & *TVBS*, *ibid*.

⁵⁸¹ Lee, Jing-yi. 2001, pp. 213-215; Taipei Times Agencies with Staff Reporter. "Lee Keeps a Low Profile On Visit to Alma Mater." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, June 29th 2001, p. 1

polluting.⁵⁸² Meanwhile more than 200 Chinese protesters rallied in Cornell University's main square to condemn Lee Teng-hui and the university's decision to name an institute after him.⁵⁸³

The Taiwan Solidarity Union

On August 12th 2001, a pro-Lee political party called the Taiwan Solidity Union (TSU) was set up. It claimed the former president as its spiritual leader, and former interior minister Huang Chu-wen was elected as Party Chairman.⁵⁸⁴ The goal of the Taiwan Solidity Union was to continue reforms in party politics and in the Legislative Yuan, and to promote Taiwanese consciousness, which former President Lee started advocating 12 years ago. The TSU aimed to stabilize the political situation by allying with the DPP after it won the legislative elections held on December 1st 2001. Thus the Pan-Green alliance was formed against the above-mentioned Pan-Blue alliance of KMT, PFP and New Party. If the DPP could become the majority party in the legislature, it would be able to counter threats and power struggles from the opposition alliance (Pan-Blue). Among 39 legislative candidates nominated by the TSU, none of them was an incumbent Delegate of the Legislative Yuan; 19 came from the KMT, nine from the DPP, four were independent candidates, three came from the New Nation

⁵⁸² Lin. June 28th 2001, p. 1; Taipei Times Agencies with Staff Reporter. June 29th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁸³ ETTV. Taipei, June 29th 2001; Huang, June 30th 2001, p. 1; PTV. Taipei, June 29th 2001.

⁵⁸⁴ CTV. Taipei, August 12th 2001; Ho, Rong-sing & Liu, Tian-chai. "The Taiwan Solidarity Union is Set Up, and Lee Teng-hui Went to Support it." *China Times Daily*, Taipei, August 13th 2001, p. 1; Lin, Chieh-yu. "Lee Says Public is Fed Up with Bickering." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 13th 2001, p. 1; PTV. Taipei, August 12th 2001.

Alliance – previously a faction within the DPP, two from the People First Party, one from the New Party, and one from the Taiwan Independence Party – a faction of the DPP in the past.⁵⁸⁵

Lee Teng-hui attended the inauguration ceremony of the Taiwan Solidity Union and said that solidarity was currently the most important issue facing the people of Taiwan. He said that as various opinion polls revealed, a year-and-a-half after the transfer of power, people were disappointed by the operation of party politics that cared more about their own interests than resolving Taiwan's problems. In other words, power struggles had become the leading preoccupation of Taiwan's party politics. At the end of the former president's speech, TSU Chairman Huang Zhu-wen called Lee Teng-hui "the father of Taiwan".⁵⁸⁶

The emergence of the Taiwan Solidarity Union was expected to divert some votes away from the Chinese KMT and the DPP. The DPP election strategists also became concerned that the new political party would capture some ballots from its legislative candidates. The worst case scenario would be the "lose-lose" situation, which meant that both DPP candidates who were marginal and the TSU candidates would lose the elections. However, it has been suggested that the Chinese KMT was more anxious about the existence of the TSU than the DPP, because in order to obtain funding from the Chinese KMT, some KMT local legislators who secretly supported Lee Teng-hui

⁵⁸⁵ Chin, Heng-wei. "DPP Must Withstand Challenge of New Group." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 5th 2001, p. 1; Lin, August 13th 2001, p. 1; *SETN*. Taipei, August 12th 2001.

⁵⁸⁶ *FTV*. Taipei, August 12th 2001; Ho & Liu., August 13th 2001, p. 1; Lin, August 13th 2001, p. 1.

remained in the party. Consequently, a competition between candidates of the TSU and the KMT would have developed over the pro-Taiwan votes.⁵⁸⁷

On August 13th 2001, the Chinese KMT Evaluation and Discipline Committee expelled 12 party members who entered the Taiwan Solidarity Union.⁵⁸⁸ As the KMT Delegate of the Legislative Yuan, Apollo Chen, suggested, the circumstance for the KMT members who still maintained good relations with the former president became tougher, since they had to cope with pressure inside the party, plus severe competition from outside. Apollo Chen said that although some TSU candidates could not be elected, they were capable of diverting votes from their opponents and causing them to lose. For example, the TSU legislative candidates including Chen Jian-min, Chai Chong-ji, and Wu Mao-shiong were expected to take about 3,000 to 10,000 votes away from their KMT competitors.⁵⁸⁹ In contrast, former DPP Director of Organizational Development, Liu Yi-de, argued that the Taiwan Solidarity Union would influence the seats won by the People First Party as well. This was in view of the TSU having attracted a number of promising candidates, who were likely to look for nominations from the PFP if the TSU were not established.⁵⁹⁰

Even though Lee Teng-hui remained a KMT member, he became active again after his one-year retirement to support the TSU, which had attracted criticism from the anti-Lee

⁵⁸⁷ Chin, August 5th 2001, p. 1; Huang, Joyce. "Parties Assess Shifting Political Scene." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 13th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁸⁸ Low, Stephanie. "The KMT Ready to Expel 12 Defectors, But Lee Remains Safe." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 14th 2001, p. 1; *PTV*. Taipei, August 13th 2001; *TTV*. Taipei, August 13th 2001.

⁵⁸⁹ *CTS*. Taipei, August 12th 2001; *ETTV*. Taipei, August 12th 2001; Huang, August 13th 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁹⁰ *CTS* & *ETTV* & Huang, *ibid*.

group. On the other hand, Lee's supporters became concerned about his age and health and wondered whether it was worthwhile. On September 2nd 2001, through an interview with the *Liberty Times* journalist, Chou Jing-wen, Lee said that his only concern was to ensure the proper functioning of Taiwan's democracy and politics after the change in power. Lee Teng-hui emphasized that he had been President and Chinese KMT Chairman for 12 years, and he was not a shallow politician who was only interested in interfering with the legislative elections in order to gain some seats. He decided to support the Taiwan Solidarity Union in view of its commitment to stabilizing the country's political situation. Regardless of who takes office, he continued, opposition parties should abandon power struggles, and accomplish their supervisory responsibilities. The former president said that he was unwilling to witness a retreat in the country's democracy, and each person would need to think deeply about this issue.⁵⁹¹ When asked what he thought of being criticized for supporting the Taiwan Solidarity Union, Lee replied with a poem which he thought was appropriate:

A thousand years of honors and fame are only shadows outside your body. A hundred years of glories and insults are only flowers in the mirror. Being not inclined towards worldly affairs; being enchanted with nature. Unconcerned about official positions; one follows one's heart and stays carefree.⁵⁹²

Lee Teng-hui explained that when a person arrived at his stage in life, fame and wealth had already become insignificant. The most important thing was to follow one's heart;

⁵⁹¹ Chou, Jing-wen. "Former President Talks about the Past and the Future." *Liberty Times*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁹² *ETTV*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

he knew what he was doing and he did not mind criticism. On the specific criticism that his decision of returning to politics for the TSU would ruin his historical status, Lee regarded this as a self-centered consideration, because the status of one individual should not be the concern when one's country was going downhill.⁵⁹³

President of the Legislative Yuan and the KMT Vice-Chairman, Wang Jing-ping, and former interior minister and another KMT Vice-Chairman, Wu Bo-shiong, who were previously Lee's cadres, visited Lee Teng-hui in his residence before the legislative elections, and the former president said that he had considered their words again and again. Nonetheless, Lee thought that the subject of elections should not be restricted to whether political speeches should be made for the KMT, since that would generate problems, and it was not possible for him to support every KMT candidate without prejudice. Lee emphasized that he would support any candidate regardless of party membership, as long as he or she identified with democratization and localization, and supported the principle of "Taiwan First".⁵⁹⁴

Former president Lee told Wang Jing-ping and Wu Bo-shiong that he had profound feelings for the KMT. He said that some party members pursued the right direction consistently, and he looked forward to seeing them elected with votes far in excess of other candidates. If they could have a greater influence in the KMT, then the political situation on the whole would improve.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹³ *FTV*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

⁵⁹⁴ *TTV*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

⁵⁹⁵ *TVBS*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

In Lee's opinion, the cooperation between Lien Chan and James Soong was not based on political ideals but expedience; more importantly, the Chinese KMT would diminish into a small party in the long run if it did not rediscover its mainstream constituency that favored Taiwanization. As former special assistant to the late Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General Hu Yao-bang, Professor Ruan Ming indicated, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party, all of which supported unification, feared the emergence of the Taiwan Solidarity Union.⁵⁹⁶ In comparison, President Chen Shui-bian appreciated the function of the TSU, which would combine forces with the DPP to counter the opposition alliance after the legislative elections. Since the Taiwan Solidarity Union had its own ideals, it did not depend on the Chen administration; in fact, President Chen's decision to not attend the TSU's inauguration ceremony had pleased members of the TSU. This was because Chen's appearance could have compromised the newly established party's existence, nature, and objectives.⁵⁹⁷

By November 2001, the DPP Secretary-General, Wu Nai-ren, predicted that about 120 legislators would participate in President Chen Shui-bian's "cross-party alliance for national stabilization", which would form a majority in the legislature after the elections. Although the Democratic Progressive Party could be unsuccessful in becoming the largest party, it could still cooperate with the Taiwan Solidarity Union as well as some pro-localization legislators from the Chinese KMT. It was emphasized by

⁵⁹⁶ *PTV*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

⁵⁹⁷ *CTV*. Taipei, September 3rd 2001.

President Chen that all Delegates of the Legislative Yuan were welcome to join the alliance regardless of their party affiliations, so opposition parties did not have to concern themselves over being divided. The DPP Chairman, Frank Hsieh, pointed out that if Dr Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Chinese KMT were still alive, he would promote the significance of solidarity. The suggestion here was that the KMT should join the cross-party alliance, because in the past one-and-a-half years, opposition parties including the Chinese KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party, had cut the government's budgets, blocked the passage of bills, and opposed the Chen administration.⁵⁹⁸

The DPP becomes the biggest party in the Legislative Yuan, Legislators-At-Large, and Overseas Legislators

As shown in Tables 1 and 2, despite the Chinese KMT aiming to win at least 85 seats on the eve of the legislative elections, it only received 68 seats on December 1st 2001, a significant decline from its original 110 seats in 1998, which concluded the party's 50-year-dominance in the legislature.⁵⁹⁹ The Taiwan Solidarity Union Chairman,

⁵⁹⁸ CTV. Taipei, November 26th 2001; Lin, Chieh-yu. "Dec. 1 Elections: The DPP Pins High Hopes On Cross-Party Alliance Plan." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, November 26th 2001, p. 1; TVBSN. Taipei, November 26th 2001.

⁵⁹⁹ Hsu, Crystal. "The DPP Scores Big as the KMT Falters." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, Mei-chun. "Lien Chan Emerges as Big Loser." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 3;

Huang Chu-wen, predicted that due to the election failures and frustrations inside the Chinese KMT, the party would be divided once again after it lost the presidential election in March 2000.⁶⁰⁰

Table 1: The Result of the 2001 Legislative Elections

	District	Aborigine	At-large	Overseas	Sum	%
DPP	69	0	15	3	87	38.67
TSU	8	0	4	1	13	5.78
KMT	49	4	13	2	68	30.22
PFP	33	2	9	2	46	20.44
NP	1	0	0	0	1	0.44
TP	0	1	0	0	1	0.44

Low, Stephanie. "The KMT Remorseful as the PFP Celebrates." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, Lindy. "Voters Deal the KMT a Second Blow." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 1; Yen, Zi-ling. "The Election Victory is the People's Victory." *Taiwan News*, Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁰⁰ Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

IC	8	1	0	0	9	4.00
<hr/>						
	176		49		225	100
<hr/>						

Source: Ceng, Bo-yao, Chiu Yi-song, Hong Yi-cheng & Shao Li-chong. "2001 Taiwan Election Booklet". *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 53.

- * DPP: Democratic Progressive Party
- * TSU: Taiwan Solidarity Union
- * KMT: Chinese Nationalist (*Kuomintang*) Party
- * PFP: People First Party
- * NP: New Party
- * TP: Taiwan Party
- * IC: Independent Candidates

On the other hand, the DPP won 87 seats out of 225 in the lawmaking mechanism, a growth of 22 seats.⁶⁰¹ The Chen Shui-bian administration had asked voters to support the government by electing legislators willing to work with the government. The people had indeed chosen the DPP as the largest party in the legislature. The outcome was similar to the 2000 presidential election, and the change of party in the Legislative Yuan was instrumental in consolidating Taiwan's democracy.⁶⁰² In fact, the DPP had faced considerable challenges in the past 17 months, since the lawmaking mechanism

⁶⁰¹ Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1; Yen, December 4th 2001, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁰² Jacobs, Bruce. "Election Results Indicate Intelligent Vote Patterns." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 5; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

remained under the control of the Chinese KMT.⁶⁰³ However, this victory turned the DPP from an opposition party to a ruling party; in the DPP Chairman's (Frank Hsieh's) words, "this is a big step towards becoming a mature democracy".⁶⁰⁴

Another party to benefit from these elections was the People First Party that only expected to achieve 35 seats, but won 46 seats in its first legislative election, an increase of 26 seats.⁶⁰⁵ The voters were impressed by the performance of the Taiwan Solidarity Union as well, which was founded less than four months earlier and nominated candidates who were not well known, but received 13 seats, a vast improvement to TSU's existing one seat.⁶⁰⁶ It indicated that Lee Teng-hui, the spiritual leader of the youngest party still retained his charisma and political influence, and the party's principles that emphasized the mainstream values of Taiwanese such as "Taiwan First", localization, solidarity of Taiwan, and political stability.⁶⁰⁷

In contrast, the New Party that strongly supported unification and pro-China policies had lost the most; only its Secretary-General, Lee Bin-nan, secured one legislative seat, a fall of 91 percent from its previous 11 seats.⁶⁰⁸ After the majority of pro-unification

⁶⁰³ Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁴ Snyder, Charles. "The US Says Elections Show Strength of Nation's Democracy." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 5.

⁶⁰⁵ Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁶ Editorial of Taipei Times. "A New Day Dawns for Taiwan." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 6; Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁷ Editorial of Taipei Times. December 2nd 2001, p. 6; Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Peng, Sian-jun. "Lee Teng-hui Way Has Won a Beautiful Victory." *Taiwan News*. December 4th 2001, p. 20; Peng, Sian-jun. & Luo, Mei-ying. "Who is the Next President of the Executive Yuan?" *Taiwan News*. December 4th 2001, p. p. 32-33; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶⁰⁸ Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Jacobs, December 2nd 2001, p. 5; Low, December 2nd 2001, p. 3.

voters moved their support from the New Party to the People First Party, the New Party nearly collapsed. Therefore, a number of its party members gave thought to joining the PFP to maintain its pro-unification principles.⁶⁰⁹ As former President Lee pointed out, the rise of national identity conflicts had been the major reason of the New Party's downfall.⁶¹⁰

Remarkably, the DPP won 11 legislative seats out of its 11 candidates in Taipei County, while the Chinese KMT took only six seats out of its 13 candidates. In Tainan County, the DPP received five seats out of its five candidates; by contrast, the Chinese KMT only obtained two seats out of its six candidates.⁶¹¹ In Kaohsiung City, the DPP secured six seats out of its six candidates, while the Chinese KMT only gained two seats out of its six candidates. In comparison to other parties, the DPP also performed well in Taipei City, where eight out of its 10 candidates won the battle. Surprisingly, the DPP won two out of a total of four seats in Chiayi County, and after Independent Legislator Chang Hua-kuan entered the DPP, the party had three out of the entire four seats.⁶¹²

Although the election result was not sufficient to give the DPP majority control to overcome the opposition and pass the government's policy initiatives in the legislature, in working with the 13 seats from the Taiwan Solidarity Union, the DPP had the

⁶⁰⁹ Editorial of Taipei Times. December 2nd 2001, p. 6; Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶¹⁰ Cited in Low, December 2nd 2001, p. 3.

⁶¹¹ Ceng, Chiu, Hong & Shao, December 4th 2001, pp. 51-66; Jacobs, December 2nd 2001, p. 5.

⁶¹² Ibid.

influential power of 100 seats. This triumph rendered the position of the Chen Shui-bian administration stronger in forming a political alliance with opposition parties and carrying out reforms in the Legislative Yuan.⁶¹³ If the Chinese KMT was willing to join the coalition, the political alliance would incorporate its policy of supporting more extensive liberalization with Beijing, plus the KMT would help to solve the problems and standoff with China. Therefore, the relationship between Taiwan and the PRC would be improved, since China had refused to start a dialogue with a DPP government. The outcome of the legislative elections of December 2001 demonstrated that many voters had rejected the Chinese KMT with its betrayal of Taiwanese consciousness or localization, and support of "one country, two systems".⁶¹⁴ It also showed that Taiwanese had become intolerant of the political struggles among opposition parties and hoped to see political stability.⁶¹⁵ On the other hand, voters signaled that they were not satisfied with any political party's performance, and none of them won the absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan. In spite of the DPP becoming the biggest party in the legislature, with only 36.5 percent of support,⁶¹⁶ it still faced threats from opposition parties.

Of the 184 Delegates of the Legislative Yuan elected in the legislative elections of 2001, 41 were legislators-at-large (legislators who were nationwide, and did not belong to a

⁶¹³ Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Peng, Su-juan. "Lee Teng-hui Stands On the Top of Taiwan Giving Chen Shui-bian a Broader Stage." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 24-25; Yang, Sian-hong. "Disenchantment." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 4-5; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶¹⁴ Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yang, December 4th 2001, pp. 4-5; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶¹⁵ Low, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yang, December 4th 2001, pp. 4-5.

⁶¹⁶ Editorial of Taipei Times. December 2nd 2001, p. 6.

specific district) and eight were overseas legislators (legislators representing the overseas Taiwanese).⁶¹⁷ When the constitution was revised by the Provincial Government and National Assembly in 1991, the Council of Grand Justices stated that, in accordance with the constitution, the central government should hold elections including public representatives and legislators-at-large. Consequently, the Central Election Commission made amendments on the Public Officials Election Law, and this system has been put into practice since the 1992 legislative elections. Every political party had to nominate its candidates of legislator-at-large, and the party had to win at least five percent of votes in the elections to claim the seats.⁶¹⁸

As indicated in Table 1, the Democratic Progressive Party took 15 seats of legislators-at-large, according to its 38.67 percent of votes, and the Chinese KMT won 13 seats with 30.22 percent of voter support, a decrease from 46.43 percent in 1998.⁶¹⁹ Moreover, the People First Party received 9 seats after winning 20.44 percent, and the Taiwan Solidarity Union obtained four seats based on its 5.78 percent.⁶²⁰ Among eight seats of overseas legislators, the DPP took three, both the Chinese KMT and the PFP won two seats, and the TSU obtained one seat.⁶²¹ On the other side, the New Party only received 0.44 percent of popular votes and failed to meet the 5 percent threshold;

⁶¹⁷ Ker, Yun-kuan. "The Strategic Implication of Legislators-At-large." *Chung-hua Daily*. Taiwan, August 17th 2001, p. 2; Tsai, Ting-i. "The DPP Takes Total of 15 At-Large Seats to Edge Out the KMT." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, December 2nd 2001, p. 4.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid.

⁶¹⁹ Ceng, Chiu, Hong & Shao, December 4th 2001, pp. 51-66; Editorial of Taipei Times. December 2nd 2001, p. 6; Tsai, December 2nd 2001, p. 4.

⁶²⁰ Ceng, Chiu, Hong & Shao, December 4th 2001, pp. 51-66; Tsai, December 2nd 2001, p. 4.

⁶²¹ Ibid.

hence, it was not eligible to be awarded legislator-at-large seats, form a caucus in the Legislative Yuan, or win government campaign subsidies.⁶²²

The local government elections

The elections of local government mayors and county magistrates in 23 cities and counties were also held on December 1st 2001. In comparison to the 1997 elections, the Chinese KMT won nine posts, a progress of one post; although the DPP obtained nine posts as well, it lost three previous posts unpredictably.⁶²³ The People First Party obtained two posts in Taidong County, and Lianjiang County (the official administrative name for the Matsu island group). The New Party won the post of Kinmen County Magistrate, and independent candidates took the posts of Miaoli County and Jiayi County.⁶²⁴

Although the Chinese KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party again made an alliance (Pan-Blue) to nominate only one Taipei County Magistrate candidate - Wang Jan-shuen - the incumbent DPP Taipei County Magistrate, Su Jen-chung, was re-elected. By comparison, the Chinese KMT Taichung mayoral candidate and former foreign minister, Jason Hu, won the post due to power struggles between the incumbent DPP Taichung Mayor, Chang Wen-ying, and the DPP Taichung mayoral candidate,

⁶²² Hsu, December 2nd 2001, p. 2; Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶²³ Ceng & Chiu & Hong & Shao, December 4th 2001, pp. 51-66; Jacobs, December 2nd 2001, p. 5; Yeh, December 2nd 2001, p. 1.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

Michael Chai. Previously, Chang Wen-ying was defeated by Michael Chai in the DPP preliminary elections, in which 30 percent of the result was derived from votes diverted from the DPP members, and 70 percent decided by the opinion polls conducted by phone.⁶²⁵ As indicated in Table 2, Chang Wen-ying left the DPP and entered the Taichung mayoral election as an independent candidate; she took 44,341 votes away from Michael Chai and caused him to lose the election.⁶²⁶

Table 2: The Result of Taichung Mayoral Election in 2001

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Party Membership</u>	<u>Votes Won</u>
Chang Wen-ying	Independent Candidate	44,341
Michael Chai	The DPP	177,515
Jason Hu	The Chinese KMT	213,866

Source: Ceng & Chiu & Hong & Shao, December 4th 2001, p. 55.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

As Taiwan specialist Bruce Jacobs pointed out, the 2000 presidential election indicated that the residents of southern Taiwan were more supportive of the DPP, while the residents of northern Taiwan were more supportive to the Chinese KMT and the People First Party.⁶²⁷ Even though this regional difference was not as obvious as in the presidential election, it had been re-discovered in the 2001 elections of local government mayors and county magistrates. This was shown when the DPP kept the southern counties and cities except for Yunlin County.⁶²⁸

In the 1997 local government elections, the DPP won four posts of local government mayor, yet in 2001 it took only one post in Tainan City, and its three original posts had been replaced by the Chinese KMT. On the other side, the KMT obtained the majority of posts along the northwest coast, where military bases were situated and where *Waishengjen* and Hakka populations were well represented. (As noted in Chapter 8, in general, *Waishengjen* and Hakka were less supportive of the DPP than Holo.) Consequently, though the DPP was the victor in the 2001 legislative elections, it turned out the loser in the battles for local government mayors and county magistrates. This signaled that the DPP had to exert itself even more if it wanted to win support.

The Taiwan Advocates, “Separate states on either side of the Taiwan Strait”, and the rectification of names

⁶²⁷ Jacobs, December 2nd 2001, p. 5.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

Former president Lee Teng-hui announced on December 3rd 2001 the establishment of a cross-party and multi-ethnic group called the "Taiwan Advocates", comprising politically significant figures in Taiwan and overseas who would play a major part in future political rearrangements. The Taiwan Advocates included President Chen Shui-bian, Executive Yuan President Chang Jun-shiong, Economic Minister Lin Sing-yi, Finance Minister Yen Ching-chang, and Transport Minister Yeh Ju-lan.⁶²⁹

In addition, some Chinese KMT pro-localization members, such as President of the Legislative Yuan and Chinese KMT Vice-Chairman, Wang Jing-pin, former President of the Executive Yuan and another KMT Vice-Chairman, Vincent Siao, and President of the Examination Yuan, Shi Shui-de, had attended the ceremony.⁶³⁰ According to political analyst Huang Wei-fong, it was to be expected that the Taiwan Advocates - led by former KMT chairman Lee Teng-hui – should have attracted a number of localized KMT members who were switching over to the Taiwan Solidarity Union.⁶³¹

Another political analyst, Wu Yu-shan, suggested that Lee Teng-hui was still a political star, and the former president had appeared to take President Chen Shui-bian's role of leading Taiwan towards independence. Unlike Chen, who needed to act conservatively

⁶²⁹ Ceng, Wen-lan. "Peng Rong-chi Acts as the Motor of the Taiwan Advocates." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 16; Jie, Yang. "The Peaceful Revolution of the New Taiwanese." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 10-13; Jie, Yang. "The Wagging Dog That Died of Fear." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 28; *Taiwan News*. "Peng Rong-chi said that the Strategies of the Taiwan Advocates Accord with Chen Shui-bian." Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 14-15.

⁶³⁰ Ceng, December 4th 2001, p. 16; Jie, December 4th 2001, pp. 10-13; *Taiwan News*. December 4th 2001, pp. 14-15.

⁶³¹ Lin, December 2nd 2001, p. 3.

in order to win votes from the neutral supporters, Lee had no intention to run for any political post and could speak unhindered in promoting his beliefs.⁶³²

Since President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party took office in May 2000, China refused to deal with the new government and expanded missile deployments and military exercises targeting Taiwan.⁶³³ As a result, on August 3rd 2002, when President Chen was participating in the 29th annual meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations in Tokyo, through the telecast he stated that Taiwan had to go its own way to create a road for its future, and "Taiwan's own road" meant democracy, freedom, human rights, and peace. Moreover, Chen emphasized that Taiwan could not be bullied, belittled or marginalized because there were "separate states on either side of the Taiwan Strait". Taiwan neither belonged to any state, nor was it another state's local government or province. In order to protect Taiwan's sovereignty, Chen said that he supported legislation to pass a referendum law: there was no state, government, or political party that could decide for Taiwan, only its 23 million citizens had the right to vote for the country's future. Not surprisingly, a spokesman for Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, Lee Wei-yi, said: "The only future for Taiwan is unification."⁶³⁴

President Chen Shui-bian's remarks reaffirmed former President Lee Teng-hui's

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). *The Military Balance 2003-2004*. Oxford University Press for IISS, London, 2003, p. 147; Cody, Edward. "China, Taiwan, US Display Might: Exercises Are a Reminder of the Potential for Conflict Over the Island." *Washington Post*. July 27th 2004, p. A09; *People's Daily*. "Three Purposes of Military Maneuver at Dongshan Island." July 19th 2004.

⁶³⁴ Lin, Chieh-yu. "Chen Raises Pitch of Anti-China Rhetoric." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 4th 2002, p. 1.

announcement in July 1999 of “the special state-to-state relationship between Taiwan and China”. As Taiwanese academic Cheng Tuan-yao observed, President Chen was angered by Beijing’s act of asking the Pacific island nation of Nauru to change its diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC on the day when Chen was inaugurated as the DPP Chairman.⁶³⁵ Furthermore, the editor-in-chief of *Contemporary Monthly*, Jin Heng-wei, suggested that since Chen Shui-bian was elected President in March 2000, and even after the Democratic Progressive Party became the biggest party in the Legislative Yuan in December 2001, the PRC had constantly undervalued the significance of Chen and the DPP, and displayed a hostile attitude in threatening Taiwan.⁶³⁶ On the other hand, Jin Heng-wei indicated that since Chen Shui-bian succeeded as President, his soft approach to China disappointed many of his hardliner supporters. Nonetheless, President Chen finally substantiated legislative and executive power, so he felt confident to return to his past rhetoric and talk of “separate states on either side of the Taiwan Strait” to satisfy local voters.⁶³⁷

A week after his “separate states” speech, on August 11th 2002, President Chen Shui-bian attended the first anniversary of the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. There he emphasized the importance of asserting Taiwan’s sovereignty, and urged Taiwanese not to be intimidated by the PRC but to keep walking “Taiwan’s road” if China still refused to respond to Taiwan’s goodwill. The 80-year-old TSU “spiritual leader” Lee Teng-hui supported Chen’s words by stressing that “Taiwan is not a part of

⁶³⁵ Chu, Monique. “Analysts Mull the Results of Chen’s Pronouncement.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 4th 2002, p. 3.

⁶³⁶ Ibid.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

China, it is a part of the world, and we are our own masters”;⁶³⁸ he pointed out that this was the reality, and Taiwanese did not need to be frightened of saying so. Lee Teng-hui added that he did not want to bring about tensions between Taiwan and China by advocating Taiwan's independence; in contrast, he hoped to see a mutually beneficial relationship developed between the two countries. Furthermore, the former president promised to lead the TSU party for the rest of his life to make sure that Taiwan would continue to be governed by Taiwanese, since Taiwan's future was more important than his life.⁶³⁹

Leaders of pro-independence groups and many high-ranking DPP politicians - such as Vice President of the Executive Yuan, Lin Hsing-yi, former Prime Minister and now DPP Secretary-General, Chang Jun-shiong, and the DPP Taipei mayoral candidate, Lee Ying-yuan - had participated in this TSU gathering. They heard TSU Chairman Huang Chu-wen announce the party's goals of “pushing for the passage of the public referendum law” and “rectifying the name of Taiwan”. Huang revealed that the party would mobilize at least 10,000 people on Mother's Day the following year (May 2003) to promote its goal of changing the country's name from the Republic of China to Taiwan, as “the name of the people's mother is Taiwan”.⁶⁴⁰

Women deployed diplomatically for “Mother Taiwan”

⁶³⁸ Lin, Mei-chun. “Chen and Lee Stress Nation's Sovereignty.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 12th 2002, p. 1.

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

That "Taiwan's road" appeared to be leading to independence was far from edifying for Taiwan's superpower guarantor, the USA, with its concern that Taipei should avoid provocative behavior in cross-Straits relations. To reassure the US, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman, Tsai Ing-wen, flew to Washington on August 8th 2002, and had meetings with the US officials, including Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, James Kelly, staff at Capitol Hill, and the members from two think-tanks -- the liberal Brookings Institution and the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

Tsai explained that President Chen Shui-bian's speech was aimed at aligning the government's position on the future of Taiwan with the position of the Democratic Progressive Party. In addition, President Chen emphasized that it was not an issue of holding a referendum on independence, but on the issue of sovereignty, and a referendum would only be called if China used force or tried to impose the formula of "one country, two systems" on Taiwan, because Taiwan could not become another Hong Kong or Macao,⁶⁴¹ and in Chen's opinion, as a president he could not decide for the rest of the people of Taiwan; thus, a referendum would provide a collective decision on the country's future.⁶⁴² Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen referred to a 1999 DPP resolution

⁶⁴¹ Taiwan Security Research. "President Chen Vows Taiwan Won't Become Second Hong Kong." Taipei, January 19th 2003, <http://www.taiwansecurity.org/News/2003/CP-011903-1.htm>; CNN.com/WORLD. "Chen Rejects Taiwan-China Reunification." September 3rd 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/02/taiwan.china/index.html>

⁶⁴² CNN.com/WORLD. "Chen Backpedals On Taiwan Nationhood." August 6th 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/06/taiwan.pres/index.html>

Snyder, Charles. "The US Reacts to One Country On Each Side." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 9th 2002, p. 1; Snyder, Charles. "Tsai Explains Chen's Words to the US Officials." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 10th 2002, p. 1.

stressing that Taiwan was a state and a “collective agreement” would be necessary if the status quo was going to be changed. Having apparently mollified American concerns, Tsai described the atmosphere in her meetings with the George W. Bush administration officials as friendly.⁶⁴³

A few days after Tsai's visit of reassurance to Washington, on August 14th 2002, Vice President Annette Siu-liang Lu visited Indonesia on more provocative terms. Her entry to Jakarta was blocked due to the PRC's severe opposition, so she flew to Bali instead. Lu condemned Beijing for its interference, and stressed that China had no right to deprive her of her right of travel; moreover, both President Chen Shui-bian and her efforts in expanding Taiwan's diplomatic space had not been changed by the PRC. The Vice President stated: “Taiwan is not a part of the PRC and it [the PRC] has no say about where I should go. Besides, traveling is my basic right, and Mainland China has no right to persecute another country's nationals.”⁶⁴⁴

According to Taiwan's most senior representative to Jakarta, Lin Shui-chi, China's officials had lodged harsh protests against the visit to at least three Indonesian ministers.⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael Ing-mao Kao indicated, Vice President Annette Lu's visit to Bali revealed Taiwan's intention of learning from Bali in promoting itself as a world famous resort. Kao said: “I do not

⁶⁴³ Snyder, Charles. “Tsai Wraps up Damage Control in the US.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 11th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁴ Chu, Monique & Lin Chieh-yu. “Lu Pans China for Restricting Her Trip.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 16th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁵ Chu, Monique & Lin Chieh-yu. “Lu's Surprise Flight to Jakarta Backfires.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 15th 2002, p. 1.

consider it an obstruction, since the arrangement of flying to Bali was one of our strategic options.”⁶⁴⁶

On the other hand, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Kong Quan, said the PRC opposed any official contacts between Indonesia and Taiwan and this was clearly conveyed to the Indonesian government.⁶⁴⁷ In addition, Kong warned Indonesia not to have any dealings with Annette Siu-liang Lu, otherwise it would jeopardize the diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia. In return to the PRC, a statement issued by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry stressed that no officials would meet with Taiwan's Vice President Lu during her Bali visit as a private citizen. In contrast, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council, Chang Rong-fon, said: “Taiwan is not a normal country to a certain extent, and in order to avoid China's moves to suppress Taiwan, we need to do everything we can to conceal many of our diplomatic efforts.”⁶⁴⁸ For instance, Presidential Office Spokesman, James Chi-fan Huang, suggested the government could not provide any briefings about the Vice President's trip, in consideration of pressures from Beijing.⁶⁴⁹

Nonetheless, on August 17th 2002, Vice President Lu entered Jakarta from the air base by car, accompanied by plainclothes presidential guard escorts, which showed that the Indonesian government had given Lu preferential treatment. Later, Indonesian Labor Minister Jacob Nua Wea visited Lu to discuss the condition of the approximately

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.

97,000 Indonesian workers in Taiwan.⁶⁵⁰ Besides, Annette Lu met with the Indonesian congressmen, the former and incumbent government officials, Taiwanese businesspeople, and Indonesia's Environment Minister, Nabel Makarim, who was the Vice President's classmate at Harvard Law School in the late 1970s.⁶⁵¹ Moreover, a minister during the administration of former Indonesian president Suharto, Agung Laksono, said he and some business executives had a friendly and private meeting with Vice President Lu. Meanwhile, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirayuda, restated Indonesia's support for the "one China" policy and said that no government officials would meet Lu.⁶⁵²

Vice President Annette Lu, Taiwan's highest-ranking official to visit Indonesia, said she was pleased to represent all 23 million Taiwanese to visit the Republic of Indonesia during its 57th National Day. Lu stated that the Republic of Indonesia was the biggest archipelago in the world, she chose to visit it first to promote President Chen Shui-bian's "south-bound policy" of strengthening Taiwan's business development in Southeast Asian countries, and she hoped Indonesia could become Taiwan's strategic partner in trade and economy. Lu also revealed that Taiwan was interested in purchasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Indonesia.⁶⁵³ The Vice President thanked

⁶⁵⁰ Chu, Monique. "Lu Slips into Jakarta After Bali Detour." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 17th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵¹ Chu, Monique & Lin, Chieh-yu. "Triumphant Lu Returns From Jakarta." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 18th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵² Chu, August 17th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵³ The PRC sought to purchase natural gas in 2002; Australia won the contract but the PRC also gave Indonesia a smaller contract shortly after. See Vaile, Mark. "Australia Wins Contract to Supply Gas to China." Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 8th 2002, http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2002/joint_gas.html; Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Vaile, Mark. "China LNG Delivers Australia's Largest Ever Trade Deal." Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 8th 2002,

the Indonesian government for receiving her regardless of strong pressure from the PRC.⁶⁵⁴ However, a planned meeting between Vice President Annette Lu and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri was cancelled due to harsh protests from China. The Indonesian President was told in person that China's diplomatic relations with Indonesia would be cut if she met with Annette Lu.⁶⁵⁵

The month following Tsai's and Lu's soft-hard, reassuring-provocative, and yin-yang diplomacy, on September 20th 2002, the wheelchair-restricted First Lady Wu Shu-chen synthesized both the reassuring and the provocative with a major women-only delegation to the US: the heartland of diplomatic clout. It was, after all, former US President Richard Nixon's détente with the PRC that led to Taiwan's international isolation. Wu brought with her more than 20 wives of government officials, including Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Shi-meng's wife Kang Ping, Foreign Minister Eugene Jiang Yo-hsing's wife, Wang Kuei-ron, and Deputy Secretary-General to President Chen Jui-nan's wife, Chen Ku Mei-kuei. This was the first time a Taiwan first lady made the visit since the US switched its diplomatic ties from the ROC to the PRC in 1979.⁶⁵⁶

First Lady Wu's physical handicap has a political context. After Chen Shui-bian was

http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2002/mvt094_02.html; Downer, Alexander. "China LNG Agreements Signed." Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, October 18th 2002, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa151a_02.html; Chu & Lin, August 18th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁴ Chiu, Yu-tzu. "Taiwan Wins Battle Without Gunfire." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, August 19th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Lin, Chieh-yu & Lin Mei-chun. "First Lady Sets Off for New York." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 20th 2002, p. 1. The power of presidential wives to the US may be traced back to the memorable address delivered to a joint session of the US House and Senate by Madame Chiang Kia-shek (Soong Mei-ling) in February, 1943, asking for U.S. support of China in its war with Japan.

elected Taipei City Councilor in 1981, during Taiwan's repressive martial law era in 1985, when Chen was thanking supporters on the street after he lost the Tainan County Magistrate election by a narrow margin, a politically instigated road "accident" represented an attempt to assassinate Chen, but he was surrounded by the huge crowd. Instead, the vehicle ran over his wife Wu, leaving her paralyzed from the waist down. After enduring great suffering, Wu Shu-chen was elected Delegate of the Legislative Yuan in 1986, and assisted her husband to become a lawmaker in 1989 and 1992, Taipei Mayor in 1994, and President in 2000.⁶⁵⁷ Her visit to the US in 2002 was rich in symbolic capital, the highlights of which are recounted below.

When Wu's plane made a refueling stop in Seattle on the way to New York, a state government official greeted her at the airport and awarded the Honorary Citizenship of Washington State to the first lady on behalf of Governor Gary Locke. When the press asked Wu Shu-chen to compare herself with China's first lady, President Jiang Ze-min's wife, Wu replied that because her husband was directly elected by the people, she should have more influence than Madame Jiang. Next, Taiwan's Representative to the US, Chen Jien-ren, and Acting Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Barbara Jane Schrage, welcomed the first lady in the airport.⁶⁵⁸

⁶⁵⁷ Markus, Francis. "Taiwan's Politicians and Their Wives." *BBC News*. UK, February 12th 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/from_our_own_correspondent/639301.stm; Zheng, T. J. "The Mayor With An Eye On Presidency. A Maverick Mayor: Taiwan's Pro-Independence Chen Shui-bian Could Become Mayor." *Aisaweek*, November 21st 1997, <http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/1121/nat6.html>; McCarthy, Terry. "Profile of a President: Behind the Smile, A Tiger-like Ferocity." *Time*. March 27th 2000, Vol. 155, No. 12, <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0327/taiwan.chenprofile.html>; Lin, Chieh-yu. "First Lady Bounces Back in Style in LA." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 29th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁵⁸ Lin, Chieh-yu. "Warm Welcome for First Lady in NYC." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 21st 2002, p. 1.

At the National Arts Club in New York City, after Broadway Artist Welly Young sang “The Impossible Dream”, Wu said that even though Taiwan’s UN application had been blocked for many years, Taiwanese who lived with dignity would never give up their efforts. She pointed out that while many people considered this impossible, one day the impossible would be made possible, and she urged the world’s democratic countries to support Taiwan, since its democracy was a model of success despite threats from the PRC.⁶⁵⁹ When Wu was interviewed by *CBS*, she said Taiwan was a sovereign state, and asked her interviewer that if it was not, “how can you call me the First Lady?”⁶⁶⁰ When Wu attended as the guest of honor a luncheon hosted by the executive director of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, David Woolner, Woolner said that as an historian, he understands Chen Shui-bian and Wu Shu-chen’s emotions for the people of Taiwan, and compared the Chens to the Roosevelts in their devotions to freedom and democracy in their respective nations.⁶⁶¹

On September 25th 2002, Wu Shu-chen attended a reception on Capitol Hill, and met with 24 members of the House and Senate. They praised her bravery and accomplishments, expressed the hope for President Chen Shui-bian to be able to visit Washington as soon as possible, and pledged America’s unshakable support for Taiwan. Six members of Congress led by one of Taiwan’s major supporters, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, said:

⁶⁵⁹ Lin, Chieh-yu. “Wu Calls On the World to Help the UN Bid.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 22nd 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁰ *CBS News.com*. “Taiwan’s Feisty First Lady.” US, September 20th 2002, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/19/world/main522654.shtml>; Lin, September 22nd 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁶¹ Lin, Chieh-yu. “The US Institute Praises Wu’s Quiet Heroism.” *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 23rd 2002, p. 1.

Few men and women have done more, and suffered more, to defend freedom than President Chen and the first lady. In addition, Taiwanese have set a lasting democratic foundation that will assure hope, freedom, opportunity, and self-government for generations to come.⁶⁶²

Representative Benjamin Gilman, who repeated his oft-stated assertion in support of Taiwan's independence, presented Wu Shu-chen with a copy of a resolution approved collectively by the House of Representatives welcoming her to Washington. Moreover, Representative Christopher Cox⁶⁶³ presented the first lady with the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Democracy Service Medal, in honor of her personal courage, her strength of character, and the inspiration she has provided to the people of Taiwan. Cox was aware that President Chen Shui-bian was intending to establish a Taiwan Democracy Foundation in March 2003, which would correspond with the goals of the NED. Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky also attended the reception.

This was the first time Taiwan's first lady addressed members of the US Congress after Madame Chiang Kai-shek in 1943.⁶⁶⁴ Wu said that the key explanation for Taiwan's relatively peaceful and smooth transition to democracy, compared to many other

⁶⁶² The National Endowment for Democracy – DemocracyNet. "Madame Chen Wu, Sue-jen, First Lady of the Republic of China (Taiwan), awarded Democracy Service Medal at Capitol Hill Ceremony." Washington D.C., September 25th 2002, <http://www.ned.org/events/wudemaward02.html>; The House Policy Committee. "Policy Chairman Cox, National Endowment for Democracy Honors Taiwan's First Lady." US, September 25th 2002, http://policy.house.gov/html/news_release.cfm?id=108; Snyder, Charles. "First Lady Makes Visit to the US Capitol." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 27th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁶³ Author of the 1999 Cox Report, concerned with the PRC "stealing" nuclear secrets from the USA.

⁶⁶⁴ *Washington Post*. "Soong Mei-ling -- The Most Powerful and Disputable Female." October 25th 2003, p. 1.

countries in the third wave of democratization, was that the political leaders were tolerant and sowed the seeds of love in place of hatred. Furthermore, the people of Taiwan did not want to go back to the old days when freedoms of speech and thought were restricted.⁶⁶⁵

The first lady's visit suggested an improving relationship between Taiwan and the US, and it was regarded as a success in the diplomatic war between Taiwan and the PRC. For example, as Secretary of the Taiwan Center in Rosemead, Hilda Lai, said the appearance of Wu Shu-chen had lifted the spirit of many Taiwanese-Americans, who were supporters of the independence of Taiwan. Lai said that while she had been taught in school that Taiwanese culture was inferior to Chinese culture, and had been forbidden to speak in Taiwanese, the first lady had returned pride to local people.⁶⁶⁶

Given that Taiwan's international space was subject to severe restriction by the PRC's diplomatic blockade, President Chen Shui-bian and even former President Lee Teng-hui's freedoms of travel had been curtailed to most countries. For example, in November 2001, Wu had to represent her husband in France to receive the Prize for Freedom from Liberty International, a global federation of 84 liberal parties from 67 countries.⁶⁶⁷ Since the first lady enjoyed more freedom to go overseas, although Wu

⁶⁶⁵ The House Policy Committee, September 25th 2002; The National Endowment for Democracy – DemocracyNet, September 25th 2002; Snyder, September 27th 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ *BBC News*. "Taiwan President Barred From Europe." November 14th 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1656654.stm>; Liberal International Human Rights Project Officer. "Awarded Freedom Prizes." UK, <http://www.worldlib.org/humanrights/freedomprize.html>; Liberal International Human Rights. "Speech Wu Shu-chen, First Lady of Taiwan." UK, November 14th 2001, <http://www.liberal-international.org/freedomprize/2001/wu.html>; *BBC News*. "President's Wife Accepts Freedom Prize." UK, November 15th 2001,

needed a wheelchair to move around, she was strong-minded to take this physically difficult task to help promote Taiwan's diplomacy. This kind of spirit impressed members of the US Congress; many of them had paid tribute to Wu Shu-chen for her strength of mind to strive for Taiwan's democracy from her wheelchair. Given that the first lady held no official government post, the PRC could not protest to the US. If it did so, the friendly atmosphere between the US and the PRC would have been damaged before Chinese President Jiang Ze-min's visit to the US the following month - October 2002 - and Taiwan could have won further publicity from this.⁶⁶⁸

As President Chen Shui-bian noted, Wu's accomplishment in expanding Taiwan's international visibility had set an example for all Taiwanese women and disabled people in the fight for the country's diplomatic status. Chen said that although his wife could not stand on her own feet, she used a wheelchair to push Taiwan to Washington. Chen emphasized that both the first lady and Vice President Annette Lu had exercised Taiwan's "soft power" to deal with strong pressures from the PRC.⁶⁶⁹

Vice President Lu stated that Wu Shu-chen's courageous example had shown that other Taiwanese should have no reason to be pessimistic in pursuing Taiwan's diplomatic

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/1658774.stm>

⁶⁶⁸ Liu, Kuan-de. "Wu Creating Model for First Ladies in Taiwan." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 30th 2002, p. 1; Wang, James. "First Lady's Trip to the US a Success." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, September 30th 2002, p. 1; *BBC News*. "China Announces the Schedule of Jiang Ze-min's US Visit." October 16th 2002, p. 2. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/world/asia-pacific/news/newsid_2332000/23320252.stm

⁶⁶⁹ Lin, Chieh-yu. "Chen Praises Wife for US Trip Success." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, October 1st 2002, p. 1. On soft power, see Dellios, Rosita. *Chinese Strategic Culture – Part 2: Virtue and Power*. Research Paper No. 2, Center for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia, November 1994, pp. 13-14. Note that the alternation of yin-yang (soft-hard) within an overall "soft power" strategy has the potential to yield "hard" results (such as national independence or the dismantling of authoritarian rule) without the use of violence.

goals. In addition, Lu said that the first lady's efforts had demonstrated how Taiwanese women helped their husbands, particularly those who were democracy advocates, to carry out political reforms. In spite of the PRC's international restrictions towards Taiwan and her physical pain, Wu, on behalf of her husband, was determined to break Taiwan's diplomatic isolation. However, as the Vice President stressed, "wife diplomacy" should not be taken as a typical approach of diplomacy, the target was for the president to go wherever he liked, not as the PRC permitted.⁶⁷⁰

An issue which arose during Wu's visit was the name rectification from the Republic of China (ROC) to Taiwan since, to the unaware, the Republic of China (ROC) was frequently confused with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and it could also suggest the meaning of "one China". "Taiwan" is better known and more often used as a name; for example, members of the US Congress had all addressed Wu as "First Lady of Taiwan" in their speeches, and Wu had also called herself "First Lady of Taiwan". Even former President Chiang Ching-kuo had recognized the "Taiwan Relations Act", he had never asked the US to change it to the "ROC Relations Act".⁶⁷¹

Lee's educational and populist projects, 2003-2004

From the sponsoring of an academic institution to encouraging mass participation in his country's liberation from China's "historical determinism", Lee continued his mission

⁶⁷⁰ Wang, James, 2002, p. 1.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

of Taiwanization and democratization in the teeth of China's missile threat. This demonstrated the post-Lee Teng-hui era still found inspiration in Lee, whose efforts out of formal power permitted him greater freedom to promote Taiwan's independence.

On May 17th 2003, former President Lee Teng-hui attended the opening ceremony of the "National Policy Research Class" in the Lee Teng-hui School. In his speech, Chancellor Lee emphasized that the aim of this school was to promote democratization and localization, ensure national identity, construct Taiwanese consciousness, pursue the sustainable development of the country, and position itself as the "big camp" for the social elites to work together on the responsibility of *phah pian* (struggling) for Taiwan. As Lee pointed out, Taiwan had been ruled by foreign political regimes for a long period of time, received colonial education, and had not fully constructed its Taiwan political consciousness. After the lifting of martial law, while Taiwan had gradually built up the democratic political and social systems and its presidents had been elected directly by the people, the country's education and culture had still been under the shadow of the "Great China Consciousness". For instance, in the elementary, junior high, and high schools' curriculum, Mainland China's and other countries' histories, geographies, and cultures were well covered, while Taiwanese history, geography, and culture were barely addressed. For example, among the 22 units of curriculum, Taiwan was only given two units.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷² Huang, Wen-chong. "Lee Teng-hui: The Lee Teng-hui School is the Big Camp to *Phah Pian* (Struggle) for Taiwan." *Central News Agency*, Taipei, May 17th 2003, <http://tw.stock.yahoo.com/n/2003/05/17/c/384.html>; Lee, Hsing-yi. "Lee Teng-hui Took off His Mask to Talk Heart to Heart." *The New Taiwan*, Taipei, Vol. 374, May 22nd 2003, http://magazines.sina.com.tw/newtaiwan/contents/374/374-012_1.html

Thus, according to Lee, the emerging generations were well educated on foreign histories and cultures but their understanding of their own country's historical background, geographic environment, and cultural heritage was inadequate. Therefore, he had concerned himself with whether future generations could develop their Taiwanese consciousness and identify with their country.⁶⁷³

Lee Teng-hui linked this "work-in-progress" in identity formation with the deepening of democratic institutions and culture, saying that during his 12 years in office - although Taiwan had used the peaceful and rational way to push the commonly acclaimed "silent revolution" - it still had a long way to go to become a mature democratic society. To this end the Lee Teng-hui School was intended to integrate academics, experts, and those who cared about Taiwan's future development to carry out democratization and localization.⁶⁷⁴

In a two-way top-down, bottom-up strategy, Lee not only sought to prepare Taiwanese intellectually for their indigenization-democratization tasks, but also to ensure the energy of "people power" was tapped into. This was well served by the "228 hand-in-hand to protect Taiwan" rally, on the 56th anniversary of the "228 Incident". On February 28th 2004, more than one million people in Taiwan joined forces to form an island-long human chain or a "democratic great wall" to protest against China's

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁴ Lin, Ho-ming. "Lee Teng-hui said that He is a bit Regretful for Promoting the Silent Revolution." *United Daily News*, Taipei, May 18th 2003, p. 1; Lee, Hsing-fan. "The Lee Teng-hui School Works in all Aspects." *Liberty Times*, Taipei, June 16th 2003, p. 2; *Southern Express*, "Lee Teng-hui Revealed that He is a bit Regretful for Promoting the Silent Revolution." May 17th 2003, Taipei, http://home.kimo.com.tw/snews1965/News/200305/20030517_03.htm;

military threats.⁶⁷⁵ This human chain stretched 500 kilometers, extending from the north at Hoping Island near Keelung, through 18 cities and counties in western Taiwan, and ending at the island's southern tip -- Changlung in Chiatung township, Pingtung County.⁶⁷⁶ The characters for "Hoping" and "Changlung" mean peace and prosperity.

The participants of the human chain linked hands at 2:28 pm on the day and chanted slogans such as "Love Peace and Oppose Missiles."⁶⁷⁷ Participants hoped the display of "people power" would focus global attention on the Chinese threat of approximately 500 missiles targeting the nation.⁶⁷⁸ President Chen Shui-bian and former President Lee Teng-hui, the initiator of the rally, linked hands in Miaoli County as a symbol of their joint effort to promote Taiwan's independence. Lee said seeing more than one million people came out to show their love and affirmation of Taiwan's national identity and rejection of China's missile threats for Taiwan, was the most touching moment he had witnessed in his life. This was the power of the people, and the victory for the people of Taiwan.⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁵ Su, Joy. "Remembering 228: Taipei County Forms 22km-long Link in the Human Chain." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, Feb 29th, 2004, p. 3.

⁶⁷⁶ Chang, Yun-ping. "Two Million Rally for Peace." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, February 29th 2004, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁷ *CNN.com/WORLD* "Human Chain Protest Spans Taiwan." February 28th, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/28/taiwan.protest.reut/index.html>

⁶⁷⁸ *BBC News*, "Human Chain Protest in Taiwan." February 28th 2004, UK, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3495546.stm>; Chang, *ibid.*; Su, *ibid.*; CNN, *ibid.*

⁶⁷⁹ Wu, Debby. "Remembering 228: Families and Dogs Bring Festival Atmosphere to Taipei." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, February 29th 2004, p. 3.; Yu, Cuddy. "Remembering 228: Japanese Christians Joined Indonesians in Tainan County." *Taipei Times*. Taipei, February 29th 2004, p. 3.

Conclusion

Since May 2000, when the ruling party was changed for the first time in Taiwan, the new Chen Shui-bian administration had encountered numerous difficulties, which caused the country to experience its most serious economic downturn in the past 50 years.⁶⁸⁰ It was a situation which would normally have had dire electoral consequences for the ruling party; however, in the legislative elections held on December 1st 2001, Taiwanese voters made the Democratic Progressive Party the largest party in the Legislative Yuan.⁶⁸¹ According to a Taiwanese academic Wang Tu-fa, and political commentator Sun Ching-yu, this reflected voters' disappointment over the chaos created by opposition parties, which controlled the lawmaking mechanism and formed the alliance to obstruct the new government.⁶⁸² They had still to appreciate the meaning of a "loyal opposition" and the importance of institutionalizing democracy. The result of the legislative elections appeared to indicate that voters wished to give the Chen administration an opportunity of governing effectively in the remaining two-and-a-half years of office. Without opposition party blockages, the government could therefore exert itself in improving economic conditions, and thence promote stability and greater solidarity.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸⁰ Sun, Ching-yu. "Lien Chan Lacks Self-Examination." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 84; Wang, Tu-fa. "Seize the Opportunities to Lift the Economy." *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 82.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Wang, December 4th 2001, p. 82.

⁶⁸³ See Sun, December 4th 2001, p. 84; Wang, December 4th 2001, p. 82.

Most importantly, mainstream popular opinion had been heard in the legislative elections of 2001, with the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) together winning 100 seats, an increase of 35 seats, which was higher than the opinion polls predicted.⁶⁸⁴ This suggests that Taiwanese consciousness was still strong, and people once again used their ballots to say “No” to pro-unification parties. The KMT's perceived betrayal of localization, and the New Party advocacy of “one country, two systems” were held responsible for their decrease of 52 seats.⁶⁸⁵

The elections of Delegates of the Legislative Yuan, and Local Government Mayors and County Magistrates were all conducted on December 1st 2001. Yet the outcome of the legislative elections directly influenced each party's power, further reforms in the lawmaking mechanism, and Taiwan's second stage democratization. Consequently, its political meaning was more significant than the elections of Local Government Mayors and County Magistrates. For example, for a year-and-a-half, Beijing had regarded the Chen Shui-bian administration as a minority government, and had never taken it seriously. Rather, the PRC tried to make contact with the KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party, but refused to face the official authority of Taiwan.⁶⁸⁶

The DPP finally took up its governing position in the Legislative Yuan, and the New

⁶⁸⁴ Ruan, Ming. “The Song of Triumph of the Taiwan Spirit.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 92-93; Wu, Su-ming. “The Fulfillment and Victory of the Taiwan Value.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 84-85.

⁶⁸⁵ Ruan, December 4th 2001, pp. 92-93; Siao, Hsing-huang. “Taiwanese Voters' Sense and Sensibility.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 85; Wu, December 4th 2001, pp. 84-85.

⁶⁸⁶ Chai, Chang-po. “The Wisdom of a New Mandate of Popular Opinion.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, pp. 90-91; Chuang, Chi-ming. “The Closing of the Elections.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 90; Lee, Siao-fon. “Gutsy Taiwanese Finally Broke Through the Siege.” *Taiwan News*. Taipei, December 4th 2001, p. 91; Siao, December 4th 2001, p. 85.

Party promoting the pro-China policies suffered its greatest loss; thus, it became difficult for the PRC not to deal with the DPP government in the future. Moreover, through the performance of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, former President Lee Teng-hui's 12-year contribution to Taiwan's democratization and localization had been confirmed for a second time. Furthermore, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, Vice President Annett Lu, and First Lady Wu Shu-chen had used their "soft power" to create new diplomatic developments for the nation.

Ultimately, efforts in the post-Lee Teng-hui period to consolidate democracy and Taiwanese consciousness were played out in an era of increasing PRC economic power which gave "Great China Consciousness" new appeal, but which also threatened to unravel Lee's legacy. The tasks of consolidation of past successes as well as addressing emergent conditions were crucial at this time.

Conclusion

From 1949 to 1988, the authoritarian rule of the Chinese *Kuomintang* Party that fled to Taiwan from Mainland China had permeated government institutions, and controlled the military and security systems in Taiwan. Taiwan developed two divergent imperatives: one was for unifying with Mainland China; the other was to seek independence. Nonetheless, supporters of each imperative shared the same desire for democracy, as demonstrated by the pro-unification parties and politicians endorsing democracy. By the 2004 presidential campaign, the Taiwanization-democratization nexus was so strong that the Pan-Blue KMT-People First Party no longer supported

reunification, but instead promote closer ties with China, which had become Taiwan's largest export market and recipient of Taiwan investment. Moreover, the Chinese KMT engaged in debate during its *Strategy and Discourse Unit* meeting in 2004 on changing its name to remove the word "Chinese"; even the "Nationalist" part was considered a handicap to the party's future.⁶⁸⁷ While no consensus had been reached as yet to change the name, the party cited its own poll in which it found that approximately half of those surveyed regarded themselves as Taiwanese. Another 20 percent regarded themselves as "Taiwanese as well as Chinese", and about "70 percent of the public harbor Taiwan consciousness"; thus if the Chinese KMT wanted to be a ruling party once again, it could not neglect "the growing Taiwan consciousness".⁶⁸⁸ This trend toward independence end of the political spectrum and away from unification and Chinese-based identity, is significant and is encapsulated below.

Since the Chinese KMT was founded, it had always taken unification with Mainland China as the objective. It believed that if it could establish Taiwan as the model province of Dr Sun Yet-san's *Three Principles of the People*, which are nationalism, democracy, and people's welfare,⁶⁸⁹ and if it followed his doctrine of developing a genuinely democratic system, then it could defeat the Chinese Communist Party and recover Mainland China.⁶⁹⁰ From the political opposition's perspective, however, Taiwan has been separated from Mainland China since 1895. Its future should have

⁶⁸⁷ Huang, Tai-lin. "KMT Is Split on 'Chinese' in Its Name." *Taipei Times*. May 16th 2004.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ See Chang, Sidney H. & Leonard H.D. Gordon. *All Under Heaven...Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought*. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University California, 1991, pp. II-III.

⁶⁹⁰ See Hoyt, 1989, p. 32; Chao & Myers, 1998, pp.310-312.

nothing to do with the PRC. This view was reinforced by local people's experiences of the "228 Incident", the "white terror", and the generally oppressive rule of the Chinese KMT.

In order to defend the legal position of the political center and maintain the continuity of thousands of years Chinese history and civilization, Taiwan's Chinese leaders felt justified in the arrest and detention of political dissidents, whose exact numbers remain unknown. As Former Vice Secretary-General of the National Security Committee, Sima Wen-wu (Antonio Chun-nan Chiang) estimates, approximately 10,000 local people were sent to jails,⁶⁹¹ and the actual number could be much higher.⁶⁹²

In the early 1970s, a group of local KMT members, young intellectuals, and locally experienced politicians started criticizing the government. Despite arrests, the number of opposition voices continued to increase.⁶⁹³ Toward the end of that decade, increased urbanization and industrialization had elevated the average income of Taiwanese to US\$3,000 per year.⁶⁹⁴ Due to this comparative economic prosperity, the opposition groups began to accumulate funds for arranging lectures and discussions, and setting up magazines and publications. Thus an active civil society emerged in Taiwan and was assisted with the growth of a better-educated middle class. Greater numbers of opposition candidates were successful in the local elections, and even a few in the

⁶⁹¹ Chiang, Antonio Chun-nan. *Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China*. Lian-Jing, Taipei, 1996, p. 156.

⁶⁹² Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 312.

⁶⁹³ Ibid., pp. 312-313.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 313.

central elections.

Popular themes among local Taiwanese in the 1970s were Western liberalism, modern Confucian humanism, Dr Sun Yat-sen's doctrines, and the nationalism of Taiwan independence - a subject rarely raised in the 1950s. After encountering the various political advocacies, Chinese core values derived from Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism were regarded as important in the construction of Taiwanese democracy. In particular, the *Ta Tung* (great harmony) philosophy of Confucianism was still seen as relevant. However, this became modified by the democratic experience itself. The process of participating in the elections and striving for democracy in 1970s and 1980s, meant that the general public was for the first time able to comment on and analyze the performance of the political center. Gradually, more and more people came to view the existence of a political opposition as necessary, and hence they supported democratic reform.

If there were no ethical and capable political leaders, it would have been impossible for Taiwan to achieve its democratic breakthrough peacefully. A number of Chinese KMT members and opposition politicians demonstrated their leadership styles in advancing a tolerant but firm promotion of a bottom-up democratic process. The reputation and charisma of President Chiang Ching-kuo proved crucial in deflecting the power of the conservative faction within the Chinese KMT. In 1980, Chiang's blueprint for democratization was formed, and in February 1984 he chose a Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, to be his Vice President. Factional disputation meant that Chiang waited until at least 1986 before he launched the political reform process. The latter 1980s saw two key

developments: the lifting of martial law and the legalization the opposition DPP, thus exhibiting Chiang's determination to encourage democracy and solve the problem of divergent politics peacefully.

The opposition leaders also wished to work out conflicting views between themselves and the ruling party peacefully; therefore, they persuaded protestors to be law-abiding.⁶⁹⁵ Even though Chiang Ching-kuo died before the democratic breakthrough had become evident, it was impossible to retreat to the time when various electoral systems were used to disguise authoritarian rule.⁶⁹⁶ Lee Teng-hui, as Chiang's successor, created the conditions that were necessary for genuine democracy. President Lee's concept of democracy differed from Chiang's Confucian perspective on democracy with its more paternalistic emphasis. After Lee became Chairman of the Chinese KMT, he defeated the conservative factions within the party, and allowed a vigorous multi-party democracy to emerge in Taiwan. Still, Lee's lifelong commitment and sense of mission went beyond a Confucian worldview that was not entirely at odds with Taiwan's leadership needs during this transitional time.

During the period of rapid political reforms, many conservatives within the Chinese KMT retired, and the younger local politicians who replaced them supported President Lee Teng-hui's position and policies. There emerged, in Rustow's apt expression, a certain "Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats".⁶⁹⁷ In other words,

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 316.

⁶⁹⁶ Diamond, Larry. Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo., 1995, p. 8.

⁶⁹⁷ Rustow, Dankwart A. "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics*.

since the Chinese KMT conservative party members had retired or left, so Lee's power as party chairman had grown proportionately.

From December 1992 to the spring of 1996, an increasing number of opposition elites followed the rules to express their views, so the street protests decreased. Indeed, the 1992 Legislature Yuan election has been identified as a major turning point of democratization in Taiwan.⁶⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the number of Chinese KMT supporters dropped gradually. For example, in the legislative elections held in December 1996, the Chinese KMT won only by a narrow margin – a major change from having taken two-thirds of the seats at the second National Assembly elections in June 1991. Nonetheless, most government positions still belonged to the Chinese KMT, and its presidential candidate, Lee Teng-hui, also received 54 percent of the vote in March 1996.⁶⁹⁹

Between 1991 and 1996, the majority of the population did not support the Democratic Progressive Party. Although most did want the international status of the Republic of China to be improved, they worried that the DPP's support for Taiwan's independence might provide justification for the PRC's People's Liberation Army to attack the island. Since 1994, the people of Taiwan had absolute power to elect their governor, mayors, and county magistrates; the DPP's Chen Shui-bian, who won the post of Taipei Mayor was one example. This provided the impetus for the original Chinese KMT officials to

Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1970, p. 358.

⁶⁹⁸ See Lin, Tse-min. Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis." *World Politics*. Vol. 48, No. 4, July 1996, pp. 453-481.

⁶⁹⁹ Chao & Myers, 1998, p. 317.

perform better in order to compete with other parties.⁷⁰⁰

In the process of Taiwan's democratic development, it was found that during the period of the "inhibited political center", the *Waishengjen* and the opposition engaged in compromises, bargaining, and open debates before reaching a common awareness on the need for democracy. During the process of adjustment, some *Waishengjen* political elites had not supported democratization. Had the political leaders not used mediation skills, Taiwan's democracy might have faltered halfway. Eventually, the political elites both inside and outside of the political center agreed that democracy was the only and the best method to solve the problems of Taiwan's national identity, and divisions among ethnic groups.

This thesis has investigated the cultural elements in Taiwan's democratization during the Lee Teng-hui era. In doing so, the aim was to emphasize the former president's era, rather than him specifically – though undoubtedly he was a major influence shaping it. It was an era in which identity on the island shifted from a dominant "Chinese" ascription to a consciousness of being "Taiwanese". In reflecting upon this subtle but profound cultural shift, which may be located in the Lee Teng-hui era of democratization, this thesis has addressed an issue not investigated before in the literature in this manner. First, former President Chiang Ching-kuo's decision to appoint a local Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, instead of appointing his own son or a *Waishengjen* as his successor, foreshadowed the emergence of democratization. The

⁷⁰⁰ Diamond, Larry. "Is the Third Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1996, pp. 20-37; Huntington, Samuel P. "Democracy for the Long Haul," Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," all in *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 3-51.

second step was Lee Teng-hui's efforts to localize the Chinese KMT. This allowed more Taiwanese to participate in politics rather than it being monopolized by the *Waishengjen*. Third, after experiencing foreign rule for a protracted period of time, plus the diplomatic blockages and military threats from the People's Republic of China, people in Taiwan hardened their resolve to become masters in their own land, and democracy was seen as the best way to reach their common goal. Next, Taiwan's "ocean culture" with its characteristic of tolerance enabled the different ethnic groups (Aborigines, Hakka, *Waishengjen*, and Holo) to identify, by consensus, as "New Taiwanese" – as encouraged by Lee Teng-hui - and to *phah pian* (struggle) together for the island. Finally, Lee's efforts in continuously promoting the Taiwan spirit further awakened people's Taiwanese consciousness and rooted the Taiwan identity "in their hearts", to use a popular Lee expression.

While democracy was still being consolidated in Taiwan after the Lee Teng-hui era, it was his era from 1988 to 2000 which developed a clearly discernible democratic culture with Taiwanese characteristics. In doing so, it was equally the case that national awakening and reconciliation were achieved through the medium of democratization. It may be concluded that the Lee Teng-hui era fused national identity with democracy to produce a powerful force for assuring Taiwan's survival within the diplomatic constraints of the prevailing international system. National survival in itself provides a powerful impetus for the forging of a national character or national presence that is in contradistinction to the perceived "enemy" externally (the PRC) and internally (the Chinese KMT). This becomes apparent in the examination conducted by this thesis of the cultural elements – those historical, political and societal issues of identity that

come together to form a sense of nation separate from that of China – in Taiwan's democratization in the period 1988-2000. By democratizing, Taiwan demonstrated that it was “different” to China. Equally, the realization of Taiwanese identity depended on democratization.

This mutuality permitted the transition from an ideologically imposed Chinese identity designed to serve the Chinese KMT's policy of “retaking” the Mainland, to Taiwanese self-ascribed identity in the Lee Teng-hui era, veering toward independence. It is a transition that merits study at the level undertaken by this thesis for it represents Taiwan's assertion of psychological independence prior to possible *de jure* independence. Even if Taiwan does eventually unify with China, this measure of achieved independence cannot help but impact on the terms of unification to create a looser and more decentralized political system within “Greater China”. The foregoing examination of the cultural elements in Taiwan's democratization suggests that identity is strongly rooted in democracy, and vice-versa. Taiwan would prove difficult for China to digest. Its democratization represents a powerful cultural (that is, symbolic) resource with which to assert its sovereignty – be it to China or the international community. The journey from being considered Chinese to Taiwanese, authoritarian to democratic, took place in the Lee Teng-hui era and has conditioned Taiwan's future development as part of China – or not; as part of the nation-state system, or outside it. Whatever the outcome, Taiwan has demonstrated an ability to define itself without closing its options - thereby assuring its survival.

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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1297881.stm>

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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/1658774.stm>

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<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1656654.stm>

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